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45
bility, and were unwilling to enter into eco-
party so attacked all military and other aid
nomic agreements or commitments which
and assistance in their power."
might jeopardize their own delicately balanced
On 18 March 1948, "high military circles"
economies. Other factors which adversely
announced in Paris that exploratory staff con-
complicated Franco-Benelux relations were
ferences were about to begin. During these
Benelux fears of large-scale Communist ac-
early discussions some tension arose over stra-
tivities in France and of possible French domi-
tegic planning and over such issues as the
nation of Western European affairs. Despite
matter of the command structure of the pro-
these initial doubts regarding political ties
posed armed forces of the Western Union. Diff-
with France, Benelux awareness of the inevi-
erences still exist between British and French
table and far-reaching effect of French events
concepts, primarily concerning the location
on the rest of Western Europe caused these
of strategic lines of defense in Western Europe
countries, eventually, to desire the establish-
in addition to functions and contributions of
ment of Western Union with the inclusion of
each power in terms of naval, air, and land
France. As the situation in France, both eco-
defense, and armaments.
nomically and politically, has become more
stable, there has been a substantial improve-
5. Relations With Italy.
ment in Franco-Benelux relations.
France's relations with Italy have been
largely determined by French realization that
4. Western Union.
closer cooperation would offer greater eco-
nomic and geographical security, not only to
The failure of the London Conference of
France, but to Western Europe. A French pol-
Foreign Ministers in December 1947 and the
icy of rapprochement first expressed itself in
formation of the Cominform in October 1947,
efforts to overcome the diplomatic difficulties
with its declaration of war against the Mar-
involved in the disposition of the towns of
shall Plan, were two factors which influenced
Tenda and Briga, given to France under the
Britain to initiate the forming of a Western
peace treaty of 1946, and questions involving
Union. The purpose of Western Union was
the Italian Navy.
primarily to strengthen military security in
M. Bidault and Count Sforza announced in
Europe, but it includes also provisions for eco-
Turin on 20 March 1948 that they had signed
nomic and social collaboration as a concession
a protocol which bound their respective gov-
to the Benelux countries. These purposes
ernments to proceed to the formation of a
were embodied in the Brussels Pact of 17
customs union. A commercial treaty was
March 1948.
signed at the same time which aimed at in-
Although affirming the traditional demo-
creasing Franco-Italian trade. In his remarks
cratic ideals as set forth in the Charter of the
on this occasion M. Bidault expressed his gov-
UN, the Brussels Pact differs in its security
ernment's belief that Trieste should be re-
provisions from that of Dunkerque in that it
turned to Italian sovereignty and that France
offers a guarantee of assistance against ag-
hoped to give Italy "the greatest possible de-
gression in Europe by any power, rather than
gree of satisfaction" on the matter of the
against German aggression only. It provides
Italian colonies. In 1948 France renounced
that the participating countries shall "afford
a major part of its claim to naval reparations.
assistance to each other, in accordance with
In March 1949 the Franco-Italian customs
the Charter of the UN, in maintaining inter-
union agreement was signed by Schuman and
national peace and security and in resisting
Sforza. Franco-Italian relations have been
any policy of aggression." More specific ap-
further greatly improved by France's success-
plication of this doctrine is found in Article 4
ful efforts to obtain the inclusion of Italy in
which says: "If any of the high contracting
the Atlantic Pact.
parties should be the object of an armed attack
in Europe, the other high contracting parties
6. Germany.
will, in accordance with the provisions of Ar-
The primary aim of French policy toward
ticle 51 of the Charter of the UN, afford the
Germany since 1944 has been to prevent a re-
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n45\nbility, and were unwilling to enter into eco-\nparty so attacked all military and other aid\nnomic agreements or commitments which\nand assistance in their power.\"\nmight jeopardize their own delicately balanced\nOn 18 March 1948, \"high military circles\"\neconomies. Other factors which adversely\nannounced in Paris that exploratory staff con-\ncomplicated Franco-Benelux relations were\nferences were about to begin. During these\nBenelux fears of large-scale Communist ac-\nearly discussions some tension arose over stra-\ntivities in France and of possible French domi-\ntegic planning and over such issues as the\nnation of Western European affairs. Despite\nmatter of the command structure of the pro-\nthese initial doubts regarding political ties\nposed armed forces of the Western Union. Diff-\nwith France, Benelux awareness of the inevi-\nerences still exist between British and French\ntable and far-reaching effect of French events\nconcepts, primarily concerning the location\non the rest of Western Europe caused these\nof strategic lines of defense in Western Europe\ncountries, eventually, to desire the establish-\nin addition to functions and contributions of\nment of Western Union with the inclusion of\neach power in terms of naval, air, and land\nFrance. As the situation in France, both eco-\ndefense, and armaments.\nnomically and politically, has become more\nstable, there has been a substantial improve-\n5. Relations With Italy.\nment in Franco-Benelux relations.\nFrance's relations with Italy have been\nlargely determined by French realization that\n4. Western Union.\ncloser cooperation would offer greater eco-\nnomic and geographical security, not only to\nThe failure of the London Conference of\nFrance, but to Western Europe. A French pol-\nForeign Ministers in December 1947 and the\nicy of rapprochement first expressed itself in\nformation of the Cominform in October 1947,\nefforts to overcome the diplomatic difficulties\nwith its declaration of war against the Mar-\ninvolved in the disposition of the towns of\nshall Plan, were two factors which influenced\nTenda and Briga, given to France under the\nBritain to initiate the forming of a Western\npeace treaty of 1946, and questions involving\nUnion. The purpose of Western Union was\nthe Italian Navy.\nprimarily to strengthen military security in\nM. Bidault and Count Sforza announced in\nEurope, but it includes also provisions for eco-\nTurin on 20 March 1948 that they had signed\nnomic and social collaboration as a concession\na protocol which bound their respective gov-\nto the Benelux countries. These purposes\nernments to proceed to the formation of a\nwere embodied in the Brussels Pact of 17\ncustoms union. A commercial treaty was\nMarch 1948.\nsigned at the same time which aimed at in-\nAlthough affirming the traditional demo-\ncreasing Franco-Italian trade. In his remarks\ncratic ideals as set forth in the Charter of the\non this occasion M. Bidault expressed his gov-\nUN, the Brussels Pact differs in its security\nernment's belief that Trieste should be re-\nprovisions from that of Dunkerque in that it\nturned to Italian sovereignty and that France\noffers a guarantee of assistance against ag-\nhoped to give Italy \"the greatest possible de-\ngression in Europe by any power, rather than\ngree of satisfaction\" on the matter of the\nagainst German aggression only. It provides\nItalian colonies. In 1948 France renounced\nthat the participating countries shall \"afford\na major part of its claim to naval reparations.\nassistance to each other, in accordance with\nIn March 1949 the Franco-Italian customs\nthe Charter of the UN, in maintaining inter-\nunion agreement was signed by Schuman and\nnational peace and security and in resisting\nSforza. Franco-Italian relations have been\nany policy of aggression.\" More specific ap-\nfurther greatly improved by France's success-\nplication of this doctrine is found in Article 4\nful efforts to obtain the inclusion of Italy in\nwhich says: \"If any of the high contracting\nthe Atlantic Pact.\nparties should be the object of an armed attack\nin Europe, the other high contracting parties\n6. Germany.\nwill, in accordance with the provisions of Ar-\nThe primary aim of French policy toward\nticle 51 of the Charter of the UN, afford the\nGermany since 1944 has been to prevent a re-\nSECRET"
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