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the support given by the army to the regime.
occur, however, a considerable further drop in
In the foreseeable future, this support can be
the purchasing power of the individual officer
expected to continue. To date, discontent
and soldier, a military coup d'état would then
within the army has been of only small pro-
become a real possibility.
portions and has generally been allayed by
Any elements that the army might place
timely increases in pay or by other benefits.
in power as the result of such a coup would
The effectiveness of secret police control, as
be anti-Communist, and would probably be
evidenced by the suppression of the military
at least as friendly to the US as is the present
conspiracy of 1947, is likely to prevent the
government, since the Army has a strong in-
success of any small-scale military uprising.
terest in receiving US materiel and technical
In terms of a long-range estimate, however,
assistance. Under Salazar's policies, this in-
a continuation of Portugal's political stability
terest has been subordinated to broader eco-
is by no means assured. The army's support
nomic considerations.
of Salazar is likely to depend to a large degree
Popular dissatisfaction with economic con-
upon the economic situation. The steady
ditions has existed for several years, princi-
worsening since 1947 of economic conditions
pally because of the failure of wages to keep
in Portugal, therefore, represents a threat to
up with prices and because of the shortage
the long-term stability of the regime, even
of goods. There is at present, however, no
though economic problems have not yet as-
organization in Portugal capable of arousing
sumed such proportions as to endanger the
the populace and spearheading any movement
government. Much will depend upon the
to improve their poverty-stricken condition.
volume of ECA aid which may be received by
Popular discontent can be expected to increase
Portugal during 1949 and 1950.
if the economic situation continues to deteri-
Within the army, control of the forces capa-
orate, but will have little effect on the stability
ble of seizing the reins of government rests
of the regime SO long as the army and police
with a group of opportunist colonels, who as
forces remain loyal.
unit commanders hold the loyalty of the
Should President Carmona die, a distinct
troops. These officers are considered to be
possibility in view of his 80 years, there would
not particularly loyal to the regime. Many
be little change in the regime. As Prime Min-
of them have been passed over for promotion,
ister, Salazar would automatically become
and as a result, tend to be dissatisfied.
president, according to the Constitution,
The junior and non-commissioned officer
which likewise provides that in such a case
groups, moreover, have been hard hit by re-
elections must be held within 60 days there-
cent increases in the cost of living and by
after to select a successor. Because electoral
regulations requiring new-style uniforms. As
machinery is firmly controlled by the govern-
a result, their morale has declined and their
ment, Salazar would probably succeed to that
loyalty to the government is questionable. In
office, unless the economic situation had
general, this group would probably be loyal
worsened to such an extent that the armed
to their unit commanders, rather than directly
forces might decide to impose a military gov-
to the government, as would probably also be
ernment.
the case among the enlisted men.
Should Salazar himself die unexpectedly,
Major factors which at the present time
his successor would be appointed by the Presi-
prevent the unit commanders from exploiting
dent. No one would be selected, however,
this situation include the lack of strong lead-
without approval of the army. Although Sal-
ership in any opposition movement, the activi-
azar's death would not in itself bring about a
ties of the government's secret police, and
major change in the governmental structure,
more particularly the influence of the army
his successor might have difficulty in control-
generals, who support the government because
ling the unwieldy, complicated corporative
of their regard for and former close relation-
government which has been built up under
ships with President Carmona. Should there
Salazar's personal direction.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "12\nSECRET\nthe support given by the army to the regime.\noccur, however, a considerable further drop in\nIn the foreseeable future, this support can be\nthe purchasing power of the individual officer\nexpected to continue. To date, discontent\nand soldier, a military coup d'état would then\nwithin the army has been of only small pro-\nbecome a real possibility.\nportions and has generally been allayed by\nAny elements that the army might place\ntimely increases in pay or by other benefits.\nin power as the result of such a coup would\nThe effectiveness of secret police control, as\nbe anti-Communist, and would probably be\nevidenced by the suppression of the military\nat least as friendly to the US as is the present\nconspiracy of 1947, is likely to prevent the\ngovernment, since the Army has a strong in-\nsuccess of any small-scale military uprising.\nterest in receiving US materiel and technical\nIn terms of a long-range estimate, however,\nassistance. Under Salazar's policies, this in-\na continuation of Portugal's political stability\nterest has been subordinated to broader eco-\nis by no means assured. The army's support\nnomic considerations.\nof Salazar is likely to depend to a large degree\nPopular dissatisfaction with economic con-\nupon the economic situation. The steady\nditions has existed for several years, princi-\nworsening since 1947 of economic conditions\npally because of the failure of wages to keep\nin Portugal, therefore, represents a threat to\nup with prices and because of the shortage\nthe long-term stability of the regime, even\nof goods. There is at present, however, no\nthough economic problems have not yet as-\norganization in Portugal capable of arousing\nsumed such proportions as to endanger the\nthe populace and spearheading any movement\ngovernment. Much will depend upon the\nto improve their poverty-stricken condition.\nvolume of ECA aid which may be received by\nPopular discontent can be expected to increase\nPortugal during 1949 and 1950.\nif the economic situation continues to deteri-\nWithin the army, control of the forces capa-\norate, but will have little effect on the stability\nble of seizing the reins of government rests\nof the regime SO long as the army and police\nwith a group of opportunist colonels, who as\nforces remain loyal.\nunit commanders hold the loyalty of the\nShould President Carmona die, a distinct\ntroops. These officers are considered to be\npossibility in view of his 80 years, there would\nnot particularly loyal to the regime. Many\nbe little change in the regime. As Prime Min-\nof them have been passed over for promotion,\nister, Salazar would automatically become\nand as a result, tend to be dissatisfied.\npresident, according to the Constitution,\nThe junior and non-commissioned officer\nwhich likewise provides that in such a case\ngroups, moreover, have been hard hit by re-\nelections must be held within 60 days there-\ncent increases in the cost of living and by\nafter to select a successor. Because electoral\nregulations requiring new-style uniforms. As\nmachinery is firmly controlled by the govern-\na result, their morale has declined and their\nment, Salazar would probably succeed to that\nloyalty to the government is questionable. In\noffice, unless the economic situation had\ngeneral, this group would probably be loyal\nworsened to such an extent that the armed\nto their unit commanders, rather than directly\nforces might decide to impose a military gov-\nto the government, as would probably also be\nernment.\nthe case among the enlisted men.\nShould Salazar himself die unexpectedly,\nMajor factors which at the present time\nhis successor would be appointed by the Presi-\nprevent the unit commanders from exploiting\ndent. No one would be selected, however,\nthis situation include the lack of strong lead-\nwithout approval of the army. Although Sal-\nership in any opposition movement, the activi-\nazar's death would not in itself bring about a\nties of the government's secret police, and\nmajor change in the governmental structure,\nmore particularly the influence of the army\nhis successor might have difficulty in control-\ngenerals, who support the government because\nling the unwieldy, complicated corporative\nof their regard for and former close relation-\ngovernment which has been built up under\nships with President Carmona. Should there\nSalazar's personal direction.\nSECRET"
}