Ask the Scholar

Page 48 of 88
I can add historical knowledge about this page.

Page image

Page 48

OCR

44 SECRET ever, that France might emerge again as a verses suffered there by both France and the great power. Their belief was based on the UK at the hands of the Nazis. Moscow was nation's geographical position, its highly kept informed of the negotiations as they pro- trained and intelligent technicians, and its gressed and the French Communists gave their economic organization and resources. support in the knowledge that similar agree- After the Liberation, France's foreign rela- ments would be offered to the Kremlin and to tions were conditioned by its economic neces- the satellite states of Poland and Czechoslo- sities, its policy towards Germany, and by the vakia, as well as to Belgium and the Nether- US-USSR polarization of world power. These lands. considerations have caused French foreign The four basic points of the Dunkerque alli- policy to be directed toward a course progres- ance are as follows: (1) The two countries sively favorable to US security interests. The agree to take such common measures as are alliances and agreements in which the French necessary should Germany adopt a policy of Government has participated with its Western aggression or take any initiative that may European neighbors and the US during the threaten the security of either nation. (2) If past two years have gradually strengthened either nation is again at war with Germany France's international position, have brought each will immediately furnish military aid the country a promise of security, and have in- whether or not the hostilities are the result of creased its strategic value to the US. Other German action, common UK-French action aspects of the nation's affairs, however, such against Germany, or orders promulgated by as its unfavorable foreign trade position, cer- the UN Security Council. (3) Both nations tain phases of its German policies, and the agree to consult if Germany fails to fulfill rapid change of governments, continue to be obligations of an economic nature imposed by important weaknesses in France's interna- proper authority. (4) Both nations will con- tional economic and political position. sult regarding all economic questions of mu- tual interest. 2. Relations With the UK. Developments throughout 1948 showed a Concurrent with its policy of seeking secu- recognition in the UK and in France of the rity from the Western Hemisphere have been mutual dependence of the two nations. This, France's efforts to strengthen its position in however, did not prevent the French from de- Western Europe. The signing of the Dun- valuating their currency unilaterally, and at kerque Treaty with Great Britain on 1 March some cost to the UK, despite the Bretton Woods 1947 was the first major step in this direction. Agreement. In midsummer, however, the The protestations of Mr. Bevin in Parliament British made a substantial loan to France to and M. Bidault in the National Assembly that be used for trading in the Sterling Area. More the projected fifty-year military alliance was recently, the British extended substantial not designed as an anti-Soviet measure leading drawing rights to France under the ECA Pro- to the formation of a Western European demo- gram. Despite adverse foreign trade develop- cratic bloc are noteworthy in the light of sub- ments the UK is expected to extend such assist- sequent events. ance to France again during 1949-50. Rela- The pact was drawn in respect to Articles 52 tions have also been improved by the UK policy through 54 of the United Nations Charter. of supporting the French position in North These Articles permit "enforcement actions" Africa. by nations directly concerned without their being required to seek authorization of the 3. Relations With Benelux. Security Council, provided such actions are While closely tied to the Benelux nations by directed against former enemy states. The geographic and cultural relationships, France agreement was therefore primarily directed until recently has been somewhat in the po- against Germany and this was emphasized by sition of a poor relative. These countries, with the fact that the instrument was signed at considerable justification, were rendered un- Dunkerque, made famous by the military re- easy by France's continuing economic insta- ECRET

Page data

Page
48
Source index
0
Type
photo
Media ID
d91ec66c98f1d8bf
Size
unknown

Document data

ID
486500649
Core
doc
Type
document
DTO data
{
    "id": "486500649",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500649",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, France, Situation Report 30",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500649",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 88,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

