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    "ocrText": "COPY NO. 1\nFOR THE PRESIDENT\nSECRET\nOF THE UNITED STATES\nFRENCH NORTH AFRICA\nINTELLIGENCE\nCHS\nOFF\nGENCY\nSR-36\nPublished 28 November 1950\ninamin\nTHE ARGNIVES NE\nAMAYO\nRECORDS\nYES SERVICE\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nDECLASSIFIED\nS.O. 116S2. Sec. 3(B) and 50D) or de\nC.I.A. 6-13-74\nI\nletter\nWHET-AL WARE Detec 7.5.78\nSECRET\nWARNING\nThis document contains information affecting the na-\ntional defense of the United States within the meaning\nof the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.\nIts transmission or the revelation of its contents in any\nmanner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\nDISSEMINATION NOTICE\n1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient\ndesignated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's\noffice who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further\ndissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-\ntion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:\na. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart-\nment of State\nb. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army\nc. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy\nd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force\ne. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission\nf. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff\ng. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other\nDepartment or Agency\n2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with\napplicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar-\nrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.\nTRUMAN\nAngyn\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nDISTRIBUTION (SR Series) :\nOffice of the President\nNational Security Council\nNational Security Resources Board\nDepartment of State\nOffice of Secretary of Defense\nDepartment of the Army\nDepartment of the Navy\nDepartment of the Air Force\nAtomic Energy Commission\nJoint Chiefs of Staff\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nResearch and Development Board\nMunitions Board\nIndustrial College of the Armed Forces\nET\nSR-36\nFRENCH NORTH AFRICA\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nSUMMARY\nCHAPTER I-POLITICAL SITUATION\n1. GENESIS OF PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM; CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE PRESENCE OF\nFRANCE IN NORTH AFRICA\n3\n2. THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM\n5\na. Algeria\n5\nb. Tunisia\n8\nc. Morocco\n12\nd. Committee for the Liberation of North Africa\n16\n3. STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION\n17\nCHAPTER II-ECONOMIC SITUATION\n1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM\n19\n2. THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION\n19\na. Agriculture\n19\nb. Mineral Resources\n24\nc. Industry\n26\nd. Finance\n27\ne. International Trade\n31\nCHAPTER III-FOREIGN AFFAIRS\n1. GENESIS OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICIES\n37\n2. SIGNIFICANT RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS\n37\n3. SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES\n37\nCHAPTER IV-MILITARY SITUATION\n1. GENESIS OF PRESENT MILITARY POLICIES\n39\n2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES\n39\na. Army\n39\nb. Navy\n40\nc. Air Force\n40\nd. Police and Security Forces\n41\n3. WAR POTENTIAL\n41\na. Manpower\n41\nb. Industry and Natural Resources\n41\nc. Science\n41\n4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES\n42\nSECRET\nCHAPTER V-STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY\n43\nCHAPTER VI-FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY\n45\nCHAPTER VII-THE FEZZAN\n1. THE LAND AND PEOPLE\n47\n2. FRENCH ADMINISTRATION\n47\n3. TRADE\n48\n4. FUTURE STATUS\n48\nMAP: Terrain Regions\nAPPENDIX A-Terrain and Climate\n49\nAPPENDIX B-Communications\n55\nAPPENDIX C-Population\n61\nAPPENDIX D-Biographies\n63\nAPPENDIX E-Chronology of Significant Events\n69\nLIST OF GRAPHICS\nFrench North Africa\nfacing\n1\nOrganization of the Government of Algeria\nfacing\n6\nDistribution of Seats in the Renewed Half of the General Councils\n8\nOrganization of the Government of Tunisia\nfacing\n9\nOrganization of the Government of French Morocco\nfacing\n12\nLand Use\n20\nComparative Yields\n21\nNorth African Herds\n23\nMoney in Circulation\n28\nOutstanding Bank Loans in Morocco\n29\nECA Aid to French North Africa\n35\nC\nSECRET\nFRENCH NORTH AFRICA\nAREA COMPARISON\nAND ARABLE LAND\n-\nA\nR\nE\nq\nFRANCE\nS A H A R A D E S E\nRT\nARABLE LAND\nSECRET\nWE 150\nSUMMARY\nFrench North Africa is, to all intents and\nParty, also exists in each area, and has been\npurposes, a political appendage of metropoli-\nunsuccessful in efforts to form a united front\ntan France, which provides its foreign policy,\nwith the nationalists. Neither the national-\nmilitary security, and over-all administration.\nists nor the Communists have the cohesion,\nEven if these favorable circumstances did not\nmeans, and sustained drive that would be re-\nprevail, this region would possess a consider-\nquired in a successful effort against French\nable value to Western security because of its\nhegemony.\nlocation and vast extent.\nThe standard of living of the native masses\nThe area, which comprises Algeria, French\nwould not decline catastrophically were the\nMorocco, and Tunisia, is five times as large as\nFrench to withdraw despite the fact that the\nmetropolitan France. More than two-thirds\nFrench phase of the local economy has im-\nof the region is desert, which all but precludes\nproved substantially since World War II.\ninvasion from the south, save by highly\nFrench policy now favors the development of\ntrained, professional soldiers, such as those\nlight industry and sources of electric power,\nwho followed General Leclerc during World\nincreased agricultural production, and a\nWar II on his celebrated march through cen-\nsearch for subsoil deposits of petroleum and\ntral Africa to the Mareth Line in Tunisia.\nstrategic minerals. Primarily for personal\nAside from the widely scattered oases of the in-\nsecurity reasons, much French capital has\nterior, the fertile land is confined to a narrow\nflowed into the area. ECA aid has contributed\nstrip along the 2,000 miles of Mediterranean\nlargely to industrial development. Of $96\nand Atlantic shores.\nmillion in ECA aid reallocated to North Africa\nNearly all of the 21 million inhabitants re-\nby France, more than half went into fuels,\nside in this verdant, and for the most part,\nmachinery and equipment, while the balance\nmountainous area. Less than eight percent\nconsisted of foodstuffs and other agricultural\nare Europeans while the balance is composed\nproducts and manufactured goods. These\nof Berbers and Arabs. The Berbers, who are\nimports reflect continuing gaps in the local\nthe indigenous stock and constitute two-thirds\nproductivity.\nof the native population, and the Arabs exist in\nAn economic problem arises from the fact\nthe primitive and impoverished economy\nthat native populations, aided by modern med-\nwhich has characterized for centuries this as-\nicine and sanitation, are growing at the rate\npect of Mediterranean culture. Their lives are\nof nearly two percent annually. Whether\ndominated by the exigencies of a rural environ-\nmodern agriculture can increase production\nment, and by the disciplines of the Moslem\nproportionately remains to be seen.\nreligion.\nThe location of French North Africa relative\nSmall native nationalist movements in\nto the Eurasian land mass makes its denial to\neach area are a source of concern to the\nthe USSR essential to the security of the At-\nadministrations. Except for membership in\nlantic community. It affords a base for\nan ineffective Committee for the Liberation of\nlaunching military operations against Europe\nNorth Africa, located in Cairo, there appar-\nand for the protection of the western Medi-\nently is no inter-area liaison or agreement\nterranean and its Atlantic approaches. The\namong the nationalist groups. A Communist\nmilitary establishments in being are capable\nParty, subsidiary to the French Communist\nof rapid expansion, although they are at pres-\nNote: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air\nForce have concurred in this report. It is based on information available to CIA as of\nJune 1950.\n1\n2\nSECRET\nent handicapped by shortages of skilled labor\nlayed for some time because the French lack\nand inadequate industrial facilities.\nthe funds to develop army, air, and naval\nBecause the French anticipate that North\nbases. The Atlantic littoral of Morocco would\nAfrica might, in the event of war, be neutral-\nretain substantial military value to the US,\nized temporarily by the USSR, they are plan-\neven if the western Mediterranean were ren-\nning to establish a focus of resistance in West\ndered untenable.\nAfrica. Realization of the plans will be de-\nSECRET\nSECRET\nCHAPTER I\nPOLITICAL SITUATION\n1. Genesis of Present Political System: Circum-\nfriendly relations between France and Ger-\nstances Leading to the Presence of France in\nmany.\" Bismarck, intent upon the consolida-\nNorth Africa.\ntion of Germany and other designs in Europe,\nThe area, known as French North Africa\nwas gratified to see the French dissipating\namong the nations of the Atlantic community,\ntheir energies on African soil, and raised no\nis called the Maghreb, or \"Western Land,\"\nobjections to the creation of a French pro-\ntectorate over the Regency of Tunis.¹\nthroughout the Arab world. Among the an-\ncients, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia bore the\nHaving gained this much, the French began\nRoman names Numidia, Mauretania, and\nplanning an empire which would spread\nAfrica, areas whose Mediterranean littoral was\nacross North Africa from the Atlantic to the\nidentified in the early nineteenth century as\nNile. The celebrated Fashoda incident in\na part of the Barbary Coast.\nSeptember 1898 put an end, however, to the\nFrance's entry into this region followed the\neastward realization of this dream. The\nFrench were forced to abandon Colonel Mar-\nCongress of Vienna (1814-1815), which ended\nFrance's hope of recovery of its former empire\nchand in the presence of an overwhelming\nlost during the preceding century in a series\nBritish force under General Kitchener, and\nof wars culminating with the defeat of Na-\nto drop further pretensions to what is now\npoleon. A new wave of Gallic imperialism\nthe Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The British, on\nrose during the ensuing fifteen years and\nthe other hand, apprehensive of Germany's\nfound an outlet in the vast, and hitherto\ngrowing power in Europe, did not offer further\nlargely neglected, continent to the south.\nopposition to French expansion in Africa.\nIn 1830 a French expeditionary force was\nHaving been outmaneuvered on the Nile, the\nlaunched on the pretext of restoring order in\nFrench turned their attention to Morocco, \"to\nAlgeria, but shortly found itself engaged in\nprotect Algeria from the West.\" During the\nfull-scale warfare. The hitherto disunited\nlatter part of the nineteenth century and up\nArabs and Kabyle Berbers rallied under the\nuntil 1912, this state had been the victim of\nleadership of the fabulous Abd-el-Kader, the\nthe violence of the many pretenders to its\nSultan of Tlemcen. They dominated the field\nthrone and native uprisings, of ruthless con-\nfor seventeen years until French arms, suc-\ncession-hunters and, finally, of almost com-\ncessively under Generals Bugeaud (later Mar-\nplete financial and economic prostration.\nshal and Duc d'Isly), Lamoricière, and the\nFrench missionaries, settlers, and traders who\nDuc d'Aumale, were at last triumphant, and\nhad been infiltrating the country for some\nAlgeria became the nucleus of a new colonial\ntime were not infrequently the objects of at-\ntack, so that about 1900 they began to en-\nempire.\ntreat Paris for protection. French troops in\nFollowing the conquest of Algeria, martial\nincreasing numbers were sent to Morocco in\nadventure on the Dark Continent became\norder to \"establish order,\" a task which they\nfashionable. Fortunately for France the con-\nperformed SO effectively that in 1912 the Sul-\nquest of Tunisia in 1881, \"to protect Algeria\nfrom the east,\" was little more than a military\n¹Tunisia is still referred to as the Regency of\nparade led by General Boulanger, a political\nTunis, a usage that persists from the time of Turk-\nopportunist who was viewed by Bismarck as\nish rule (1705) when the Bey of Tunis was a Prince\n\"the greatest political obstacle to continued\nRegent for the Sultan in Constantinople.\nSECRET\n3\n4\ntan was obliged to sign the Treaty of Fez.\ngree of industrialization, as well as decentrali-\nThis instrument placed the country under\nzation and a considerable local self-adminis-\nFrench protection and gave the great colonial\ntration for each area. This Conference laid\nadministrator, Marshal (then General) Lyau-\nplans for improving the social and economic\ntey an ample field for the exercise of his tal-\nlot of native peoples, and, when the De Gaulle\nents. He not only succeeded in pacifying the\nGovernment was transferred to Paris, some\narea, but also in preserving it for France dur-\nsteps were taken.\ning the first World War.\nDe Gaulle was cautious, however, in the\nThe Treaty of Fez (1912) completed France's\nmatter of self-rule. A Committee on Overseas\ndominion over a land area which extends 1,450\nFrance was set up to explore the colonial prob-\nair miles from Cape Noun on the Atlantic\nlem, and finally recommended a curious blend\nOcean to Cape Bon in the Mediterranean.\nof federalism and centralization in the form\nSave for its shallow coastal strip and widely\nof the \"French Union,\" with membership\nscattered oases in the interior, this vast\nbased on \"free consent.\" This recommenda-\nstretch of land, which embraces parts of the\ntion was incorporated in the draft constitu-\nSahara Desert in its southern reaches, is arid\ntion rejected in May 1946, but the phrase \"free\nand inaccessible.\nconsent\" was omitted from the Constitution\nThe problems which confronted French co-\nof the Fourth Republic as adopted in October\nlonial officials in Morocco in 1912 were gener-\n1946. French attempts to draw the protec-\ntorates of Morocco and Tunisia within the\nally similar to those previously encountered\nFrench Union as \"Associated States\" have met\nin Tunisia and Algeria; the solutions developed\nalong familiar and similar lines. The first\nwith consistent opposition from the national-\nFrench step was to free the French Zone of\nists, who demand autonomy.\nMorocco from all traces of international con-\nThe fall of France in 1940 and the promises\ntrol, starting with the establishment of a new\nof political independence implied in the At-\njudicial system for the purpose of abolishing\nlantic Charter and the Brazzaville Conference\nforeign capitulations which had been in exist-\nencouraged the nationalists in the three states\nence since 1358. By 1930 every effective ves-\nto hope for the withdrawal of French control.\ntige of foreign privilege in French Morocco\nBy late April 1945 nationalist feeling had be-\nhad been eliminated, except that of the United\ncome intense. On 8 May (VE-Day) a native\nStates (established in 1787 and renewed in\nuprising occurred at Setif, Algeria. Between\n1836) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the\n100 and 300 French were slain. Within a few\nUnited Kingdom (established in 1856). Re-\ndays, Arab population centers in the vicinity\nforms were initiated in the administrative,\nhad been bombed by French planes in reprisal;\neconomic, financial, and military branches of\nand between 1,000 and 3,000 Arabs died.\nthe government, many of which were greatly\nFundamentally, the natives of French North\nretarded by the two World Wars.\nAfrica have remained substantially unchanged\nAfter the fall of France in 1940, the Vichy\nfor centuries. The French have imposed a\nGovernment, with the consent of the Nazis,\nveneer of European civilization on only a\ncontinued the forms and character of the\nsmall part of the urban populations. The\nFrench political administrations and military\nrural natives and the terrain over which they\ncontrol in North Africa. After the area was\nare widely scattered have remained essentially\nliberated by the Allies, however, the De Gaulle\nuntouched by their contact with Europeans.