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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, France, Situation Report 30",
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    "seq": 21,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "16\nECRET\nthe Conseil d'Etat, at the head. In addition,\nIn denying Cabinet responsibility to the Coun-\na number of special courts were created under\ncil of the Republic, the present Constitution\nthe Provisional Government to carry out a\nattempts to block any evolution of the Coun-\npurge of collaborationists. The Napoleonic\ncil of the Republic into a superbody, such as\nCode, with modifications and amendments, is\nthe Third Republic's Senate, which could and\nthe basic law.\ndid arrogate to itself the right to overthrow\ncabinets.\n5. The Government in Practice.\nThe present composition of the Council of\nActual executive authority does not reside\nthe Republic by political groups as of 7 August\n1949 is as follows:\nin the President, who is still largely decorative.\nAs in the tradition of the Third Republic, the\nCommunists and affiliates\n20\nPresident is the Chief of State and the Premier\nSocialists\n62\nis the Chief of Government. However, depend-\nRGR\n85\ning upon his powers of persuasion, the Presi-\nMRP\n21\ndent can exercise a certain indirect influence\nIndependent Republicans\n41\nupon domestic and foreign policy. Real execu-\nRural Action\n15\ntive power resides with the President of the\nPRL\n12\nCouncil of Ministers.\nADR (Gaullist)\n58\nUnaffiliated\n5\na. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet).\nTotal\n319\nThe selection of the President of the Coun-\ncil (Premier) is actually the joint work of the\nThe Assembly's right to overthrow govern-\nRepublic's President and the Assembly. After\nments is subjected to certain rules designed to\nbeing named by the President, but prior to\nlimit the number of ministerial crises. A mo-\nselecting his Cabinet Ministers, the Premier\ntion of censure (necessitating the resignation\nappears before the Assembly to secure a vote\nof the Cabinet) may be introduced at any time,\nof approval for his plans and programs by an\nbut a cooling-off period of one full day must\nabsolute majority of the Assembly's member-\nelapse before the Assembly votes. Likewise,\nship. This executive-legislative relationship\nthe Cabinet, or Premier, may decide to demand\nincreases the Assembly's direct control over\na vote of confidence on a specific point of poli-\nthe selection of a Premier, since the Assembly\ncy, and again one full day must elapse before\nwould find it easier to overthrow one man than\nthe vote occurs. In either case, an absolute\nto overthrow a politically formed Cabinet. In\nmajority of the Assembly's total membership\npractice, however, a premier designate can cir-\nis required to bring about the fall of a govern-\ncumvent this rule by tentatively naming his\nment.\nCabinet Ministers in advance, thus determin-\nDissolution of the Assembly may be resorted\ning the number of votes per party he is apt\nto by the Cabinet, but only within certain\nto receive before he asks parliamentary ap-\nlimits. The power cannot be utilized at all\nproval of himself as Premier. An escape clause\nduring the first eighteen months after an As-\nprovides that a Premier can be legally ap-\nsembly has been elected. After that time it\npointed by the President without the As-\ncannot be used unless two governments have\nsembly's investiture if force majeure-extreme\nfallen within a consecutive period of eighteen\nconditions-prevent the Assembly from con-\nmonths. In addition, any ministerial crisis OC-\nvening. This would provide a legal basis for\ncurring within two weeks after the formation\na government-in-exile during a future war.\nof a new cabinet cannot be counted in adding\nup crises to invoke the dissolution procedures.\nb. Relationships between Cabinet and Par-\nWith this complex machinery, dissolution of\nliament.\nthe Assembly is likely to be extremely rare.\nThe Cabinet is collectively responsible to the\nLeft-wing parties incorporated this procedure\nAssembly, and the various ministers are indi-\ninto the Constitution to prevent the use of dis-\nvidually responsible for their personal acts.\nsolution as an executive weapon over the legis-\nECRE"
}