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personal connections with rival gangs, have factionalized the force to the point where its groups are prepared, on occasion, to engage in bloody combat with one another. Following a particularly spectacular battle in a residential suburb of Havana, a new commander of the police was appointed who, it was hoped, would put an end to the lawless activities of the police. The hoped-for reforms have not been accomplished, so that the police does not honestly perform its prescribed function of enforcing the laws of the Repubilc. Despite these faults, however, the national police would, in time of national emergency, make a definite contribution toward defending the Republic itself. C. The Navy. Cuba maintains a navy principally because it feels that one is necessary to its national prestige. The navy is seldom used for any practical purpose, and Cuba does not regard its presence as a necessary protection against naval attack by any of its neighbors. There are 41 vessels, including 7 gunboats, 13 modern submarine chasers, and 14 vessels acquired from the US during 1947 (3 PF's, frigates; 2 ATR's, ocean tugs, rescue; 5SC's, subchasers 110'; 2 PCE's, patrol vessel escort 183'; and 2 PT's, motor torpedo boats). The operating condition of all units - except those recently obtained from the US-is uniformly low, and most vessels spend months and even years anchored in one place. The terminated US Naval Mission (21 September 1946) accom- plished little during its tour of duty in Cuba. The mission was utilized principally by the Cuban Navy as a means of acquiring vessels and equipment during the war period, and when the submarine menace declined, the Cuban Navy resumed its accustomed indifference toward progress and improvement. The 3,755 naval personnel, under the command of a Commodore, the highest officer in the Cuban Navy, are subject to political influences similar to those that corrupt the police force. Though greatly inferior in numbers and importance to the army, the navy is not directly controlled by the army and at times pursues an independent course. Since the Cuban Navy does not serve any well-defined peacetime purpose and since its wartime role is indefinite, it would appear to be difficult to establish proper discipline and efficiency. Cooperation with the US forces on submarine patrol during World War II and anti-submarine training received at Miami by some of the personnel were excellent morale builders for which there is no corresponding peacetime activity. The Navy Air Arm, consisting of 19 planes and 144 men, is considered to be "largely inoperative" at the present time, and is inferior in every respect to the army air forces. 3. WAR POTENTIAL. a. Manpower. The present armed forces of Cuba constitute 1.5 percent of the total population. It is estimated that Cuba could mobilize 30,000 additional men within 180 days of the beginning of mobilization. An Emergency Military Serivce recruitment system is in effect for which all males register in the month of August following their twentieth 32

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "personal connections with rival gangs, have factionalized the force to the point where\nits groups are prepared, on occasion, to engage in bloody combat with one another.\nFollowing a particularly spectacular battle in a residential suburb of Havana,\na new commander of the police was appointed who, it was hoped, would put an end to\nthe lawless activities of the police. The hoped-for reforms have not been accomplished,\nso that the police does not honestly perform its prescribed function of enforcing the\nlaws of the Repubilc. Despite these faults, however, the national police would, in\ntime of national emergency, make a definite contribution toward defending the Republic\nitself.\nC.\nThe Navy.\nCuba maintains a navy principally because it feels that one is necessary to its\nnational prestige. The navy is seldom used for any practical purpose, and Cuba does\nnot regard its presence as a necessary protection against naval attack by any of its\nneighbors. There are 41 vessels, including 7 gunboats, 13 modern submarine chasers,\nand 14 vessels acquired from the US during 1947 (3 PF's, frigates; 2 ATR's, ocean tugs,\nrescue; 5SC's, subchasers 110'; 2 PCE's, patrol vessel escort 183'; and 2 PT's, motor\ntorpedo boats). The operating condition of all units - except those recently obtained\nfrom the US-is uniformly low, and most vessels spend months and even years\nanchored in one place. The terminated US Naval Mission (21 September 1946) accom-\nplished little during its tour of duty in Cuba. The mission was utilized principally by\nthe Cuban Navy as a means of acquiring vessels and equipment during the war period,\nand when the submarine menace declined, the Cuban Navy resumed its accustomed\nindifference toward progress and improvement. The 3,755 naval personnel, under the\ncommand of a Commodore, the highest officer in the Cuban Navy, are subject to political\ninfluences similar to those that corrupt the police force. Though greatly inferior\nin\nnumbers and importance to the army, the navy is not directly controlled by the army\nand at times pursues an independent course. Since the Cuban Navy does not serve any\nwell-defined peacetime purpose and since its wartime role is indefinite, it would appear\nto be difficult to establish proper discipline and efficiency. Cooperation with the US\nforces on submarine patrol during World War II and anti-submarine training received\nat Miami by some of the personnel were excellent morale builders for which there is\nno corresponding peacetime activity.\nThe Navy Air Arm, consisting of 19 planes and 144 men, is considered to be\n\"largely inoperative\" at the present time, and is inferior in every respect to the army\nair forces.\n3. WAR POTENTIAL.\na. Manpower.\nThe present armed forces of Cuba constitute 1.5 percent of the total population.\nIt is estimated that Cuba could mobilize 30,000 additional men within 180 days of the\nbeginning of mobilization. An Emergency Military Serivce recruitment system is in\neffect for which all males register in the month of August following their twentieth\n32"
}