\nGovernment-in-Exile gave colonial policy a\nThe political scene is deeply conditioned by\nnew direction. In January 1944 Consultative\nilliteracy, extreme poverty, indifference, and\nAssembly debates on colonial problems dis-\na relatively primitive outlook in the mass of\ncussed decentralization of administrative con-\nthe people; on the upper levels there is more\ntrol. Also in January 1944, the Brazzaville\nself-interest than a burning zeal for democ-\nConference of colonial administrators recom-\nracy. Upon these disparate conditions the\nmended a federal assembly of French colonies,\nmetropolitan French have imposed a paternal-\na centrally planned economy, and a large de-\nistic and generally uniform modus vivendi.\n5\n2. The Present Political System.\nDecree of 1870, has not been assimilated cul-\nturally by the French.\nThe Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates\nAt that time there were many legal difficul-\nare viewed by the French as prospective As-\nties which deterred any Moslem from attain-\nsociated States of the French Union; Algeria,\ning a similar status. The chief of these was\non the other hand, has the status of an Over-\nthe requirement that he renounce Koranic\nseas Department in the French Republic and\nlaw, and place himself under the French judi-\nthe French Union. It consists of the depart-\ncial system. Most Moslems preferred to re-\nments of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine\nmain under Koranic law. Until quite re-\nwhich, with certain exceptions, are adminis-\ncently only a few thousand had elected to\ntered much as metropolitan departments, and\nfollow this alternative course, and these were\nof the Southern Territories which are still\nviewed with contempt by both the French and\nunder military jurisdiction, although the Al-\nthe natives. The overwhelming majority of\ngerian Statute provided for departmental\nstatus for them also. The Fezzan, a large but\nthe population was left with few civil rights.\nsparsely populated area in adjacent Libya, is\nThis situation was highly satisfactory to\nalso under French military administration.\nmost of the French minority residing in Al-\ngeria. The most vehement of these are the\na. Algeria.\n\"colons,\" a group of large landowners who, de-\nAlgeria enjoys a considerable range of civil\nspite their initiative and personal courage, are\nliberties. Press and radio are uncensored.\ndistinguished for their reactionary political\nThe 80-90 percent illiteracy of the people\nideas.\nenables France to keep Algeria on a level of\nIn 1944, however, General De Gaulle's\ncivilization below that required for full demo-\nFrench Committee of National Liberation in\ncratic self-government. The nationalists are\nAlgiers gave some 60,000 Moslems the right to\ndemanding more extensive modern education,\nvote in the first college without requiring\nwith a greater use of Arabic in the curriculum.\nthat they renounce their rights under Koranic\nlaw. Simultaneously the number of natives\nThe complacency with which France has re-\nempowered to choose local assemblies was in-\ngarded its political and economic position in\ncreased from 200,000 to 1,400,000, and the pro-\nAlgeria is revealed by the fact that prior to\nportion of native representation in these as-\nVincent Auriol's visit in 1949 only five chiefs\nsemblies was raised from one-third to two-\nof the French State, including Napoleon III,\nfifths.\nhad crossed the Mediterranean to inspect this\nOn 20 September 1947 the Algerian Statute\narea.\nbecame effective by its passage in the National\nThe French Government has followed pri-\nAssembly in Paris. The Statute stipulates\nmarily a policy of assimilation in Algeria. A\nthat Algeria shall continue to exist as three\ndecree of 1848 declared that Algeria was an\nFrench departments under a semi-autono-\nintegral part of French territory and per-\nmous administration in Algiers, which is en-\nmitted French citizens to send representatives\ndowed with civil responsibility and financial\nto the Constituent Assembly in Paris. At the\nautonomy. Although the Statute abolished\nsame time the government began to set up\nthe Southern Territories and \"considered\nadministrative organisms corresponding as\nthem as departments,\" it was not until Feb-\nclosely as possible to those in metropolitan\nruary 1950 that the Algerian Assembly took\nFrance. The cultural assimilation of the Al-\nany action. At that time the Assembly ap-\ngerians was less successful because of the\nproved a resolution of the Government Gen-\nenormous differences in religion, language,\neral to liquidate a portion of the Southern Ter-\ncustoms, and race which separate the Moslems\nritories by extending the boundaries of the\nfrom the French. Except for the few upper\nthree existing departments to the south.\nclass Jews the Jewish minority (about two\nUntil this action has been approved by the\npercent of the total population), which was\nNational Assembly in Paris, these areas re-\ngiven full French citizenship by the Cremieux\nmain under military jurisdiction.\nTCR E1\n6\nThe Statute also provides for universal suf-\nThe Assembly's principal function is discus-\nfrage,¹ creates an Algerian Assembly and es-\nsion and approval of the Algerian budget,\ntablishes Arabic and French as official lan-\nafter it has been drawn up by the Governor\nguages. The Statute, which is modified by\nGeneral and before it is promulgated in Paris\nlocal usage, asserts that all citizens have\nby a decree of the Minister of the Interior,\nequality of opportunity and obligation in the\ncountersigned by the Minister of Finance.\npublic service, and enjoy the liberties and\nBoth the Governor General and the Algerian\nrights of French citizens.\nAssembly can initiate expenditures. The As-\n(1) Government.\nsembly also elects six representatives to the\nA Governor General, who is subordinate to\nAssembly of the French Union at Versailles.\nthe French Minister of the Interior, is ap-\nA superficial appearance of political equal-\npointed for an indefinite term by the Presi-\nity exists between the French and native rep-\ndent of the French Republic with the approval\nresentatives in the Assembly. Each group\nof the Council of Ministers. He is charged\nhas 60 members. The two sections, or \"col-\nwith the administration of Algeria and main-\nleges,\" sit together and have equal rights.\ntaining the constitutional rights and liberties\nMoreover, the presidency of the Assembly al-\nof the population.\nternates annually between its two \"colleges.\"\nThe present Governor General is Marcel Ed-\nThe term \"the first electoral college\" de-\nmond Naegelen,² a Socialist who has held of-\nnominates the eligible voters among the 1,000,-\n000 Europeans and a small number of assimi-\nfice since February 1948. This official is aided\nlated natives who elect one-half of the Assem-\nby a Council of Government, the Algerian As-\nbly from their own ranks. The \"second elec-\nsembly, an extensive civil service, and by his\ntoral college,\" on the other hand, consists of\ncivil and military aides and advisers. His\nthe eligible voters among the 8,000,000 natives\nchief assistant is a General Secretary of Gov-\nwho elect the balance of the Assembly. Thus,\nernment of his own choice. (See accompany-\ning chart.)\nalthough there are eight times as many na-\ntives as there are French and assimilés in\nA Council of Government, over which the\nAlgeria, each group has the same number of\nGovernor General presides, acts as a civilian\nrepresentatives not only in the local body but\ncabinet; it is also charged with \"watching over\nalso in the French National Assembly and the\nthe executions of the decisions of the Algerian\nCouncil of the Republic in Paris.\nAssembly.\" The President and one of the\nThe political indifference of the native Al-\nVice Presidents of the Assembly are auto-\ngerians is indicated by the fact that in the\nmatically members of the Council, two others\nare appointed by the Governor General, and\nApril 1948 elections for the Assembly, the\n1,320,000 natives eligible to vote for candidates\nthe remaining two are elected annually by the\nAssembly, one from each \"college.\"\nto the \"second college,\" cast only 39 percent\nof the total ballots; whereas the 612,500 eli-\n(2) Legislative Bodies.\ngible Europeans and assimilés cast 61 percent\nThe members of the Algerian Assembly are\nof the total.\nelected for six years; half of the Assembly is\nIn view of the skillful way in which the\nelected every three years. Their duties are\nFrench manipulate these elections, it is not\nprimarily consultative. The effectiveness of\naltogether surprising that 103 of the 120 mem-\nthe Algerian Assembly is curtailed by the fact\nbers elected were either Frenchmen or pro-\nthat all of its measures must be approved by\nFrench Moslems, while only seventeen seats\nthe French Government.\nwere won by native nationalists. A single\n¹Legally Moslem women, as French citizens, have\nThis consultative body was created by the French\nthe right to vote; as Algerians, however, their qual-\nConstitution of 1946 and came into being at the end\nifications are subject to the Algerian Assembly,\nof 1947. Most questions regarding Overseas Terri-\nwhich has not yet fully implemented this provision.\ntories are submitted to the Assembly of the French\n2 Because Naegelen is a member of the French\nUnion for its opinion. Algeria is represented by\nNational Assembly, his leave of absence is extended\neighteen delegates, twelve of whom are elected by\nsemi-annually by that body.\nthe General Councils.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA\nGovernor General\nAlgerian\nAssembly\nCivil Cabinet\nMilitary Cabinet\nSecretary General of the\nAlgerian Office\nGovernment\nin Paris\nInspectors General of\nCabinet\nCivil Service\nControl of Appropriated\nthe Administration\nPlanning Staff\nInspection\nExpenditures\nDeputy Secretary General\nDeputy Secretary General\nof the Government for\nof the Government\nEconomic Affairs\nTechnical\nPublic Health\nSocial Hygiene\nInspectors\nCommerce, Power\nHydraulics\nGeneral\nand Industry\nPublic Works and\nFinance\nLabor\nPrice Control\nTransportation\nSouthern\nGeneral Security\nAgriculture\nSupply\nTerritories\nInterior and\nLegislation and\nForests\nMaps\nFine Arts\nPublic Functions\nNational\nPosts, Telegraph\nWE 250\nEducation\nand Telephones\n7\nCommunist, a Frenchman, sits for Oran.\ncriminal cases, however, French law has sole\nFrench control of the Assembly is further\njurisdiction. In areas where a serious conflict\nguaranteed by a method of balloting which\nexists, Moslem law is gradually being modified\ncan be invoked at the will of the Governor\nunder French pressure; where French in-\nGeneral, the Finance Committee, or one-\nfluence is at a minimum, such as in the Kabyle\nfourth of the Assembly. In this case, the\nregions inhabited by Moslem Berber tribes and\nballoting on a given measure is delayed for\nin the Southern Territories where the unor-\n24 hours, at which time a two-thirds vote is\nthodox Mozabites, a special Islamic sect, dwell,\nrequired, unless a majority in each \"college\nthe ancient practices continue.\nof the Assembly\" has been obtained.\nFrench courts, which follow the pattern of\n(3) Local Administration.\nthose in metropolitan France, have jurisdic-\nThe electoral inequality noted above is more\ntion over French nationals, Europeans, and as-\nmarked on the cantonal level. Three-fifths of\nsimilated natives who have renounced their\nthe 168 seats of the three General Councils¹\npersonal status under Moslem law. There is\nare filled by Europeans and two-fifths by\na growing tendency for French tribunals to\nMoslems.\nexpand their complex jurisdiction over the\nnatives in an increasing number of civil in-\nMoslem\nEuropean\nstances as well as in criminal cases. With the\nCouncillors\nCouncillors\nexception of the Courts of Assize, which con-\nDepartment of Oran\n22\n33\nDepartment of Algiers\n21\n32\ncern themselves only with serious criminal\nDepartment of Con-\noffenses, all French courts have both civil and\nstantine\n25\n35\ncriminal jurisdiction.\n-\n68\n100\n(5) Political Parties.\nThe same political parties exist in Algeria\nThe Southern Territories are under military\nadministration. The area is divided into \"cir-\nas in metropolitan France, although rightist\nparties are, on the whole, more conservative.\ncumscriptions,\" \"circles,\" annexes and posts,\ncommunes of \"plein exercise,\" 2 mixed com-\nThere are two nationalist parties, as well as\nmunes and all-native communes, all of which\ncertain pro-French native groups with legal\nare supervised by French native affairs offi-\nstanding.\ncers and administrators. Ancient Arab tra-\nA political dichotomy results from the semi-\nditional taxes and customs are in force, and\ncolonial status and outlook of the French, on\norder is maintained by the picturesque camel\nthe one hand, and the politically inert native\ncorps. Plans are underway for integrating\nmasses, on the other. The local scene is\nthem into the existing departments. The As-\nfurther complicated by the multi-party setup.\nsemblies in Paris and Algeria are faced with\nThe \"colons\" dread a weakening of French au-\nthe formulation of laws which will guide the\nthority in Algeria, and gravitate toward the\nchange-over.\nright in support of anti-Communist and colo-\nnialist policies. The \"colons\" number, how-\n(4) Judicial System.\never, less than ten percent of the local Euro-\nThe judicial branch of the Algerian Govern-\npean population, but exert much more in-\nment is dual, using both French and Moslem\nfluence than their numbers suggest.\nlaw. French law is under the direction of the\nThe result of the cantonal elections of\nMinistry of Justice in Paris, while Moslem law\nMarch 1949 was to keep nationalist repre-\ndescends from the Government General in\nsentation at a minimum; no Communists were\nAlgiers. The two bodies of law frequently\nelected. As the following table shows, the\noverlap in civil and commercial matters; in\nsecond college elected an overwhelming ma-\njority of pro-French Moslems.\n1 The party affiliations of the candidates elected\nin March 1949 are shown on page 8.\nNationalism. The general ineffectiveness\n2 Communes with powers approximating those of\nof nationalists in Algeria is heightened by the\na French commune.\nfact that the two movements-the Movement\nSECRET\n8\nDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE RENEWED HALF OF THE GENERAL COUNCILS\n(MARCH, 1949)\nFIRST COLLEGE\nSECOND COLLEGE\nIndependent Republicans\n15 Seats\nFranco-Moslem Union\n9 Seats\nRPF and affiliated\n13\nAlgerian Union\n9\nRadical Socialists\n10\nIndependents\n9\nIndependent Radicals\n2\nSocialists\n2\nMRP (Popular Republicans)\n3\nMRP\n1\nSocialists\n4\nMoslem Federation\n1\nRight Independents\n2\nUDMA\n2\nIndependent\n1\n(Pro-Administration)\nTOTAL 50\nTOTAL 33\nWE 350\nfor the Triumph of Democratic Liberties\ntive culture, and the political apathy of the\n(MTLD), formerly the Algerian People's Party,\npopulation.\nand the Democratic Union of the Algerian\n(6) Labor.\nManifesto (UDMA)-refuse to cooperate.\nThere is now little difference in the long-\nOrganized labor is the most effective Com-\nrange aims of these groups: the MTLD aspires\nmunist mass weapon in Algeria. The great-\nto complete independence from France even\nest number of unionized workers are grouped\nat the price of open violence; the UDMA be-\ninto the three Departmental unions which are\nlieves that Algeria should achieve its inde-\naffiliated with the French CGT. A coordinat-\npendence peacefully, its immediate aim being\ning committee, made up of prominent Alge-\nto have Algeria declared an Associated State\nrian Communists, directs the three organiza-\nof the French Union. The MTLD is led by the\ntions.\nfiery and mystical Messali Hadj while the\nThe leadership claims a total membership of\nUDMA is headed by the more moderate and\n250,000, three-fourths of whom are Algerian\nEuropeanized Ferhat Abbas. Since the na-\nnatives; it is believed, however, that member-\ntionalists now control only fourteen percent\nship is substantially less than 100,000. The\nof the seats in the Algerian Assembly, they\nCGT has concentrated its activity among\nare unable to exert a substantial effect on the\ndockers and railway and streetcar workers.