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    "localId": "486500592",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
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    "id": "486500592",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1948-12-23",
            "month": 12,
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{
    "seq": 42,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-042.tif",
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    "ocrText": "CHAPTER VI\nSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nBecause of the role of Cuba in the defense of the Panama Canal, in the protection\nand patrol of US lines of communication, and as a source of strategic materials, Cuba\nand thus Cuban foreign policy are of importance to the US.\nIn general, Cuba's constitutional democratic system of government, its Western\ncultural orientation, and its well-defined political and economic ties to the US render\nvery unlikely any Cuban political development unfavorable to US security.\nSpecifically, there are, however, two elements at work in the political life of Cuba\nthat could conceivably impede the ability of the US to meet its strategic requirements\nby (a) making of Cuba a base of operations for Communist groups which the Cuban\ngovernment could not control, and (b) causing Cuba to deny in a period preparatory to\nconflict between the US and the USSR, air bases and expanded naval facilities deemed\nnecessary by the US. These two elements are the Popular Socialist Party and anti-US\nnationalists. In this connection, the relevant problems are whether either of them,\nacting independently or together, could (a) lessen the Cuban government's degree of\ncooperation with the US and impede its capacity to associate with it, in support of the\nUS, a substantial majority of the Cuban people, and (b) reduce Cuba's ability to main-\ntain public order.\nThe Popular Socialist Party / the Communist Party of Cuba - is inimical to US\nstrategic interests in the area. Although, at present, it does not have sufficient strength\nat the polls to capture control of any branch of the government, Cuba's republican form\nof government and multi-party system, in combination with Cuban traditions of purely\nfortuitous and expedient political alliances and \"deals\" are such as to afford the Com-\nmunist Party an opportunity to influence Cuban policy to a degree beyond that which\nits numbers or its popularity at the polls might warrant. Furthermore, much of the\nCommunist propaganda in Cuba is presented in terms of nationalism and consistently\nattributes Cuba's misfortunes to its subservience to US commercial and political in-\nterests. The appeal of propaganda of this nature is not confined to those in Cuba who\nare communistically inclined, but also to the anti-US nationalists who, no matter how\nstrongly they may reject the philosophy of economic determinism and the class struggle,\nfind, on individual issues at least, that they are on common ground with the anti-US\nCommunists. For this reason there is, in Cuba, always the peacetime possibility of the\ncombination of these two political forces for reasons of expediency. The existence of\nsuch a possibility thus enhances the Communists' opportunity to lessen US-Cuban\ncooperation and Cuba's support of US foreign policy. Accordingly, a substantial in-\ncrease in the number of adherents of the Communist Party, even if less than that neces-\nsary to afford the party a majority at the polls, could jeopardize US interests by imped-\ning the ability of the Cuban government to associate with it, in support of the US, a\nmajority of the people.\n35\nSECRET"
}