Context sent to Scholar

Document identity
{
    "localId": "486500649",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, France, Situation Report 30",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500649"
}
Document source metadata
{
    "id": "486500649",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500649",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, France, Situation Report 30",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500649",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 88,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500649",
    "naId": 486500649,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 17,
            "logicalDate": "1950-03-17",
            "month": 3,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
    "seq": 48,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875512/875512-01-048.tif",
    "mediaId": "d91ec66c98f1d8bf",
    "ocrText": "44\nSECRET\never, that France might emerge again as a\nverses suffered there by both France and the\ngreat power. Their belief was based on the\nUK at the hands of the Nazis. Moscow was\nnation's geographical position, its highly\nkept informed of the negotiations as they pro-\ntrained and intelligent technicians, and its\ngressed and the French Communists gave their\neconomic organization and resources.\nsupport in the knowledge that similar agree-\nAfter the Liberation, France's foreign rela-\nments would be offered to the Kremlin and to\ntions were conditioned by its economic neces-\nthe satellite states of Poland and Czechoslo-\nsities, its policy towards Germany, and by the\nvakia, as well as to Belgium and the Nether-\nUS-USSR polarization of world power. These\nlands.\nconsiderations have caused French foreign\nThe four basic points of the Dunkerque alli-\npolicy to be directed toward a course progres-\nance are as follows: (1) The two countries\nsively favorable to US security interests. The\nagree to take such common measures as are\nalliances and agreements in which the French\nnecessary should Germany adopt a policy of\nGovernment has participated with its Western\naggression or take any initiative that may\nEuropean neighbors and the US during the\nthreaten the security of either nation. (2) If\npast two years have gradually strengthened\neither nation is again at war with Germany\nFrance's international position, have brought\neach will immediately furnish military aid\nthe country a promise of security, and have in-\nwhether or not the hostilities are the result of\ncreased its strategic value to the US. Other\nGerman action, common UK-French action\naspects of the nation's affairs, however, such\nagainst Germany, or orders promulgated by\nas its unfavorable foreign trade position, cer-\nthe UN Security Council. (3) Both nations\ntain phases of its German policies, and the\nagree to consult if Germany fails to fulfill\nrapid change of governments, continue to be\nobligations of an economic nature imposed by\nimportant weaknesses in France's interna-\nproper authority. (4) Both nations will con-\ntional economic and political position.\nsult regarding all economic questions of mu-\ntual interest.\n2. Relations With the UK.\nDevelopments throughout 1948 showed a\nConcurrent with its policy of seeking secu-\nrecognition in the UK and in France of the\nrity from the Western Hemisphere have been\nmutual dependence of the two nations. This,\nFrance's efforts to strengthen its position in\nhowever, did not prevent the French from de-\nWestern Europe. The signing of the Dun-\nvaluating their currency unilaterally, and at\nkerque Treaty with Great Britain on 1 March\nsome cost to the UK, despite the Bretton Woods\n1947 was the first major step in this direction.\nAgreement. In midsummer, however, the\nThe protestations of Mr. Bevin in Parliament\nBritish made a substantial loan to France to\nand M. Bidault in the National Assembly that\nbe used for trading in the Sterling Area. More\nthe projected fifty-year military alliance was\nrecently, the British extended substantial\nnot designed as an anti-Soviet measure leading\ndrawing rights to France under the ECA Pro-\nto the formation of a Western European demo-\ngram. Despite adverse foreign trade develop-\ncratic bloc are noteworthy in the light of sub-\nments the UK is expected to extend such assist-\nsequent events.\nance to France again during 1949-50. Rela-\nThe pact was drawn in respect to Articles 52\ntions have also been improved by the UK policy\nthrough 54 of the United Nations Charter.\nof supporting the French position in North\nThese Articles permit \"enforcement actions\"\nAfrica.\nby nations directly concerned without their\nbeing required to seek authorization of the\n3. Relations With Benelux.\nSecurity Council, provided such actions are\nWhile closely tied to the Benelux nations by\ndirected against former enemy states. The\ngeographic and cultural relationships, France\nagreement was therefore primarily directed\nuntil recently has been somewhat in the po-\nagainst Germany and this was emphasized by\nsition of a poor relative. These countries, with\nthe fact that the instrument was signed at\nconsiderable justification, were rendered un-\nDunkerque, made famous by the military re-\neasy by France's continuing economic insta-\nECRET"
}