\nlocal French administration.\nStrikes called by the CGT have not been\nCommunism. The Algerian Communists\nnotably successful, nor have the dockers been\nare numerically smaller than the native\nable to impede the movement of military\nparties but better organized and much noisier.\nmateriel consigned to the Far East.\nThe Party has concentrated most of its ef-\nb. Tunisia.\nforts on the poorer native and European labor\n(particularly dockers and utilities employees),\nThe French found in Tunisia a relatively\nand in recent months has made an effort to\nwell-developed, homogeneous native society\nattract segments of the native rural popula-\nand the remnants of a once-effective local gov-\ntion. The Party is led by Paul Caballero and\nernment, which had formerly sworn fealty to\nConstantinople. This government had been\nPierre Fayet who follow the line laid down in\nin the form of an absolute monarchy under a\nMoscow; it seeks closer association with the\nsuccession of sovereign Beys.\nnative nationalists and advocates a general\nThe French wisely availed themselves of\npolicy of liberation for all dependent native\nthis situation and retained a native shadow-\npopulations. The Algerian Communists have\ngovernment alongside their protectorate re-\nmet with little success because they are faced\ngime. Under the Bardo Treaty (1881) and\nwith almost insurmountable obstacles created\nthe Marsa Convention (1883) the powers of\nby the Moslem faith, the primitive state of na-\ngovernment, including the direction of for-\nORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA\nRESIDENT GENERAL\nBEY OF TUNIS\nDepartment of Public\nSecurity\n( Policy-lawmaking\n( Administration )\n( Technically\nCABINET COUNCIL\nresponsible\nCOUNCIL OF MINISTERS\nto Bey )\n( Moslems )\nSecretary\nPrime Minister\n( Prime Minister technically responsible to Bey)\nPrime Minister\nGeneral\n( Ministers ex-officio )\n( French)\n( Moslems)\n( French )\nAsst. Sec.\nSecretary\nInterior\nAdviser\nJustice\nGeneral\nGeneral\nAsst. Sec.\nPublic Works\nJustice\nAdviser\nCommerce\nGeneral\nDirector of\nFinance\nPublic Health\nAdviser\nPublic Health\nFinance\nLabor and\nDirector of\nEducation\nAgriculture\nAdviser\nSocial Security\nEducation\nCommerce and\nAdviser\nAgriculture\nDir. P. T. & T.\nHandicrafts\nLabor and\nCommissioner of\nAdviser\nSocial Security\nReconstruction\nSECRET\nWE 450\n( French advisers responsible to Secretary General)\n9\neign policy, rest with France. Nevertheless,\nwill be noted, moreover, that when the Bey's\nthe Bey of Tunis, under the control of France,\nCabinet Council reaches a deadlock, the ques-\nretains as a legal fiction the powers attaching\ntion must be passed to the Resident General's\nto the exercise of sovereignty.\nCouncil of Ministers for solution. It will also\nThe Bey is required by the Marsa Conven-\nbe noted that all the Moslems, with the ex-\ntion to undertake any administrative, judicial,\nception of the Prime Minister, who sit on the\nand financial reforms judged useful by the\nCouncil of Ministers are merely ex officio mem-\nFrench Government.\nbers of that body, and that each has a French\nFrenchmen and their descendants retain\n\"adviser\" who conforms the minister's activi-\ntheir French citizenship. Moslems and Jews\nties to French policies. Each minister must\nare considered Tunisian nationals. Non-\nconsult his adviser regarding the conduct of\nTunisians may acquire French or Tunisian\nall affairs of his department, and all docu-\nnationality by naturalization. Any non-Mos-\nments transmitted by the ministers to the\nlem born in Tunisia, at least one of whose par-\nSecretary General for implementation must\nents was born in Tunisia, acquires French na-\nfirst be \"certified\" by the advisers. On the\ntionality at birth. According to the French\nother hand, the French members of the Bey's\nlaw of 20 December 1923, however, such na-\nCabinet Council sit as full members of that\ntionality may be repudiated within a year\nbody, and are not encumbered with Moslem\nafter the attainment of majority.\n\"advisers.\" This situation is, of course, highly\n(1) Government.\nirritating to Tunisian sensibilities.\nFrench political domination is not restricted\nThe present native ruler is Lamine Pasha\nBey, a close relative ¹ of Moncef Pasha Bey\nto these, the top organs of government. Tu-\nnisians are disenfranchised save for a rela-\nwho was deposed by the French in 1943 and\nwho has since died.\ntively small group of \"notables,\" 2 who are\nFrance's chief representative in Tunisia is\njudged to be sufficiently reliable from the\nthe Resident General. He is appointed by the\nFrench viewpoint. These individuals are al-\nlowed to join with the French residents in\nPresident of France upon the suggestion of\nthe French Council of Ministers. His tenure\nelecting persons to the Grand Council of Tu-\nnisia which consists of 53 French and 53 Tu-\nof office is at the pleasure of the French Gov-\nernment. The present incumbent is Louis\nnisian members. This body, which occasion-\nPerillier, a career civil servant with Rightist\nally reacts in its own self-interest, exercises\ntendencies.\nfunctions which are similar to, but even less\nThe Resident General, who is responsible to\nvital than those of the Algerian Assembly.\nTunisian notables also elect members to the\nthe French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acts as\nForeign Minister for the Bey, and conducts\nrural Unit Councils and to the Municipal\nall external affairs. French military and\nCouncil of the city of Tunis. Other officials\nnaval commanders in Tunisia are under his\nare appointed by the French authorities.\norders.\nFrench control of the region, which has al-\nThe accompanying chart illustrates the\nways been rendered difficult by the shadowy\nand sometimes dual nature of the adminis-\ncomplexity imposed upon the Tunisian Gov-\nernment by the fact that it is a protectorate.\ntration, has become even more difficult for the\nThe native government is not allowed to make\nFrench because of increasing nationalism and\npolicies or pass laws, but must administer the\nthe high cost of military occupation, and be-\nmeasures laid down by the French after con-\ncause world opinion, exploited by USSR\nsultation with the Bey's ministers. The Resi-\npropaganda, favors independence for depend-\ndent General may, and does, veto native pro-\nent peoples.\nposals which conflict with French aims. It\nAs a result of these conditions, the French\nadministration has made certain superficial\n1 Succession is dynastic, rather than hereditary;\nand ineffective gestures to appease native\nthe Regency throne has been occupied since the\nbeginning of the eighteenth century (1705) by the\n: A group of natives who pay direct taxes, hold\nHussein family.\ncertain diplomas, or are veterans.\n10\nSECRET\nsentiment. An illustration is a decree pro-\nexecution of the Marsa Convention; (2) ter-\nmulgated by the Resident General in April\nritorial administration, Tunisian judiciary,\n1948 creating a Mixed Delegation to sup-\nand Arabic language educational posts, re-\nplant the old Superior Council. In the\nserved exclusively for Tunisian Moslems; and\nnew body, which is derived from the\n(3) a variety of other posts open, at least in\nelected members of the Grand Council, the\ntheory, equally to French and Tunisian na-\nFrench Government is not represented. The\ntionals.\npurpose of the Delegation is to afford a\n(3) Local Administration.\nmedium whereby the French and native mem-\nThe French exert a regulatory influence on\nbers of the Grand Council may continue to\nthe lower orders of Tunisian society through\nwork on problems on which that body has be-\ntheir Office of Native Affairs. Its represen-\ncome deadlocked. The Delegation will also\ntatives usually work directly with native Tu-\nact on behalf of the Council, when it is not\nnisian officials and, under certain conditions,\nin session, in matters relating to the budget.\nwith the people themselves. This phase of\nThe decree, in other words, places in the hands\nthe protectorate has been successful largely\nof elected Tunisian and French citizens powers\nbecause the French have used discrimination\nwhich had previously been under the guidance\nin making permanent appointments to this\nof French protectorate officials.\nservice and because, as a result, these French\nOn the whole, however, the actual control\nofficials have a general reputation among the\ncontinues to center in the Resident General.\nnatives for fairness and integrity.\nHe is aided, as the chart shows, by a Secre-\n(4) Legislative Representation.\ntary General of Government, who is Minister\nThe French minority of about 140,000 per-\nof Interior ex officio, and by French Directors\nsons, less than four percent of the population,\nresponsible for Finance, Education, Public\nis represented in the French Council of the\nWorks, all of whom are members of the Coun-\nRepublic by two Councillors elected by bal-\ncil, and by the vital Department of Public\nlots mailed to Paris by French members of the\nSecurity, which is not represented on the\nGrand Council and French members of the\nCouncil. As has been pointed out, certain\nelected municipal councils. The Tunisians\nMoslem Ministers sit ex officio in this body.\nobject to this representation in the Council\nThe Bey's Cabinet Council parallels the\nof the Republic, and have refused participa-\nResident General's Council of Ministers but\ntion in the assembly of the French Union.\nis concerned with the administration of the\n(5) Judicial System.\nregulations, laws, etc., which originate in the\nThe judicial system, as in Algeria and Mo-\nFrench organization. The Moslem Prime\nrocco, is dual. French courts have jurisdic-\nMinister, who at present is Mustapha Kaak, is\ntion in all cases in which one of the con-\nthe head of this body and is technically re-\ntesting parties is a non-Tunisian, while Tuni-\nsponsible to the Bey. The French Secretary\nsian courts have authority when both litigants\nGeneral also sits on this Cabinet Council and\nare Tunisians. The Tunisian secular courts\nis directly responsible to the Resident General.\nenforce both Moslem and French law. These\nOther French officials who are full members\ntribunals include cantonal magistracies, re-\nof this native body are shown on the chart.\ngional courts of the first instance, courts of\nIt is of interest that laws do not become en-\nappeal, and the Court of Cassation. Tunisian\nforceable until they bear the seal of the Bey\necclesiastical courts, on the other hand, deal\nand are signed by the Resident General. By\nrefusing to allow the use of his seal, the Bey\nwith matters subject to Koranic law. Among\nthe reforms introduced since the establish-\nhas been able on rare occasions to exert al-\nment of the protectorate are the codification\nmost a veto power over French legislation.\nand modification of the civil and criminal pro-\n(2) Civil Service.\ncedure of the Tunisian secular courts. A\nClassified civil service consists of three cate-\njoint Tunisian Land Tribunal, responsible for\ngories: (1) supervisory posts, reserved ex-\nthe registration of landed property, has ac-\nclusively for French citizens, pertaining to the\ncomplished a great deal toward the consolida-\nSECRET\nSECRET\n11\ntion of real estate property titles. A rabbin-\ndirected Tunisian Committee for the Defense\nical court exists at Tunis for persons subject\nof Peace was established in 1949 with a con-\nto Mosaic law.\nsiderable Neo-Destour representation on its\n(6) Political Parties.\ndirectorate. Recently, Neo-Destourian mem-\nThe Tunisians are more culturally advanced\nbers have openly expressed opposition to their\nand politically conscious than the natives of\nCommunist colleagues. The chief appeal of\nthe Communists for the nationalists is the\nthe other French North African areas.\nSoviet catchline, \"full and immediate inde-\nNationalism. There are two nationalist\npendence for all dependent colonial peoples,\"\nparties in Tunisia, both of which are legally\nwhich for French consumption has been wat-\nproscribed but are permitted to operate. The\nered down to \"early liberation.\"\nOld Destour (Constitution) and the Neo-Des-\ntour represent the desire of the Moslem popu-\n(7) Labor Organizations.\nlation for independence from France. These\nThe two important labor unions in Tu-\nparties are relatively small, but incorporate\nnisia are the Communist-controlled USTT\nthe natural and literate leadership of the\n(Syndical Union of Tunisian Workers) and\nTunisian nation.\nthe nationalist-dominated UGTT (General\nThe Neo-Destour party, formed in 1934, is\nUnion of Tunisian Workers). The Commu-\nan offshoot of the Old Destour party, and was\nnist-controlled USTT, led by Georges Poro-\nformed by young radicals who considered the\npane and Hassan Sadaoui, has made repeated\nolder members too pro-French. Although at\nattempts to incorporate the nationalist-domi-\none time the Neo-Destourians supported the\nnated UGTT whose able leader, Farhat\nidea of local autonomy, a position similar to\nHached, has had years of intensive training\nthat of the Algerian UDMA, the party (under\nunder French labor leadership.\nthe active leadership of Habib Bourghiba and\nBy the shrewd use of religious and nation-\nSalah ben Youssef) now works for complete\nalist appeals to the Tunisian workers, Hached's\nindependence, with violence threatened as a\nunion not only avoided joining forces with\nlast resort. They advocate a constitutional\nthe USTT, but has increased its membership\nmonarchy headed by a dynastic, sovereign\nfrom 40,000 to 70-80,000, while USTT mem-\nruler. A French offer in 1947 to include lead-\nbership within three years has declined from\ning Destourians in the Resident General's\n40,000 to 15-18,000. Despite its aversion to\ncabinet was rejected because the leaders feared\nCommunism, the UGTT somewhat hesitantly\nthat such an action would expose them to\naccepted affiliation with the Communist-\narrest unless they were safeguarded by hold-\nsponsored World Federation of Trade Unions\ning the premiership and several of the key\nin July 1949 in order to procure the world\nministries, and because the Destourians con-\n\"sounding board\" thus provided. Subsequent\ncluded that acceptance of this overture might\nto this affiliation, Hached has appealed to the\nbe construed as nationalist submission to the\nEconomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for\nFrench protectorate regime. The chief source\nan investigation of social and labor conditions\nof political power exercised by the nationalists\nin French North Africa. Although the WFTU\nis in their control of labor, a matter of grow-\nhas no official connection with ECOSOC it has\ning concern to the French.\naccess to ECOSOC meetings. Hached, by ac-\nCommunism. A small but active Commu-\ncepting WFTU membership for his union, has\nnist Party, guided by Mohammed Ennafaa, has\nplaced himself in a position to make use of\nachieved a limited degree of success in mak-\nthe propagandistic values attaching to this\ning common cause with the Neo-Destourians\nindirect connection. The UGTT may ulti-\nin local labor's demands for the elimination\nmately withdraw from the WFTU and join\nof social and economic injustice. The Com-\nthe anti-Communist ICFTU, with which the\nmunist Party of Tunisia has had more tan-\nleaders have expressed sympathy. French\ngible results than its Algerian and Moroccan\nResidency officials have stated that they con-\ncounterparts in efforts toward a rapproche-\nsider the UGTT of greater importance than\nment with the nationalists. A Communist-\nthe USTT; however, the unions have equal\nSECRET\n12\nSECRET\nrepresentation at the consultative level in\nwas imposed and has not yet been lifted, except\neconomic and social matters. Because of its\nfor non-Communist French newspapers.\nrapid growth, the UGTT overshadows its spon-\n(1) Government.\nsor, the Neo-Destour party, and now occupies\na position that is potentially dangerous to\nThe shadow government of the Sherifian\nFrench interests. Although Communist la-\nmonarchy is represented at present by a Sul-\nbor in Tunisia failed to merge with and ab-\ntan of the Alaouite dynasty, in the person of\nsorb the larger nationalist labor union, Com-\nSidi Mohammed ben Youssef ben El-Hassan\nmunist influence upon Tunisian labor must\nV, eighth of his line, now in the twenty-third\nnot be discounted in view of the UGTT's affi-\nyear of his reign.