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people against the rewritten constitution
son in his desire to change the constitution.
which was finally adopted (October 1946).
Following the Strasbourg speeches (6-7 April
This constitution did create a two-body parlia-
1947) which presented no definite political
ment, but with superior powers granted the
program (except the oft-repeated calls for re-
National Assembly, and gave the President
vision of the constitution and creation of a
slightly more prestige. He was unsuccessful
strong chief executive), De Gaulle followers
in asking the electorate to name legislators
announced the formation of the Rassemble-
favoring revision to his ideas (Oct.-Nov. 1946).
ment du Peuple Francais, which was to be or-
De Gaulle is apparently convinced that
ganized by regional and departmental com-
France must choose openly in supporting or
mittees. The "Rally" allegedly was not an-
opposing Communism. He feels that the
other party but would work through existing
multi-party system will continue to encounter
parties. Reaction was immediate; Commu-
crisis after crisis until the people's patience is
nists and Socialists united in charging that
exhausted and he is called to head the state.
De Gaulle was launching a campaign to de-
He seeks a constitution giving the president
stroy parliamentary democracy and gain per-
strong executive powers to install successive
sonal power, while conservatives and rightists
governments, to dissolve the elected Assembly
gave their support to the new movement.1
whenever the absence of an adequate major-
Although his supporters have hoped for US
ity makes it impossible to work effectively, and
aid for his return to power, De Gaulle was not
to have real arbitrating powers above the par-
characterized by a sympathetic attitude to-
ties.1
ward the US during the war. At that time he
De Gaulle skillfully blends his prestige as
accused the Allies of seeking a "seizure of
war leader with his political activities. He is
power" in France, a charge much like that
considered by his followers as a national mes-
which the Communists bring against the US
siah who alone can guarantee the salvation of
today. The pact which he signed with Mos-
France, and by his opponents as a petulant,
cow was motivated largely by his desire to
conciliate the French Communists, but also
vain cock-of-the-walk, desiring personal glory
and dictatorship. Rightist extremists have
to gain a diplomatic trump against Washing-
attached themselves to De Gaulle, hoping his
ton. Speaking in Bar-le-Duc in July 1946, De
Gaulle took the neutral attitude toward the
personal popularity may swing their program
into actuality. He is the target of bitter Com-
US and the Soviet Union, stating that both
munist Party attacks, and on 1 April 1947
were expanding nations whose "unfolding of
power" was "draped in the mantle of doc-
Leon Blum pointed up the break between the
trines." Since then he has decided that the
Socialists and De Gaulle, stating: "From now
on the fight is in the open." De Gaulle is be-
menace of Communism is greater for France
than the menace of the US, as he once consid-
lieved to realize that neither the US nor Eng-
ered it and as the Communists now consider
land has sympathy for him personally, but he
also realizes that if he were able to make
it. At the same time he acquired an admira-
tion for the US Constitution, which he believed
France a satellite of these powers they could
forget personal animosities engendered in the
insured a strong Executive, who stood above,
past. Knowing that the French multi-party
or could free himself from partisanship.