\nliation with the WFTU.\nUnder the terms of the Treaty of Fez, the\nC. Morocco.\nFrench Government is represented by a Resi-\nThe native government which the French\ndent General who is the sole diplomatic inter-\nfound in Morocco was much weakened by cor-\nmediary, with the rank of ambassador, be-\nruption, economic chaos, intrigues, and the\ntween the Sultan and all representation of\nrivalries of pretenders to the sultanate.\nforeign powers in Morocco. The Resident\nGeneral is responsible also for the implemen-\nUnder the guiding genius of Marshal Lyau-\ntation of the treaty.\ntey, France took full advantage of the political\nand economic disorder within the decrepit\nThis officer, a political appointee, is selected\nSherifian 1 Empire. The French installed\nby the French Council of Ministers, and is\ntheir own government beside a native govern-\nresponsible to the French Ministry of Foreign\nment (Makhzen) which was composed of the\nAffairs. Three soldiers, including the present\nremnants of the old Moorish imperial regime.\nincumbent, General Alphonse Juin, and six\nIn addition to the over-all administration of\ncivilians have held this position during the\nthe area, the Treaty of Fez permitted the\n38 years of the Protectorate's existence.\nFrench Government to assume the responsi-\nThe Resident General is assisted chiefly by\nbility for the conduct of Moroccan foreign af-\na Deputy whose title is Delegate to the Resi-\nfairs and the maintenance of a defense force.\ndency General and who is a career officer of\nThe Moslem religion and the native customs\nthe French Foreign Service. The Resident\nwere respected; the authority of the sultanate\nGeneral is also assisted by a Diplomatic Coun-\nwas diminished and the reformation of the\nsellor and by the chiefs of his civil, military,\nSherifian Government was begun. The terri-\nand diplomatic cabinets. (See accompanying\ntorial limits of the Sherifian Empire included\nchart.)\nthen, as now, the French, Spanish, and Inter-\nThe Resident General exercises direct con-\nnational (Tangier) Zones of Morocco.\ntrol over the Directorates of the Interior and\nDespite the fact that the Treaty of Fez\nSherifian Affairs, and the Security Services,\nprovides for a protectorate, the French have\nall of which are concerned with the political\ngoverned Morocco since 1912 under a state of\nproblems of a country which has evolved from\nsiege decree. This places the population un-\ntribalism to the initial stages of a modern\nder modified martial law which gives the\nsociety in less than four decades. The Direc-\nFrench military and civil authorities the right\ntorate of the Interior is the most important\nto intervene in cases of civil disobedience and\nof these agencies because it exercises police\nto exercise the extraordinary disciplinary\ncontrol over the entire area. The Directorate\npowers that would otherwise be inapplicable.\nof Sherifian Affairs is charged with liaison\nIn addition, in 1939 strict military censorship\nbetween the various branches of the French\n\"Sherifian\" derives from the title \"Sherif,\" de-\nand native governments and is the medium\nnoting an Arab prince or chief descended from the\nby which official communications are dis-\nprophet Mohammed, bestowed upon the Sultans of\npatched and received between the rural Caids\nMorocco of the present dynasty. Succession to the\nsultanate is elective within the dynasty, and not\n(tribal chiefs), the urban Pashas (mayors),\nnecessarily hereditary.\nand the Makhzen.\nSECRET\nORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRENCH MOROCCO\nRESIDENT GENERAL\nSULTAN\nDELEGATE OF\nSECRETARY GENERAL\nGrand Vizir\nChief of Protocol\nRESIDENCY\nOF PROTECTORATE\n( Policy )\n( Administration )\nMendoub Tangier\nPublic Security\nCivil\nIndustry\nPublic Works\nFinance\nJustice\nDiplomatic\nCabinet\nPolitical\nand Mines\nCounselor\nSecretariat\nDiplomatic\nIndustrial\nPublic\nCabinet\nMilitary\nPublic\nHabous\nCabinet\nProduction\nHealth\nand Mines\nEducation\nInterior\nJudicial\nEducation\nAgriculture\nSherifian\nCounselor\nPublic Health\nand Commerce\nAffairs\nAgriculture\nFinance\nWE 550\n13\nAnother figure of importance in the Resi-\nFrench minority. Delegates (77 in number)\ndency 1 is the Secretary General of the Pro-\nof the French section are elected by French\ntectorate who controls and coordinates the\ncitizens. In 1948, for the first time, delegates\nnon-political administrative services. He\nto the Second College (21 members) of the\nsupervises the Directorate of Public Works (of\nnative Moroccan section were elected; the\nimportance in a region where no roads existed\nremainder (56 members of the First and Third\n38 years ago), the Directorate of Education\ncolleges) continue to be appointed.\n(charged with reducing the high illiteracy\nThe electorates which choose these dele-\nrate), and the Directorate of Public Health\ngates are composed of large numbers of \"repre-\nand Family Care (which with ever increasing\nsentative\" farmers, and businessmen and in-\nresponsibilities is charged with the health and\ndustrialists, who are organized into regional\nsanitation of a population which until 1912\nadvisory Chambers of Agriculture, and of\nwas living under extremely unsanitary condi-\nCommerce and Industry. Agriculturalists\ntions). The Directorate of Finance, also un-\nwho are elected to the Council of Government\nder his control, is a complex organization\nconstitute the First College of that body; busi-\nwhich includes central services and the de-\nnessmen and industrialists constitute the Sec-\ncentralized services of registry, stamp-duty,\nond College; a third College, which has existed\ndomain or landed property, and the adminis-\nsince 1926, consists of functionaries, em-\ntration of customs and internal revenue. It\nployees, and members of the liberal profes-\nis also heir to the old Service of the Debt\nsions.\nwhich was part of the Makhzen before the\nestablishment of the Protectorate in 1912. In\nIn the absence of any popularly elected\naddition, there are two directorates: that of\nassembly empowered to pass laws, legislation\nAgriculture, Commerce, and Forests and that\nis promulgated by \"dahir.\"2 Refusal to sign\nof Industrial Production and Mines. The\na Protectorate dahir is a prerogative enjoyed\nSherifian Office of Control and Exportation\nby the Sultan which the present incumbent\nand the Moroccan Office of Tourism, charged\nhas invoked occasionally, and from which, in\nrespectively with international trade and\ncertain instances, no amount of pressure from\ntravel, are both under the Directorate of Agri-\nthe Residency has been able to deter him.\nculture and Commerce. The Postal, Tele-\nSome dahirs have, nevertheless, become law\ngraph and Telephone Services are combined\nwithout the Sultan's signature.\nin an office, not a Directorate, also under the\n(3) Native and Local Administration.\nauthority of the Secretary General of the Pro-\ntectorate.\nNative administration is concentrated un-\nder the Sultan in a central Makhzen or native\n(2) Legislative System.\ngovernment, a relic of the old Sherifian Em-\nA Council of Government was created in\npire. Principal official posts are those of\n1919, and enlarged in 1926, to assist and ad-\nGrand Vizir (Prime Minister), presently occu-\nvise the Resident General. It is composed of\npied by the aged Mohammed Hadj el Mokri,\nFrench and Moroccan sections which convene\nVizir of Justice, Vizir of the Habous (inalien-\nseparately twice annually. The sessions of\nable collective religious property and endow-\nthe Council of Government, during which the\nment for support of religious or charitable\ndelegates of all three Colleges are consulted,\ninstitutions), a Director of Protocol, and five\nafford the Resident General a considerable\nrepresentatives of the Grand Vizir assigned\ncross section of public opinion, both Moroccan\nto the modern Sherifian departments referred\nand French.\nto above, which are the chief technical depart-\nThe chief function of the Council of Gov-\nments with French direction.\nernment is to make recommendations on the\nbudget and on lesser matters of economic and\n2 A dahir is a decree-law promulgated by the Resi-\nsocial interest to the native majority and\ndent General and signed by the Sultan or the Grand\nVizir. An order of the Vizir is a statutory order\n1 The term \"Residency\" is used to designate the\nissued by the Grand Vizir acting under powers per-\nResident General and his closest official colleagues.\nmanently delegated by the Sultan.\nSECRET\n14\nSECRET\nThe Resident General is represented by\nStates which retains its capitulatory rights\nFrench Civil Controllers in his relations with\nand privileges in Morocco and exercises con-\nthe native Makhzen authorities of the urban\nsular jurisdiction. This relic of extraterri-\ncenters and rural inland areas. Native Af-\ntorial justice owes its existence to the con-\nfairs officers, however, still remain in charge\ntinued adherence of the United States to its\nof administrative functions in the more re-\nTreaties with Morocco of 1787 and 1836, the\nmote parts of Morocco.\nlatter a renewal and development of the\nMorocco is divided into seven regions: of\nformer, and to the reaffirmation, extension\nthese, three (Oujda, Rabat, Casablanca) are\nand clarification of these treaties by the Ma-\neach headed by a French Civil Controller;\ndrid Convention of 1880 and the Act of Alge-\nthree (Marrakech, Meknes, Fez) by a general\nciras of 1906.\nor colonel of the French Army; and one, the\nAs in metropolitan France, there are courts\nAgadir-Confines of the Sahara, is a military\nof the peace, courts of first instance, and a\narea under command of a general.\nCourt of Appeals. There is, however, a nota-\nNineteen cities of Morocco are organized as\nble absence of the small army of court officials\nmunicipalities, and governed separately from\nso prevalent in France. The functions of\nthe regions. Two of the larger cities, Casa-\nthese minions of the law are discharged by\nblanca and Fez, because of their mixed Mos-\nthe auxiliary servants of justice, composed of\nlem and European (French) populations have\na body of secretary-registrars, or recorders,\ntwo administrations, one Moroccan and the\nand also are assumed to some extent by the\nother French.\nlawyers who act in the official capacity of\n(4) Representation in Paris.\nattorneys and notaries. Since 1930 a certain\nLike the Tunisians, Moroccans are not rep-\nnumber of notaries have been appointed for\nresented in the French Parliament and refuse\nthe larger cities by the protectorate govern-\nto participate in the Assembly of the French\nment.\nUnion. They also resent the fact that the\nThe courts of first instance also have crim-\nFrench residents in Morocco, who number\ninal jurisdiction, and perform the functions of\nabout a quarter of a million (less than three\nFrench Courts of Assizes. The number of\npercent of the total population) are repre-\nassessor-jurors is limited to six, of whom at\nsented by three members in the French Coun-\nleast three must be French citizens; the others\ncil of the Republic. These officials are desig-\nare European or Moroccan, according to the\nnated in Morocco as candidates for the Coun-\nnationality of the person on trial.\ncil of the Republic, by the people they repre-\nBefore the arrival of the French, the native\nsent, and are subsequently elected in and by\ncourts, from that of the Sultan down, had\nthe French National Assembly.\nabsolute authority. A pasha, or mayor, for\nThe combined French citizen membership\nexample, was all things to his people; he was\nin the French Council of the Republic for\na governor, a direct representative of the Sul-\nTunisia (two) and Morocco (three) is only 1.5\ntan for purposes of administration and ap-\npercent of the upper house of Parliament and\npeal, and a judge of criminal proceedings,\nis politically negligible.\nwhose sentences were immediately executed.\n(5) Judicial System.\nThe French have instituted certain reforms,\nIn Morocco, as in Algeria and Tunisia, the\nsuch as the abolition of corporal punishment,\nsystem of justice is dual. French justice,\nincluding mutilations. In many ways Mos-\nbased on the Napoleonic Code, was instituted\nlem justice is still primitive by western stand-\nby Marshal Lyautey in 1913. With one ex-\nards and native nationalists have urged that\nception, the foreign consular courts which ex-\nthe Moslem laws be modernized and codified.\nisted prior to 1913 were eliminated over a\nDivorce procedures are loose and facile. As\nperiod of years, with the recognition of the\nmatters stand, civil law suits can be dragged\nFrench Protectorate by foreign powers. These\nout interminably, especially in the lower tri-\ncourts were superseded by the French court\nbunals such as those in which the Cadis exer-\nsystem. The sole exception is the United\ncise their religious jurisdiction, the temporal\nSECRET\nSECRET\n15\njurisdiction of the Pashas and Caids, and to a\nfanatical leaders. Their potential influence is\nlesser extent in the Djemaas,¹ the local assem-\nreckoned by the French less on a numerical\nblies of the Berber tribes. The power of jus-\nbasis than on the assumption that these par-\ntice of the Pashas has been somewhat reduced\nties constitute a hard core of a widely-held but\nand their activities placed under the control\ngenerally latent nationalistic feeling which\nof a French court adviser, known as a Govern-\ncould be aroused and put into action under\nment Commissioner. Penalties entailing a\nconditions generally unfavorable to the\nprison term of more than two years have been\nFrench administration.\nunder the jurisdiction of the High Sherifian\nNationalist leaders agree generally that the\nCourt in Rabat since 1918.\nnative population is immature politically, as\nThe Jewish minority, about three percent of\ncompared with their neighbors in Tunisia.\nthe total population, has its own rabbinical\nBut, having given up hope of obtaining any\ncourts, competent for civil lawsuits, and an\nreal preparation for independence from the\nappellate jurisdiction, the High Rabbinical\nFrench, Istiqlal leaders demand complete and\nCourt of Rabat.\nimmediate independence with a constitutional\ngovernment under the Sultan. They admit,\n(6) Reform Measures.\nhowever, that they would require French or\nThe reforms indicated in the Treaty of Fez\nother outside assistance for a time after such\nhave been realized only in part. Not only was\nindependence was achieved.\nmuch time consumed in the pacification of the\nIt is of interest to note that the Sultan's\ncountry and in the fighting of two world wars,\npopularity with the mass of the people has\nbut the fact is that French policy, hoping\ngrown constantly as he has offered resistance\nto keep Morocco in subject status, has at cer-\nto Resident General Juin. The Sultan has\ntain times either opposed or failed to imple-\ngiven strong, consistent, but usually covert,\nment the changes proposed in these articles.\nsupport to the Istiqlal party, despite the\nA more rapid rate of progress has been made\nblandishments and threats of the French\nsince 1947 than in any comparable period in\nauthorities, which have included defamation\nthe past in the fields of judicial, administra-\nof character, and even a few trial balloons\ntive, educational, economic, and financial re-\ndesigned to test public response to the idea\nform.\nof placing young Prince Moulay Hassan on\n(7) Political Parties.\nhis father's throne.\nNationalism. Nationalism is the chief\nIstiqlal has benefited by the fanatical and\nrallying point of politically conscious Moroc-\nenergetic leadership of Allal el Fassi, now re-\ncans. The French have outlawed, but toler-\nsiding in Tangier because he fears curtailment\nate, both of the nationalist parties: the im-\nof his liberty should he return to French\nportant Istiqlal (Independence) and the very\nMorocco. The present active leader of Istiqlal\nmuch smaller but corrupt, from the native\nin Morocco is Ahmed Balafrej who, although\nviewpoint, Shoura (Democratic Independ-\nlacking the fire and eloquence of El Fassi, is\nence). Istiqlal is one of the more pro-US and\na better political organizer and enjoys the con-\nanti-USSR nationalist parties in North Africa.\nfidence and strong backing of the Sultan.\nUnder the leadership of Mohammed ben\nAlthough the precise size of these illegal\nHassan el Wazzani, its founder, the Shoura\norganizations is unknown, it is probable that\nparty has weakened itself because of its will-\ntogether they do not exceed 50,000. Their\ningness to compromise with the French, for\nvitality arises chiefly from hatred of the\nwhom it has acted as a stalking-horse. It\nFrench and from religious sentiments which\nhas, consequently, failed to divide nationalist\nare frequently inflamed by competent and\nopinion, although it has attempted to do so\nby advocating Moroccan autonomy within the\n1 Djemaas are administrative, judicial, and at\ntimes legislative.\nframework of the French Union. In this re-\nDjemaas judiciaires, with strictly judicial func-\nspect, it has fallen in line with an earlier policy\ntions, exist in Berber territory; there were 16 such\nof the Communists with whom the Shoura is\ntribunals in 1929.\nreported to have engaged in limited collabora-\nSECRET\n16\nSECRET\ntion. Shoura leaders reportedly came around\nhave more recently been somewhat successful\nto Istiqlal's thinking in the spring of 1950, and\nin their proselytizing in the rural areas. Com-\nboth groups now strive toward complete sep-\nmunist influence is more evident in the field\naration from French control.\nof labor in Morocco than in the political arena,\nCommunism. The Moroccan Communist\nwhere it carries little weight.\nParty, like its counterparts in Tunisia and Al-\nd. Committee for the Liberation of North\ngeria, makes up for its small size by its volu-\nAfrica.\nbility and close organization. It also enjoys\nInternational liaison among nationalist\na considerable advantage over the nationalist\nleaders has been maintained through the\nparties because it has legal status and controls\nCommittee for the Liberation of North Africa,\nthe principal labor federation.\nformed in Cairo in January 1948 under the\nIn the absence of its former leader, the Al-\nchairmanship of the Rif leader, Abd-el-Krim.\ngerian Ali Yata, driven underground by the\nEleven delegates representing all nationalist\nFrench, the destinies of the Party are in the\nparties except the Algerian UDMA party com-\nhands of Abdeslam Bourquia, a typical fol-\nposed the original committee. The aim of the\nlower of the usual anti-US political and Com-\norganization was to work for the complete in-\nmunist-directed CGT labor lines. He is less\ndependence of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco,\nnoxious to the French than the more appeal-\nwithout negotiating with the French or Span-\ning and inflammatory Ali Yata.\nish before achieving independence. The com-\nBecause the Istiqlal and the Sultan are both\nmittee seeks to obtain this independence by\napprehensive of Soviet intentions, Communist\npeaceful means, if possible, and contends that\nadvances toward rapprochement with the\nif violence is necessary the responsibility will\nnationalists have met with much more resist-\nlie with France and Spain.\nance than in Algeria and Tunisia. Recently,\nThe committee has proved ineffective be-\nhowever, fear that the US might relinquish\ncause of the lack of delegated authority from\nits privileged treaty position in Morocco, in\nthe North African parties, the failure of Abd-\ndeference to increasing French objections, has\nel-Krim to regain his prestige since his exile,\nled Moroccan nationalists to despair of US\nthe return to North Africa of the most influ-\naid or sympathy in their struggle for inde-\nential committee members, the defeat of the\npendence. This pessimism has caused the\nArab League on the Palestine question, and\nIstiqlal to take under consideration proffered\nthe League's declining influence and loss of\nCommunist assistance in spite of the incom-\nprestige in North Africa. Being located in\npatibility of Islam and Communism. Only\nfriendly Egyptian territory, however, the Cairo\npolitical expediency would prompt the nation-\nheadquarters has been able, to a degree not\nalists to accept this assistance.\npossible within North Africa, to contact and\nThe similarity of Communist activities and\nseek the assistance of Arab and other friendly\ntheir timing throughout North Africa indicate\nnations, to establish an active propaganda\nthat the three Communist parties in Algeria,\ncenter, and to meet freely to study North\nTunisia, and Morocco operate according to a\nAfrican problems. Recent statements by\ncommon plan directed from Paris. The So-\nAbd-el-Krim suggest that he is seeking to in-\nviet Consulate in Algiers undoubtedly main-\ncrease the activity and the influence of the\ntains contact with the local leaders and the\ncommittee and to focus world attention on\nFrench Communist Party, as well as with\nnationalist aspirations.\nMoscow.\nA second North African nationalist group,\nBecause of the French ban on Moslem\nthe Maghreb Bureau, forerunner of the Com-\nlabor's right to organize, the French have\nmittee for the Liberation of North Africa,\nplayed into the Communists' hands and the\nfunctioned until recently in Cairo. This body\nCommunist-directed local CGT has with rela-\nconsisted of representatives of Istiqlal, Neo-\ntive ease dominated European and native\nDestour, and MTLD, and maintained a sep-\nlabor. Despite the rigid control exercised by\narate entity although cooperating with the\nthe protectorate, Communists in Morocco\nAbd-el-Krim Committee. The eclipse of its\n17\nactivities by the Committee for the Liberation\nFrench economy; many schools have been\nof North Africa and the decline in vitality of\nestablished, the state of public health and\nthe Arab League, from which it received lim-\nsanitation is much improved, roads and rail-\nited financial assistance, have caused the\nways have been built, and a degree of public\nMaghreb Bureau to suspend operations, at\nsecurity established which is far superior to\nleast for the present.\nthe conditions which prevailed before the\nestablishment of French control.\n3. Stability of the Present Administration.\nThe value of its North African interests to\nThe French political position in North\nthe French nation is a compound of history,\nAfrica may be regarded as stable but on the\neconomy, and sentiment. The region as a\ndefensive. The major force, aside from war,\nproducer of wealth for the \"protecting\" na-\nwhich might cause the French to move out\ntion cannot be compared to the rich Nether-\nat some later date is not only the nationalist\nlands East Indies when under Dutch control\nmovements in the area but the change in\nor to India during the British occupation. In-\nworld attitude toward colonial possessions.\ndeed, if it were possible to compute the total\nThe British withdrawal from India, Burma,\nmilitary costs as well as those of civil admin-\nand Ceylon in 1948, the establishment of Israel\nistration, both French and native, including\nin 1949, recent developments in Indonesia and\nthe improvements which have been realized,\nIndochina, and the United Nations General\nit is probable that such a theoretical financial\nAssembly's decision to grant independence to\nstatement would show an over-all deficit for\nLibya, including the Fezzan, by 1952, all affect\nFrance. To be sure, many individual French-\nthe future of the French in North Africa.\nmen and groups have grown rich in North\nThe nationalist leaders will continue to ex-\nAfrica, and the growing volume of trade is\nploit this situation in their dealings with the\nfairly substantial, but whereas the British held\nFrench and the US. Much emphasis will also\nIndia with its population of 450,000,000 for\nbe laid on the anti-democratic menace of\nmany decades with a garrison of 50,000\nCommunism. But the fact remains that most\ntroops, the French are even now employing\nof the peoples in French North Africa have\nnot less than 90,000 troops in their far less\nlived for centuries in a culture pattern which\nopulent African domain in order to keep\nhas afforded them no mass sense of demo-\n21,000,000 natives in order.\ncratic procedures. The growing native mid-\nThe French view of the matter does not stop\ndle class has not yet developed sufficient size\nthere, however. Much French blood has been\nor cohesiveness to exert an effective political\nshed, and an enormous amount of capital has\ninfluence. Most nationalist leaders, when\nbeen expended. The hope is always latent in\nthey speak of independence and liberty for\nthe French estimate of the situation that\nthe area, are aware of the fact that they do\nNorth Africa, rather than making a few\nnot represent a literate and politically con-\nFrenchmen rich, may eventually return at\nscious population which could in the next\nleast a quid pro quo to the French nation as\ndecade realize a system of popular self-govern-\na whole. It is also assumed that the area will\nment. Nor do the natives, save for a minority,\nserve as a political and military refuge should\ndesire a democratic government. They do,\nhowever, feel the resentment common to all\nFrance be again overrun by an enemy and\noccupied peoples, and desire to be rid of\nthat it might again serve as a springboard\nFrench control.\nfor a successful counterattack. It should also\nbe noted that while the world empires of the\nIt is generally admitted, however, even by\nmany of the more ardent nationalists, that\nnineteenth century have been falling apart\nthe French have, on the whole, benefited the\nwith notable rapidity since the end of the\narea sociologically and economically. During\nsecond World War, French amour propre is\nthe past 36 years France was engaged in two\nstill stimulated by the fact that these protec-\nlife-and-death struggles against Germany,\ntorates exist and that Algeria is politically, at\nwith results that were all but disastrous to\nleast, an integral part of the French nation.\n18\nSECRET\nFrance will, therefore, endeavor to hold the\ntive populations than it has thus far seen fit\nregion, although in doing so it will be required\nto accord.\nto grant much greater concessions to the na-\nSECRET\nCHAPTER II\nECONOMIC SITUATION\n1. Genesis of the Present Economic System:\nThe great majority of the 20 million natives\nEconomic Factors Concurrent with and Subse-\nexist on a low standard of living, which is\nquent to French Military Penetration and Politi-\nbecoming further depressed because the popu-\ncal Administration of North Africa.\nlation is increasing at the rate of 1.7 percent\nThe present economic system in French\nannually while food production has remained\nNorth Africa is based on three factors: (1) the\nrelatively constant. The natives, 85 to 90 per-\nprimitive production and trading which char-\ncent of whom are illiterate, are engaged in\nacterize the Berber and Arab civilization; (2)\nsmall-scale agriculture, commerce, mining,\nthe traditional utilization of the area as a\nand handicrafts. Few of the natives are\nready market for the output of French indus-\nskilled workers or technicians, and most of\ntry; and (3) the recent efforts of the French\nthese could not meet western standards. Un-\ntoward industrialization against the possi-\nemployment is not a serious problem except\nbility that France will again be overrun by an\nduring drought years.\ninvader.\nNationalization is widespread among non-\nThe economic development of the area was\nnative industries. It is manifested in vary-\ndeliberately retarded during the nineteenth\ning degrees of French, Algerian, and Protec-\ncentury by French policy designed to protect\ntorate Government control, by government\nthe interests of metropolitan industry and\nparticipation in capitalization or in manage-\ncommerce. Until recently, industrialists were\nment, and by subsidies. The governments\ndiscouraged from establishing factories in\nhave majority participation in all petroleum\nNorth Africa to produce finished or semi-\nindustries, public utilities, and local airlines.\nfinished goods. French commercial interests\nNearly all rail lines are state-owned. Tobacco\nretain special advantages in Tunisia and Al-\nprocessing, the manufacture of matches, the\ngeria. Morocco, on the other hand, by virtue\ndistillation of alcohol, and exploitation of for-\nof the Treaty of Algeciras (1906) maintains\nest lands are state monopolies. Most mining\nan \"Open Door Policy\" and imposes import\nactivities are strictly regulated.\nduties and special import taxes.¹ In general,\n2. The Present Economic Situation.\ninter-territorial trade is free throughout the\na. Agriculture.\narea.\nIt appears, however, that the profits which\nAlgeria, Tunisia, and Morocco comprise an\nhave accrued to French individuals and in-\narea of more than a million square miles, of\ndustries have been, in the long run, more than\nwhich about three-quarters are sterile desert\noffset by the vast military and civil expendi-\nor wasteland; the balance (250,000 square\ntures necessary to pacify and govern the im-\nmiles) is arable. Production per acre of such\npoverished natives.\nessential crops as wheat and barley averages,\nhowever, little more than half the US output.\n1 Goods of foreign origin on entry into the French\nFrench agriculturists have demonstrated\nZone of Morocco are subject to an import duty of\nthat the use of modern agricultural practices\n10 percent ad valorem, except for silk, fabrics, pre-\nand equipment would permit the area to meet\ncious stones, jewelry, wines, liquors, and alimentary\nits own food requirements and to produce a\npastes on which the duty is 5 percent ad valorem.\nIn addition to the import duty, a special tax of 2.5\nsubstantial surplus for export. Most of the\npercent ad valorem is levied on imports into the\nland is, however, farmed by natives who still\nFrench Zone.\nemploy primitive methods. They have little\nSECRET\n19\n20\nECRET\nknowledge of insect control, use poor quality\nturned over to French colonists. When still\nseeds, and seriously lack irrigation facilities.\nmore land was needed for colonization, the\nSevere droughts in recent years and a scarcity\nFrench forced modification of the existing\nof consumer goods in local markets have\nMoslem laws and customs and thereby legal-\nhelped retard production.\nized the permanent alienation of both habous\nBecause of the war and the droughts which\nand collective lands to Europeans, who ob-\noccurred through 1943-45, the food situation\ntained rights tantamount to private owner-\nbecame so stringent that essential commodi-\nship. As a direct result of these ruthless oper-\nties were rationed until the late winter and\nations, almost half the natives in Algeria were\nearly spring of 1949. Conditions have now SO\nuprooted.\nimproved that only such imported items as\nLater, in Tunisia, the French practiced a\ncoffee, green tea, and special milk products\nmilder land policy; native land tenure was dis-\nare on the restricted list. Shortages of meat\nturbed even less in Morocco. In both protec-\nand dairy products continue.\ntorates, however, reduction of communal lands\n(1) Land Utilization.\nrather than confiscation of large areas pre-\nLand tenure, before the French occupation,\nvailed, and native laws regarding habous and\nwas governed by tribal custom and Moslem\ncollective land were modified.\nlaw. When French occupation began, a small\nThe rate of transfer of land from native to\nportion of each territory was privately owned,\nFrench control has slowed down appreciably,\npossibly one-third was habous property (en-\nalthough allotments of agricultural land are\ndowed for the support of religious charities),\nset aside annually for European colonization.\nwhile the vast bulk of the land was collectively\nFrom the meager statistics available on land\nowned by tribes or tribal fractions. Almost\ntenure, it has been estimated that Europeans\nimmediately after occupying Algeria, the\nfarm about 47 percent of the cultivated land\nFrench confiscated large areas of the tribal\nin Algeria, 22.5 percent in Tunisia, and 14 per-\nlands, thus forcing the natives back into\ncent in Morocco, as indicated in the following\nmountains and deserts. The seized land was\ntable. Comparatively small areas of land,\nLAND USE\nALGERIA\n8,371,200\n544,640,000 acres\n7,423,500\nTUNISIA\n6,391,400\n1,855,600\n30,887,500 acres\nMOROCCO\n104,220,000 acres\n13,534,000\n2,203,200\nCultivated\nCultivated by\nUncultivated\nby Natives\nEuropeans\nALGERIA\nTUNISIA\nMOROCCO\nVINEYARDS,\nORCHARDS, GARDENS\n0.3%\n3.2%\n0.5%\nFALLOW\n1.1%\n8.8%\n4.6%\nANNUAL CROPS\n1.5%\n14.7%\n10.0%\nUNPRODUCTIVE\n86.4%\n29.6%\n54.9%\nFOREST\n1.7%\n8.1%\n5.9%\nPASTURE\n9.0%\n35.6%\n18.9%\nSTEPPE LANDS\nPRODUCING ALFA\n5.2%\nWE 650\nSECRET\n21\nwhich are to be made arable by irrigation\neventually be reflected in increased yields. Al-\nprojects, will be distributed primarily to\nthough the 1949 estimated harvest is only\nnatives.