system is objectionable and difficult to under-
Described as the "riddle" or "unknown
stand in the US and England-where French
quantity" of French politics, De Gaulle is
democracy is synonomous with instability-
strongly nationalistic even to the point of
De Gaulle takes advantage of this state of
chauvinism. Intelligent, deliberate, calculat-
mind to make the two powers believe he is the
ing, and something of a mystic, he is able to
only man who can rise above political groups
arouse intense hatred or adulation. A com-
and stabilize France by having greater powers
manding military figure, he has a formal, aus-
conferred on its president, hence another rea-
1 Dept. of State, BI Rpt., 10 March 1947 (Secret)
1 Dept. of State, BI Rpt., 10 March 1947 (Secret)
New York Times, 21 October 1947
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n69\npeople against the rewritten constitution\nson in his desire to change the constitution.\nwhich was finally adopted (October 1946).\nFollowing the Strasbourg speeches (6-7 April\nThis constitution did create a two-body parlia-\n1947) which presented no definite political\nment, but with superior powers granted the\nprogram (except the oft-repeated calls for re-\nNational Assembly, and gave the President\nvision of the constitution and creation of a\nslightly more prestige. He was unsuccessful\nstrong chief executive), De Gaulle followers\nin asking the electorate to name legislators\nannounced the formation of the Rassemble-\nfavoring revision to his ideas (Oct.-Nov. 1946).\nment du Peuple Francais, which was to be or-\nDe Gaulle is apparently convinced that\nganized by regional and departmental com-\nFrance must choose openly in supporting or\nmittees. The \"Rally\" allegedly was not an-\nopposing Communism. He feels that the\nother party but would work through existing\nmulti-party system will continue to encounter\nparties. Reaction was immediate; Commu-\ncrisis after crisis until the people's patience is\nnists and Socialists united in charging that\nexhausted and he is called to head the state.\nDe Gaulle was launching a campaign to de-\nHe seeks a constitution giving the president\nstroy parliamentary democracy and gain per-\nstrong executive powers to install successive\nsonal power, while conservatives and rightists\ngovernments, to dissolve the elected Assembly\ngave their support to the new movement.1\nwhenever the absence of an adequate major-\nAlthough his supporters have hoped for US\nity makes it impossible to work effectively, and\naid for his return to power, De Gaulle was not\nto have real arbitrating powers above the par-\ncharacterized by a sympathetic attitude to-\nties.1\nward the US during the war. At that time he\nDe Gaulle skillfully blends his prestige as\naccused the Allies of seeking a \"seizure of\nwar leader with his political activities. He is\npower\" in France, a charge much like that\nconsidered by his followers as a national mes-\nwhich the Communists bring against the US\nsiah who alone can guarantee the salvation of\ntoday. The pact which he signed with Mos-\nFrance, and by his opponents as a petulant,\ncow was motivated largely by his desire to\nconciliate the French Communists, but also\nvain cock-of-the-walk, desiring personal glory\nand dictatorship. Rightist extremists have\nto gain a diplomatic trump against Washing-\nattached themselves to De Gaulle, hoping his\nton. Speaking in Bar-le-Duc in July 1946, De\nGaulle took the neutral attitude toward the\npersonal popularity may swing their program\ninto actuality. He is the target of bitter Com-\nUS and the Soviet Union, stating that both\nmunist Party attacks, and on 1 April 1947\nwere expanding nations whose \"unfolding of\npower\" was \"draped in the mantle of doc-\nLeon Blum pointed up the break between the\ntrines.\" Since then he has decided that the\nSocialists and De Gaulle, stating: \"From now\non the fight is in the open.\" De Gaulle is be-\nmenace of Communism is greater for France\nthan the menace of the US, as he once consid-\nlieved to realize that neither the US nor Eng-\nered it and as the Communists now consider\nland has sympathy for him personally, but he\nalso realizes that if he were able to make\nit. At the same time he acquired an admira-\ntion for the US Constitution, which he believed\nFrance a satellite of these powers they could\nforget personal animosities engendered in the\ninsured a strong Executive, who stood above,\npast. Knowing that the French multi-party\nor could free himself from partisanship.\nsystem is objectionable and difficult to under-\nDescribed as the \"riddle\" or \"unknown\nstand in the US and England-where French\nquantity\" of French politics, De Gaulle is\ndemocracy is synonomous with instability-\nstrongly nationalistic even to the point of\nDe Gaulle takes advantage of this state of\nchauvinism. Intelligent, deliberate, calculat-\nmind to make the two powers believe he is the\ning, and something of a mystic, he is able to\nonly man who can rise above political groups\narouse intense hatred or adulation. A com-\nand stabilize France by having greater powers\nmanding military figure, he has a formal, aus-\nconferred on its president, hence another rea-\n1 Dept. of State, BI Rpt., 10 March 1947 (Secret)\n1 Dept. of State, BI Rpt., 10 March 1947 (Secret)\nNew York Times, 21 October 1947\nSECRET"
}