\nslightly below that of 1948 and compares\n(2) Production.\nfavorably with the 1935-39 average, it must\nIn economic importance, cereals lead all\nbe remembered that the North African popu-\nother products. These are followed by wine,\nlation has increased by 3,000,000 (or eighteen\npercent) in the intervening decade. It is\ncitrus fruits, green vegetables, olives and olive\noil, cork, livestock, fibers, and tobacco.\nprobable that local breadgrain requirements\nin 1949-50 will be satisfied, but is unlikely\n(3) Cereals.\nthat there will be any large quantity for ex-\nAll cereal production, centered largely in\nport. On the other hand, the large exporta-\nthe rich coastal regions, is under strict gov-\nble surplus of barley cannot be sold on the\nernmental control. Of the acreage sown, 84\nworld market because North African prices are\npercent normally is devoted to wheat (44 per-\ntoo high.\ncent) and barley (40 percent). Native\n(4) Wine.\nfarmers favor barley because it requires less\nViticulture is of great importance in French\ncultivation and is more resistant to drought.\nNorth Africa, particularly in Algeria, where\nAs may be seen from the following table,\none-half of the total exports consist of wine.\ncereal production has been fairly static over\nIn 1948 Algerian wine production totalled 334\nthe last fourteen years. Cognizant of the\nmillion gallons, or considerably below the esti-\nneed to increase production, both French and\nmated average prewar annual production of\nlocal authorities are intensifying their efforts\n500 million gallons. A vast program of re-\nto educate native farmers and procure more\nhabilitation of vineyards is under way, and in\nefficient tools for their use. The arrival of\nabout ten years maximum production may\nmodern farm equipment through ECA should\nagain be reached.\nCEREAL PRODUCTION\n(In metric tons)\nWHEAT\nBARLEY\nOATS\nCORNª\n1935-39 average\n2,000,000\n2,075,000\n221,500\n218,000\n1946\n2,670,000\n1,669,000\n173,720\n220,000\n1947\n1,728,000\n1,782,000\n120,000\n257,000\n1948 preliminary\n2,150,000\n2,260,000\n216,560\n340,000\n1949 estimate\n2,079,000\n2,290,000\n243, 200ᵇ\n319,000\n1949 estimate for France (as of 1 August 1949)\n7,068,000\n1,354,000\n3,196,000\na Morocco only.\nb Algeria and Morocco only.\nCOMPARATIVE YIELDS\n(In bushels per acre, average computed from 1946-47-48 yields)\n37.7\n32.3\n34.2 35.7\n26.3\n22.7\n25.6\n'46\n22.6\nonly\n14.7\n15.8\n'46&'48\n17.2\n17.8\n14.0\n10.3\naverage\n9.5\n8.27\n6.45\n4.8\nALGERIA\nMOROCCO\nTUNISIA\nFRANCE\nU.S.\nWheat\nBarley\nOats\nCorn\nWE 750\n*insignificant\nR E\n22\nSECRET\nThe vast majority of Algerian wines are\nplantings are owned by natives. Yearly pro-\ncommon table varieties used extensively in\nduction has risen from 18,000 metric tons for\nFrance for blending with the finer grade\n1945-46 to about 25,000 metric tons during\nFrench wines. In 1948 almost 238 million gal-\n1948-49. The maximum possible production\nlons were exported to France and other French\nfrom present cultivation is 50,000 metric tons\nterritories, more than two-thirds of the total\nannually.\nAlgerian production.\nIn 1949, the Algerian commercial produc-\nTunisia and Morocco are net importers of\ntion of dried figs amounted to 16,500 metric\nwine; domestic production in both countries\ntons. Date exports amounted in 1948-49 to\nis substantially lower than consumption.\n24,500 metric tons, a portion going to Morocco.\nThe following table compares the 1947 and\nAlmonds produced in Morocco amounted to\n1948 wine production for French North Africa\n4,200 metric tons in 1948-49, and are esti-\nwith that of France, the world's leading pro-\nmated at 3,440 metric tons for 1949-50.\nducer, and of Spain:\nFrance is the only important importer of\nMoroccan almonds.\nPRODUCTION\n(In gallons)\n(6) Vegetables.\nCOUNTRY\n1948\n1947\nPulse production, chiefly broad beans, len-\nTunisia\n15,800,000\n12,000,000\ntils, peas, chick peas, and beans, totalled 131,-\nAlgeria\n334,000,000\n219,000,000\n000 metric tons for Algeria and Morocco in\nMorocco\n10,500,000\n11,000,000\n1947-48. Normally, production is in excess\nTotal French North\nof the countries' needs, and substantial ex-\nAfrica\n360,300,000\n242,000,000\nports are customary. There is also a consid-\nFrance\n1,129,000,000\n1,031,000,000\nerable production and export of fresh vegeta-\nSpain\n475,000,000\n536,000,000\nbles. (From Morocco alone, a monthly aver-\nage of more than 4,300 metric tons of fresh\n(5) Fruits.\nvegetables was exported in 1949.)\nFruit growing ranks third as a source of\n(7) Oils.\nNorth Africa's agricultural wealth, with citrus\nLarge imports of peanut and palm oil\nfruits predominating. Algeria, Tunisia, and\nfrom West Africa permit French North Africa\nMorocco devote a total of 123,550 acres to\nto export quantities of olive and linseed oils.\ncitrus fruits, and the production goal is 350,-\nAlgerian and Moroccan olive crops in 1948\n000 metric tons (almost 50 percent higher\ntotalled 123,000 metric tons, from which were\nthan the 1947-48 yield of 237,300 metric tons),\npressed some 14,000 metric tons of olive oil.\nor slightly more than three percent of the\nAlgerian oil is consumed domestically, but\nworld's total.\nMoroccan olive oil is one of the largest sources\nAs in the case of wine, Algeria leads the\nof dollars for the Protectorate Government,\nother two countries in citrus fruit production,\nwhich exported 4,916 metric tons ($4,146,918\nwith 122,300 metric tons in 1947-48, of which\nin value) to the US in 1948. (In 1949, Moroc-\n93,472 tons were exported, principally to\nco exported 446.7 metric tons of olive oil to\nFrance. Over 90 percent of the groves are\nthe US, valued at $343,264.)\nowned by Europeans, who produce 92.5 per-\nProduction of olive oil in Tunisia fluctuates\ncent of the total output. As in the production\nseasonally. About 42,000 metric tons were\nof cereals, the more modern methods of culti-\nproduced in 1948-49, 25 percent above the\nvation employed by Europeans result in\n1940-49 average annual production. The\ngreater yield. Moroccan production has\n1949 surplus available for export amounted\nsteadily increased from 32,000 metric tons in\nto 10,000 tons, of which more than one-third\n1942-43 to an estimated 130,000 metric tons\nhas already been exported to France.\nin 1948-49, of which 81,801 tons were exported,\nchiefly to France. Plans are being made to\n(8) Livestock.\nexpand production to 175,000 metric tons by\nLivestock is not only a source of meat and\n1952-53. In Tunisia about 60 percent of the\nhides, or wool, but is also a source of draft\nSECRET\nSECRET\n23\nNORTH AFRICAN HERDS.\nAlgeria (1947)\nMorocco (1948)\nTunisia (1950)\nSHEEP\n3,000,000\n10,000,000*\n2,500,000\nGOATS\n2,145,000\n6,009,000\n1,800,000\nCATTLE\n682,000\n1,660,000\n450,000\nASSES\n282,000\n554,600\n185,000\nCAMELS\n140,000\n165,400\n150,000\nHORSES\n189,000\n155,000\n100,000\nMULES\n222,000\n140,800\n60,000\nHOGS\n90,000\n96,600\n60,000\n* 1950 estimate\nWE 850\npower. There is, however, a great deficit in\nSome 15,000 fishermen are employed in\ndairy products-annual milk production in Al-\nTunisian fisheries. Sponge fishing, produc-\ngeria, for instance, is about 9.5 pints per\ning about 125 tons annually, is the most im-\ncapita. During the years of severe drought\nportant element of the Tunisian fishing in-\n(1943-45), sheep and hogs were reduced by\ndustry. The annual fish catch is estimated at\nmore than one-half and other herds suffered\n9,000 metric tons.\nto a lesser extent. Adequate rainfall and good\npasturage have resulted in substantial im-\n(10) Tobacco.\nprovement in numbers, although several more\nAlgerian tobacco production, 19,500 metric\nyears will be required before drought losses\ntons in 1948, is almost sufficient to supply the\nare made good.\nlocal market. Tobacco imports are declining,\nThe table above indicates the approximate\nand exports increasing. Morocco raises a\nnumber of domestic animals in the area.\nsmall quantity of tobacco-1,600 metric tons\nWool production, which averaged 28,000\nin 1946.\nmetric tons annually in 1931-35, dropped to\nabout 22,000 metric tons in 1947 and 1948.\n(11) Fibers.\nConsumption is in excess of production, how-\nVegetable fiber and esparto and alfa grasses\never, and imports of South American and Aus-\ngrow wild. In 1948 Algeria and Morocco har-\ntralian wools are necessary to supply the\nvested some 115,000 metric tons of alfa (used\nwoolen trade. Although most goat hair is\nin the manufacture of fine paper), about one-\nprocessed locally, a small amount is exported\nthird of which was exported. About 130,000\n(Algerian production in 1948 was 5,500 metric\ntons of vegetable fiber were exported. Great\ntons, of which 375 were exported).\nBritain is the chief purchaser of Algerian\nFrance and French territories are the prin-\nesparto grass (used in the manufacture of\ncipal importers of North African hides, most\ncordage, shoes, baskets, and paper); produc-\nof which are tanned locally.\ntion in 1948 amounted to 162,025 metric tons.\nMorocco produces about 25 tons annually of\n(9) Fishing.\nsisal, and larger quantities of hemp and flax.\nMorocco has a sizable fishing industry, and\nplans are being developed for its expansion.\n(12) Forests.\nAuthorities hope that with the procurement\nThe forests and wooded areas of French\nof modern refrigeration equipment the Moroc-\nNorth Africa were estimated in 1937 to cover\ncan fishing industry can be extended to supply\n18.7 million acres. In Morocco about 56,000\nAlgeria and Tunisia, as well as to furnish fresh\nacres (of a total of 6,425,000 acres) is prima-\nfish for the French market. More than 1,400\nrily cork oak, and 64,750 acres predominantly\ncraft were engaged in fishing in 1948, and the\ncedar. Other stands include varieties of oaks\ncatch was estimated at 55,938 metric tons.\nand conifers.\nSECRET\n24\nSECRET\nIn Algeria (8,948,000 acres) and Tunisia\ncarried on by the state or by semi-private or\n(2,511,000 acres) wooded areas are principally\nprivate firms with governmental permit.\nscrub forests including oaks (cork, evergreen,\nSubstantial wage increases, higher costs of\nand deciduous), conifers, and wild olive.\ntransportation, and replacement of essential\nOases of date palms are found in desert areas\nequipment have forced the governments to\nof Algeria and to some extent in Tunisia.\ngrant subsidies to keep the mines in operation,\nWild cork is the principal forest product;\nwith the result that annual production equals\nothers include firewood, lumber, and some pit\nand in some cases surpasses prewar tonnages.\nprops for the local mines. Charcoal manu-\nAntiquated mining methods restrict mineral\nfacture is a widespread, small-scale native in-\noutput in all areas. Mechanization is not\ndustry; production and consumption statis-\nwarranted, however, at properties with low-\ntics are not available.\ngrade or limited reserves. Transportation\n(13) Cork.\ndifficulties, particularly in Morocco and Al-\nAlgerian cork production is surpassed only\ngeria, also hamper production.\nby Portugal and Spain. Algeria normally\nSince there are few smelters and phosphate\nproduces 35-40,000 metric tons of cork an-\nprocessing plants in North Africa, the bulk\nnually (one-seventh of the world production);\nof the raw ore is exported. This situation\nlesser amounts are produced in French Mo-\nwill probably continue because of the high\nrocco (17-18,000 metric tons) and Tunisia\ncost of plants and equipment, and the lack of\n(3,000 metric tons). Of the 1,087,000 acres\nskilled labor and of technical experts.\ndevoted to cork in Algeria, 617,750 acres of\nNorth Africa is the world's largest producer\nthe less desirable areas are owned by the state\nof phosphates with 5,761,000 metric tons\nand the balance by private individuals and\nmined in 1948. The two principal deposits\nlocal governments. Rehabilitation of cork\n(Khouribga and Louis Gentil), with tremen-\nforests is essential or production will soon be\ndous reserves and yielding 75 percent com-\ndrastically reduced.\nmercial ore, are in Morocco and furnish more\nThe government does not control the har-\nthan one-half of the total production. Most\nvesting and processing of cork. Some 17-\nof the remainder comes from Tunisian de-\n18,000 Algerian natives are employed for two\nposits, with a smaller production in Algeria.\nmonths annually in stripping the trees. About\nIron ore production in 1948 was more than\n14,000 metric tons of cork, or substantially\n2,868,000 metric tons, of which 1,870,700 were\nless than half the production, are processed\nmined in Algeria where reserves are estimated\nin Algeria in four large factories, fifteen small\nat 30 to 40 million tons (average iron content\nfactories, and 50 hand shops, employing a\n53 percent). Known reserves in Morocco are\ntotal of 5,000 laborers, and producing 4,000\nabout 30 million metric tons from which 30-\ntons of finished products, such as stoppers,\n85,000 metric tons are produced annually.\nmats, and similar articles. Because few cork\nTunisia also possesses substantial deposits.\nprocessing establishments exist in either\nMorocco is the only important source of\nFrench Morocco or Tunisia, a portion of Moroc-\ncan and Tunisian cork is processed in Algeria.\nmanganese ore in the French Union, and pro-\nduces at present about one-half of the French\nAll unprocessed cork and the bulk of the\nmanufactured products are exported. France\nsteel industry's requirements. Manganese\nis the principal importer of the manufactured\nproduction has almost tripled in the past dec-\nade (from 78,000 metric tons in 1938 to\nproducts, while the US imports raw and scrap\ncork as well as some manufactured articles.\n195,400 tons in 1948). The largest known de-\nposit is remotely located south of the Atlas\nb. Mineral Resources.\nmountains, far from railhead or seaport, and\nFrench North Africa's second most impor-\nproduction is limited by the carrying capac-\ntant economic asset is its mineral wealth.\nity of truck transport. With adequate trans-\nKnown sources of phosphates and iron ore are\nportation, production could be doubled in the\nextensive; mineral fuels are scarce or of poor\nnext few years, thus making France self-suf-\nquality. The development of all resources is\nficient in this strategic material, and perhaps\nSECRET\nSECRET\n25\nproviding a small exportable surplus. A semi-\ngrade. About 80 percent of Moroccan coal\nprocessing plant of limited capacity is located\nrequirements are imported. Tunisian indus-\nat Casablanca.\ntry and power depend entirely upon imported\nMany non-ferrous metals and non-metallic\nfuels.\nminerals are found in French North Africa.\nKnown petroleum resources are insignifi-\nAll areas produce substantial quantities of lead\ncant. Morocco is the only one of the three\nand zinc, while Algerian mines yield antimony,\nareas producing any appreciable amount of\nmercury, barite, and diatomite. Moroccan\npetroleum and in 1948 supplied only ten per-\nmineral production includes minor quantities\ncent of its own needs. Prospecting for oil is\nof copper-in the form of chalcopyrite-and\nunder way in all three areas. After prolonged\ncobalt.\nnegotiations, British and US oil interests were\nAlthough known coal deposits are estimated\nfinally granted permission in August 1949 to\nat 100 million metric tons, production is sub-\ninvestigate petroleum potentialities in Tunisia.\nstantially below requirements. Algerian coal\nPreliminary discussions are now under way by\nis of mediocre quality and three-quarters of\nUS and French capitalists who desire to pros-\nAlgerian consumption requirements are im-\npect in Algeria.\nported. Moroccan coal is of better quality\nThe following table compares 1948 produc-\nthan Algerian, yet is also considered low\ntion with that of 1947:\nMINERAL PRODUCTION\n(Metric tons)\nALGERIA\nTUNISIA\nMOROCCO\n1948 TOTAL\n1947 TOTAL\nFerrous Minerals\nIron Ore\n1,870,700\n696, 100\n301,300\n2,868,000\n2, 109, 500\nManganese Ore\n195,400\n195,400\n103,400\n(Mn content)\n(104,970)\n(104, 970)\n(49,000)\nPyrite\n34, 230\n3, 215\n37,440\n42,020\nNon-Ferrous Minerals\nLead Ore\n1, 750\n21,620\n39,200\n62, 570\n50,710\n(Lead concentrate)\n(1, 050)\n(13, 370)\n(28, 240)\n(42, 660)\n(34,960)\n(Lead metal)\n(17,960)\n*\n(9, 840)\nZinc Ore\n13, 780\n4, 940\n4,660\n23,380\n21,800\n(Blende)\n(560)\n(4, 720)\n(4, 070)\n(9, 350)\n(9, 880)\n(Calamine)\n(13, 220)\n(220)\n(590)\n(14,030)\n(11, 920)\n(Zn content)\n(6, 130)\n(2, 470)\n(2, 340)\n(10, 940)\n(10, 180)\nAntimony Ore\n2, 540\n895\n3,435\n1, 140\n(Sb content)\n(855)\n(450)\n(1, 305)\n(540)\nCobalt Ore\n2, 100\n2,100\n2, 660\n(Co content)\n(280)\n(280)\n(370)\nCopper Ore\n1, 800\n1,800\n170\n(Cu content)\n(440)\n(440)\n(40)\nMercury\n13. 15\n13. 15\n11. 7\nNon-metallic Minerals\nPhosphates\n670,600\n1,863,700\n3,226,700\n5,761,000\n5,422,800\nFuller's Earth\n27, 640\n3, 810\n31,450\n22,800\nDiatomite\n8, 410\n8, 410\n6, 540\nBarite\n7, 610\n230\n7, 840\n6, 970\nFluorspar\n525\n525\nAsbestos\n400\n400\n790\nGraphite\n285\n285\n440\nMineral Fuels\nCoal\n222, 600\n290,300\n512, 900\n473, 100\nLignite\n70, 520\n70,520\n75,700\nPetroleum\n110\n12, 920\n13,030\n3, 030\n* Produced in Tunisia from Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan ores.\nSECRET\n26\nSECRET\nc. Industry.\nand certain electrical products. Except for\nSince the war, the French Government has\nthe recent establishment in Casablanca of\nmodified its economic doctrine and encouraged\nthe Société Chérifienne de Matériel Industriel\nindustrialization in North Africa. Consider-\net Ferrovierre (SCIF) which will produce,\nable progress has been made under the new\namong other things, railroad cars for local use,\npolicy despite the government's inability to\nthere are no facilities for the production of\nimport sufficient equipment from abroad, the\ntransportation equipment. Repair facilities\nneed to construct plants, insufficient fuel and\nfor automotive and aircraft equipment are\npower facilities, inadequate transportation,\nadequate for present requirements.\nand scarcity of skilled labor. Industries par-\n(2) Construction.\nticularly encouraged include: food processing,\nIndustrial and commercial construction re-\nmetallurgical, electrical, chemical, fat proc-\nceived a particular impetus during World War\nessing, paper and pasteboard, construction\nII and reached its peak in early 1948. Housing\nmaterials, textile and leather, wood, and cork\ncontinues to be in short supply, owing both to\nplants.\nthe increasing population and the trend\nThe influx of fugitive French capital into\ntoward urban expansion. The principal de-\nNorth Africa since 1945, the postwar demand\nterrents to the industry are the shortage of\nfor consumer goods, and industrial replace-\nmaterials, skilled workers, and capital. Gov-\nment and reequipment needs have now\nernment control over rentals has seriously dis-\nlevelled off, and the trend toward expansion,\ncouraged the construction of housing, and it\nexcept in chemical and metallurgical indus-\nis unlikely that substantial amounts of capi-\ntries, probably will be slowed. Because of\ntal will be attracted until higher investment\ntransportation inadequacies and the absence\nreturns are assured.\nof appreciable deposits of commercial-grade\nConstruction activity has been greatest in\nfuels in the area, there is little probability\nTunisia, where wartime property damage is\nthat any heavy industry will be established\nestimated at $335-420 million. Reconstruc-\nin the immediate future.\ntion is well under way, but work has been\nAlthough most technicians are drawn from\nhandicapped by non-delivery or delayed ship-\nthe European minority of the population or\nment of supplies and equipment from the US.\nfrom Europe itself, the North African native\n(3) Power.\npopulation is a potentially good source of\nMorocco and, to a lesser extent, Algeria\nskilled industrial labor. The Arabs and Ber-\nhave excellent water power sources, but until\nbers are intelligent, have an aptitude for me-\nmore dams are constructed to capture and\nchanics, and are quick to grasp new princi-\nhold a greater portion of surplus water from\nples when given an opportunity to learn.\nseasonal rains, hydroelectric facilities cannot\n(1) Manufacturing.\nprovide for year-round power needs. Tunisia\nTwo distinct types of manufacturing estab-\nis almost totally deficient in water power\nlishments prevail throughout French North\nsources, and practically all electricity pro-\nAfrica-native handicraft carried on in the\nduced locally is dependent upon imported\nhomes, and hundreds of small factories owned,\nfuels. Thermal and diesel installations in Al-\nfinanced, or managed by the European, or for-\ngeria and Morocco also require imported coal\neign, minority. Handicrafts are confined to\nand oil fuel.\nrug and carpet making, some textile weaving,\nElectric power produced in 1948 is esti-\nand leather, metal, and wood crafts. The\nmated at 950 million kwh, of which one-third\ngreatest number of processing plants in the\nwas produced by Algerian and Moroccan\nfactory category are devoted to foodstuffs—\nhydroelectric installations. While Algeria\nfish, fruit, and vegetable canneries, flour and\nand Tunisia have made constant gains in\noil mills, and distilleries. Locally grown to-\npower production in postwar years, the larg-\nbacco, as well as the imported tobacco, is proc-\nest increase occurred in Morocco where power\nessed in Algeria. Other manufactures are\nproduction increased 21.40 percent in 1948\nleather, matches, soap, paper, textiles, shoes,\nover 1947. As a phase of the government's\nSECRET\nSECRET\n27\nindustrial expansion program, several large\nfreight in 1949, or more than one-fourth of\nhydroelectric power projects are under con-\nthe 562,000 metric tons of freight carried in\nstruction in all areas. The completion of ma-\nan average month in 1949 by the railroads.\njor power projects now under way in Morocco\nAir freight and passenger traffic has also\nshould enable that area by 1954 to produce 800\nbeen greatly increased in recent months.\nmillion kwh annually, which would permit the\nPort facilities are being enlarged and mod-\nexportation of electricity to Algeria.\nernized, and new ports constructed. The port\n(4) Transportation.\nof Casablanca is particularly in need of en-\nWartime disruption of the transportation\nlargement. The reconstruction of Tunisian\nsystems had been overcome by 1948, although\nports, which suffered considerable war dam-\nmodernization and expansion of existing\nage, is well under way, and the state-con-\nequipment is necessary to service adequately\ntrolled port authorities have outlined plans\nthe increasing industrialization.\nfor extensive expansion of facilities.\nThere are slightly more than 5,000 miles of\nd. Finance.\nrailroad in French North Africa-concen-\n(1) Money.\ntrated chiefly on the littoral-of which only a\nEach area has its own monetary unit, the\nsmall percentage is electrified (475 miles in\nMoroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian franc; all\nMorocco and 150 miles in Algeria). Planned\nare tied to one another and the French franc\nimprovements of existing rail lines include\nat the rate of one to one. On 19 September\ndoubling the tracks, electrification, replace-\n1949 a single official rate of about 350 francs\nment of steam locomotives by diesel engines\nto the dollar was established in place of the\nand modification of steep grades and sharp\nprevious base rate of 214, the commercial rate\nturns. In 1948 Algeria and Morocco together\nof 272, and the official \"free\" rate of 330.\nreported more than 14.6 million metric tons\nof freight handled. (In Algeria alone, 62 per-\nPaper currency, issued by the two central\ncent more freight and 11 percent more pas-\nbanks, is the principal circulating medium.\nsengers were carried in 1948 than in 1947.)\nFrench currency is not legal tender in French\nPresent equipment is barely sufficient for\nNorth Africa; each of the French North Afri-\nadequate service. The French Government\ncan currencies is legal tender only in the state\nis attempting to interest ECA or US private\nfor which it is issued. All, however, are freely\ncapital in extending North African railroads\ninterchangeable on a franc-for-franc basis at\ntoward the Atlantic Coast and to open up\nany bank in the area, thereby greatly facili-\neast Moroccan and west Algerian mineral\ntating trade and capital transactions between\nareas. The ultimate terminus of this project\nthese areas and metropolitan France. A law\nwould be on the Moroccan west coast, which\nof August 1948 permitted resumption of trade\nwould then provide an interior route from\nin gold in Morocco, and it has become an\nthe Atlantic to the Mediterranean. This\nimportant center for gold transactions. Small\nproject would increase trackage by 1,750 miles\ndenomination coins, up to two francs, of non-\nand would cost about 29 billion francs ($82,-\nprecious metals also circulate, but they have\n860,000).\nbeen of little significance since inflationary\nThe primary road network, consisting of\nforces raised prices to a point where coins\nsome 30,000 miles of improved roads, also is\nbecame too cumbersome for transaction\nconcentrated in coastal areas. A 1947 cen-\npurposes.\nsus of commercial vehicles indicated slightly\nThe quantity of money in circulation rose\nover 30,000, which number has been greatly\nsteadily during the war and postwar periods,\nincreased by truck imports. By utilization of\nas a result of governmental deficit financing\nthe extensive road network, the truck trans-\nand extensive investment operations insti-\nport system is providing serious competition\ngated by French authorities and financiers.\nfor the railroads, and cessation of gasoline\nThe latest available monetary statistics for\nrationing in mid-1949 further stimulated\nthis inflationary period are shown in the fol-\nbusiness. Moroccan truckers hauled a\nlowing chart (comparable statistics for Tu-\nmonthly average of 124,500 metric tons of\nnisia are not available).\nSECRET\n28\nSECRET\nMONEY IN CIRCULATION\nLEGAL TENDER\nBANK DEPOSITS\n31\nDec.\n1938\n638\nMOROCCO\n831\n\"\n39\n1,072\n1,152\n\"\n45\n13,167\n11,924\n,,\n46 14,887\n24,198\n,,\n47\n19,107\n31,265\n\"\n48\n24,151\n46,999\n\"\n49\n26,721\n49,888\nALGERIA\n1\nSept.\n39\n3,200\n4,000\n30\nSept.\n45\n25,573\n18,562\n\"\n46 26,990\n27,058\n59\n48 43,000\n45,000\n(Figures shown are in millions of francs)\nWE 950\nInflation has interfered with postwar eco-\non 1 January 1948 by a directive from the\nnomic recovery in the three countries, just as\nDirection des Finances, the government organ\nit has done in France and many other areas.\nwhich frames bank policies, requiring affili-\nThe Moroccan inflation has been particularly\nated banks to report all loans in excess of\nbad, because of the better prospects for in-\n1,500,000 francs. So far the bank has not\nvesting fugitive capital from metropolitan\nacted as a direct loan control agency, al-\nFrance. During 1949, however, there has\nthough indirectly its influence is exerted\nbeen repatriation of money to France, ac-\nthrough its regular functions. Machinery for\ncompanied by a decrease of money in circu-\nsupervision over the granting of all credit in\nlation and a decrease in checking accounts.\nthe country having been established, in-\nApparently this contribution to inflation has\ncreased governmental controls over the econ-\nlargely run its course.\nomy may be forthcoming.\n(2) Central Banking.\nThe primary difference between the cen-\nBy the Act of Algeciras in 1906 a central\ntral banking in Morocco, on the one hand, and\nbank was created for Morocco, the Banque\nin Algeria and Tunisia, on the other, is that\nd'Etat du Maroc, the controlling interest in\na single institution, the Banque de l'Algérie et\nwhich is held by a private firm in France, the\nde la Tunisie, has had the sole privilege of\nBanque de Paris et des Pays Bas, although its\noperating for both countries. The bank is\ndirection is now in the hands of the Protec-\nowned and controlled by the Government of\ntorate Government. Its functions are those\nFrance. When in 1948 the Tunisian Govern-\nof an ordinary central bank: issuance of cur-\nment received without payment from France\nrency, depository for state funds, clearing\nhouse, rediscounting, and the operation of\na bloc of the bank's shares, it for the first time\nbranch establishments. Although most of\ngained an element of control in the bank.\nthe twenty-odd commercial banks in Morocco\nSimultaneously the French ceded an even\nare affiliated with the central bank, their\nlarger bloc to the Algerian Government Gen-\ncredit policies are not yet under its super-\neral. Little or no change in bank policy is\nvision. A step in this direction was taken\nexpected in the immediate future.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n29\nOUTSTANDING BANK LOANS IN MOROCCO\n(billions of francs)\nDEC.\nDEC.\nDEC.\nDEC.\n20 NOV.\n1945\n1946\n1947\n1948\n1949\n30.8\n30\n22.4\n20\n13.6\n10\n6.2\n2.7\nWE 1050\n(3) Commercial Banking.\nthe Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas con-\nCommercial banks in French North Africa\nsented, at the request of the French Govern-\nare privately owned, many being branches of\nment, to lend funds to the faltering Sherifian\nthe larger private banks in France. Short-\nGovernment and negotiated the 5 percent\nterm credit is little in demand, for the ancient\nMoroccan loan of 1904; in 1906 it took part\nnative specie habits still prevail to such an\nin the creation of a central bank for Morocco;\nextent that most business is transacted on a\nit created the Régie des Tabacs (Tobacco\ncash basis. The use of checking accounts is\nMonopoly); and it formed the Compagnie\nfar less prevalent than in Western Europe,\nGénérale du Maroc through whose intermedi-\nnotwithstanding a postwar trend in the direc-\nary it contributes to the construction and de-\ntion of replacing currency in circulation by\nvelopment of the railways, port installations,\nthe use of bank deposits.\nelectric power supply and distribution, and\nPostwar bank loans in Morocco have grown\nroad transportation.\nconsiderably, a trend which reflects increased\nAnother example is that of Mirabaud et\ninvestment activities as well as the falling\nCompagnie, a bank which has belonged to a\nvalue of the franc.\nsingle French family for generations, and\nThe primary reason for the increase in loans\nwhich is especially active in mining undertak-\nis the abundance of capital coming from\nings in Tunisia, such as the rich Phosphates\nFrance during the latter's unsettled economic\nde Gafsa, lead and zinc mines in Morocco\nand political conditions. Most loans are from\nthrough participation in the Métallurgie de\n30 to 90 days, as banks are cautious about\nPenarroya, mineral prospecting and promo-\nlong-term loans.\ntional ventures throughout French North\nIn Algeria loans were more limited, total-\nAfrica by the intermediary of its subsidiary\nling only 2.4 billion francs in 1948, in spite\nSociété Française d'Etudes et d'Entreprises.\nof an abundance of liquid funds.\nMany others, including the Rothschild bank-\nWhile there is no outstanding example of\ning dynasty, have been interested in finan-\nthe existence of the ownership and control of\ncial ventures in the three areas, so that a\nthe leading commercial banks in French\nconsiderable segment of existing larger enter-\nNorth Africa by private industry, banking in-\nprises which have not been nationalized are\nterests control large segments of industry.\neither owned or partially controlled by the\nFrench military occupation of each country\nbanks.\nwas followed by economic penetration,\nThe effect of various French fiscal and trade\nwherein French private banking interests\npolicies with respect to French North Africa\nwere active in establishing control over po-\nhas been to favor French banking almost to\ntential trading and industrial possibilities.\nthe exclusion of foreign-owned and controlled\nIn Morocco, for example, from 1902 onward\nbanking interests. As a consequence, so lim-\nSECRET\n30\nSECRET\nited is the field of opportunity open to for-\nGovernment finance in Morocco is a dual\neign banking that no important foreign banks\nfunction, for in addition to the French Pro-\noperate in the areas, except two Italian banks\ntectorate Administration budget, the Makh-\nin Tunisia and a British bank in Algiers.\nzen, or native Moorish Government, has its\nIn addition to commercial banks, there are\nown separate budget. Comparison of the\ngovernment-owned and controlled savings in-\n1948 Makhzen budget of 277 million francs\nstitutions, postal and ordinary, throughout\nwith the 22,482 million franc budget of the\nthe three areas. Current deposits with sav-\nProtectorate Administration in Morocco indi-\nings institutions are many times those of pre-\ncates the limited sphere of operations of the\nwar, reflecting the inflation as well as a pref-\nnative government. The other two countries\nerence for increased liquidity. A number of\nhave this duality of government but not of\ninsurance companies, predominantly French,\nbudget.\nalso have investment banking activities which\nPreparation of budgets is a function of the\nare controlled to a high degree by the gov-\nlocal governments, subject to final approval\nernment. Because the two most notable eco-\nby the French Ministries of Interior (Algerian\nnomic features of the area are a low stand-\nbudget), Foreign Affairs (Moroccan and Tu-\nard of living and an extremely unequal dis-\nnisian budgets), and Finance. In Tunisia ap-\ntribution of wealth, the role of savings insti-\nproval by the Grand Council is required, un-\ntutions is to accumulate a large share of the\nless the Tunisian and French Sections of the\navailable money suitable for investment.\nCouncil disagree, in which case the Mixed\nThese large savings comprise an important\nDelegation makes the decision. Since 1947,\npart of the total purchasing power, approxi-\nthe Algerian Assembly approves the budget\nmately 90 percent of which is concentrated in\nafter its proposal by the Governor General and\nthe hands of Europeans and wealthy natives\nprior to final approval in Paris. Contribu-\nwho together constitute but 10 percent of the\ntions from French North Africa to the French\npopulation.\nGovernment for military purposes were in-\n(4) Government Finance.\ncreased during the war (the maximum Al-\ngerian contribution was 600 million francs in\nThe three countries have similar, but sepa-\n1943) and subsequently reduced. Postwar\nrate, methods of government finance. The\ncontributions have been largely returned for\nbudget systems are patterned after that of\nsocial welfare and reconstruction.\nFrance, insofar as each has an ordinary budg-\net, an extraordinary budget, and one or more\nRevenues are derived principally from tax-\nspecial budgets. The ordinary budget covers\nation, customs duties and income from state-\nthe regular recurring expenses of the govern-\nowned properties and monopolies. For the\nment departments; the extraordinary budget\nfiscal year 1949, Morocco's budgeted revenues\nis used for such projects as new public works,\nincluded 5,980 million francs from direct\nand, more recently, postwar reconstruction.\ntaxes, 8,088 million francs from customs du-\nThe 1949 Tunisian budgets totalled 29.1 bil-\nties, 2,165 million francs from indirect taxes,\nlion francs, of which over one-third is obtained\nand 1,745 million francs from registration and\nfrom French appropriations-3 billion francs\nstamp taxes. Another major source of in-\nfrom ECA counterpart funds and 7 billion\ncome was 6,408 million francs income from\nfrancs from regular appropriations-which\nthe state monopolies of Morocco. The Al-\nhave been the primary source of deficit finance\ngerian budget for 1949 was based on expected\nand hence are inflationary in character. The\ntax revenues of 31,160 million francs, income\n1949 Moroccan budget totalled 31.3 billion, of\nfrom state properties of 777.6 million francs\nwhich 12 billion francs are loaned from French\nand 1,864 million francs from miscellaneous\ncounterpart funds, and 0.2 billion are ad-\nsources. While the Tunisian budget was not\nvances from the French Treasury. The Al-\nbroken down, anticipated revenue in 1949\ngerian budget for 1949 totalled 52.5 billion\nfrom all sources was 16,340 million francs.\nfrancs. Special loans are floated from time to\nWith negligible exceptions, taxation is for\ntime as additional sources of deficit finances.\nsupport of the local governments. There is\nSECRET\nSECRET\n31\nvirtually no taxation in the area by the cen-\nSavings had been low and most funds for\ntral government at Paris. Revenue from\ncredit operations had come from abroad with\ntaxes is high relative to that in France. For\nhigh rates of interest. The protectorate gov-\nexample, Algerian taxes in 1948 consumed 25\nernments had leaned heavily on their central\npercent of the country's national income com-\nbanks for investment financing. Since the\npared to 19 percent in France. Most taxes\ncessation of hostilities there has been, until\nare borne by the consumer, and cannot easily\nrecent months, a heavy influx of private capi-\nbe increased because of the public's limited\ntal from France, because of the relatively less\npurchasing power.\nstable conditions in metropolitan France.\nExpenditures prior to the war were made for\nSuch funds were invested in industrial enter-\nthe most part from the Ordinary Budget and\nprises, mining, land and the building boom,\nwere allocated among the various departments\nnotably in Morocco where the bulk of the \"hot\nof government for administrative purposes.\nmoney\" is to be found. It is estimated that\nIn the postwar period, expenditures have in-\n10 billion francs (about $30 million) entered\ncreased rapidly as a result both of increased\nMorocco as fugitive capital in 1948 alone.\ncosts during an inflationary period and of the\nThe effects of postwar capital influx have\nenlarged scope of governmental economic\nbeen: (1) a heavy contribution to inflation\nfunctions. Whereas the majority of prewar\nby stimulation of investment activities; (2)\nexpense was for personnel, outlays for build-\nlowering exorbitant interest rates to normal;\ning and equipment are now nearly as large\n(3) a large increase in short-term bank\nas for payrolls. Reconstruction of war dam-\nloans-relative to long-term loans-for the\nage and public works projects in combination\nbanks fear a sudden withdrawal of deposits for\naccounted for 61 percent of budgeted expendi-\nrepatriation to France; and (4) speculation in\ntures for the Tunisian Protectorate for 1948.\nmany directions, aiding prosperity for the\nIn Algeria and Morocco, where war damage\nwealthy minority.\nwas negligible, public works projects consti-\nFurther extensive private investment, how-\ntute about one-half of government expendi-\never, appears unlikely, for the trend has re-\ntures.\nversed as a consequence of improved condi-\ntions in France, returning confidence in the\nBudgetary deficits have been largely\nFrench franc, and glutting some French\nfinanced by loans and Treasury advances from\nNorth African markets.\nthe Government of France. Although an ad-\nditional burden to the French taxpayer, these\ne. International Trade.\n\"subsidies\" are employed as a means of re-\nThe relative importance of foreign trade to\nenforcing political domination of the area.\nthe three areas is indicated by the value of ex-\nDuring recent years, the proportions of French\nports per capita for 1948: Algeria, 8,400 francs,\nfinancial aid has been increasing, until the\nand Morocco and Tunisia each about 4,000\n1949 budgets of Morocco and Tunisia provided\nfrancs. For French North Africa as a whole,\nfor deficits of 10 and 13 billion francs, respec-\nthe per capita value of exports in 1948 was\ntively.\nslightly less than 6,000 francs, as compared\nThe public debts of those two areas had\nwith the figure for the metropole of 10,400\nat the end of 1949 exceeded 40 billion francs\nfrancs.\nin Morocco and 31 billion francs in Tunisia.\nFrench North Africa is particularly impor-\nThese debts were expected to reach 54 and 40\ntant as a market for French metropolitan\nbillion francs, respectively, before the end\ngoods, accounting for 28 percent of France's\nof 1950. The Algerian public debt is expected\nexports in 1948. As a source of supply,\nto reach 30 billion francs by the end of the\nFrench North Africa accounted for 16 percent\n1951 fiscal year (31 March 1951).\nof France's imports in 1948. French North\nAfrica exceeds in importance all other French\n(5) Capital Movements.\noverseas territories, accounting in 1948 for\nCapital had been at a premium in all three\nabout 65 percent of France's trade with all\ncountries prior to the end of the recent war.\nFrench overseas territories.\nSECRET\n32\nLicenses are required in Algeria and Tunisia\nDISTRIBUTION OF PHOSPHATE ROCK EXPORTS\nfor trade with countries outside the franc zone.\nJANUARY-JUNE 1949\nIn French Morocco licenses are also required,\n(In metric tons)\nexcept for a list of 20 items which may be im-\nMOROCCO\nALGERIA\nTUNISIA\nported without license, provided the importer\nFrance\n247,925\n50, 403\n190, 352\ndoes not request an official allocation of for-\nGreat Britain\n352,523\n23,975\n213,531\neign exchange. Import permits are restricted\nItaly\n212,941\n15,920\n162, 546\nto goods which are essential to the economy\nSpain\n127,079\n25, 835\n80, 410\nof the respective areas and which France and\nPortugal\n48,730\n11,950\n19, 460\nits possession cannot supply in sufficient\nGermany\n73,809\n115,767\nNetherlands\n148,258\n48,680\n50,766\nquantities.\nBelgium\n133,737\n29, 396\n(1) Commodity Composition of Trade.\nYugoslavia\n12,900\n9, 710\nPoland\n12, 210\n2,650\nFrench North Africa exports agricultural\nHungary\n4,650\n2, 438\nproducts, minerals, and metals; it imports\nFinland\n26,481\ntropical food products (coffee, sugar, tea), tex-\nCzechoslovakia\n20,614\ntiles, steel, and manufactured goods.\nOther\n637, 033\n51, 155\n54, 198\nBy far the most important export by value\nTotal Exports\n1,908,226\n331,487\n978, 319\nis Algerian wine, which in 1948 accounted for\nmore than half of Algeria's total export trade\nexports and less than 2 percent of Algeria's\nand about a third of the total value of all\nexports), lead (12 percent of Tunisia's exports\nFrench North African exports. Although the\nand 1 percent of Morocco's exports), and man-\nvolume of production and exports of wine are\nganese (4 percent of Morocco's exports).\nwell below the prewar level, total value has\nOf the total value of imported commodities\nincreased because of the higher level of post-\nin 1947, fuel (coal and petroleum) and wood\nwar prices.\naccounted for over 10 percent. Cotton fabrics;\nThe second most important export com-\ncoffee, sugar and tea, as a group, and auto-\nmodity is phosphate rock, accounting for\nmobiles and parts, each accounted for be-\nabout 17 percent of Morocco's exports, 24 per-\ntween 5 and 10 percent of the total. Wheat\ncent of Tunisia's exports, less than 2 percent\nand rice, meat and dairy products, and peanut\nof Algeria's exports, and 8 percent of total\noil (the locally produced and more valuable\nFrench North Africa's exports in 1948. Phos-\nolive oil being exported) were smaller but\nphate rock being a low value commodity, value\nnevertheless significant import categories.\ndata fail to reflect the significance of North\nImports of agricultural machinery, particu-\nAfrica as a world supplier. The most impor-\nlarly for Morocco, are increasing under the\ntant markets are France, Great Britain, and\nECA program.\nItaly. The very wide distribution of phos-\nphate rock is shown in the following table.\n(2) Geographical Distribution of Trade.\nCanned fish was Morocco's second most im-\nTrade with the French Union (chiefly met-\nropolitan France) accounts for well over two-\nportant export in 1948, accounting for 13 per-\nthirds of the total trade of French North\ncent of total Moroccan exports and approxi-\nAfrica. Of the three areas, Morocco has\nmately 4 percent of North African exports in\n1948.\nshown the largest increase in postwar trade\nwith France. Before the war the area as a\nDried figs and dates from Algeria were the\nwhole exported more (about 13 percent more\nfourth most important North African export\nin 1938) to France than it imported; imports\nin 1948, amounting to about 6 percent of Al-\nincreased more sharply after the war than ex-\ngerian exports and slightly less than 4 percent\nports, and by 1947 the area had a 30 percent\nof the total for the whole area.\ntrade deficit with France. The drain on the\nOther export commodities in order of im-\nmetropole continued at about this rate during\nportance by value (1948) for the area as a\n1948. French policy, the overvalued franc,\nwhole were iron ore (7 percent of Tunisia's\nand the world-wide payments difficulties of the\nSECRET\n33\npostwar period have undoubtedly contributed\n(3) Balance of Payments.\nto the concentration of North African trade\nEach of the three countries has always\nwithin the franc area.\nshown a deficit in the balance of payments on\nPrewar trade with the United States was\ncurrent account (which in addition to com-\nnegligible, and exports have never assumed\nmodities trade includes the invisible items of\nsignificant proportions. Imports, on the other\nprofit remittances, bank charges, shipping\nhand, increased spectacularly after the war to\ncosts, interest on investments, loans and the\nsatisfy deferred requirements for manufac-\npublic debt, and tourist payments), made pos-\ntured goods, the US accounting for about a\nsible by contributions from the French budget,\nfourth of each area's total imports in 1946.\nby loans guaranteed by the French Govern-\nShortage of dollar exchange and the increased\nment, and by private investment from France.\navailability of capital and consumer goods\nThe deficit increased during the latter part of\nfrom France caused a falling off of imports\nWorld War II with heavy importing for the\nfrom the dollar area in 1947 and 1948. In\nmilitary occupation and with decreased ex-\n1948, however, the value of US exports to\nporting caused by droughts and war disrup-\nFrench North Africa was $72 million, or al-\ntions. In the postwar years the deficit has\nmost seven times the value of US imports\ngrown rapidly.\nfrom French North Africa. Machinery and\nComplete figures for the international pay-\nsteel mill products accounted for 40 percent\nments situation of French North Africa are\nof the total, grain (to Algeria) 21 percent, coal\nnot available. Trade in commodities accounts\nand petroleum 16 percent, and textiles\nform the greatest part of the deficit. The\n(chiefly cotton fabrics) 7 percent. US imports\nnext most important item of foreign exchange\nfrom French North Africa amounting to $10.7\nexpenditure is interest payments on invest-\nmillion consisted of olive oil (principally from\nments and loans. Tourism is also a net for-\nMorocco) 35 percent; iron ore (mainly from\neign exchange expenditure, for the money\nAlgeria) 23 percent; cork (about two-thirds\nspent by wealthy natives who periodically de-\nfrom Algeria) 17 percent. Although most of\npart for cooler lands is not entirely offset by\nthe North African iron ore went to the UK,\nforeign tourists. Other negative balances are\nFrench North Africa exported to the US\nshipping charges, primarily to France, and\n470,272 long tons, or 7.7 percent of US total\npremiums to France for several kinds of in-\nimports of iron ore in 1948. North African\nsurance, to the US for fire, to Switzerland for\ncork accounted for 15 percent of the total\naccident, and to the UK for marine insurance.\nvalue of US imports of cork in 1948. Efforts\nThe only net receipt of foreign exchange on\nare being made under the ECA program to in-\ncurrent account in French North Africa is a\ncrease exports to the US and to curb dollar\nnegligible one, wages sent home by the 100,000\nimports, SO that by 1952 the area hopes to\nAlgerians and the Moroccans working in\nbalance its dollar account.\nFrance.\nFrench North African trade with the UK\nA reduction in inflow of foreign exchange\nhas traditionally provided the French Union\nduring recent years has been caused by de-\nwith net earnings of sterling. In 1947, for\ncreased exports as a result of grain and olive\nexample, the UK was the market for 12 per-\ncrop failures brought on by the drought years\ncent of Tunisia's exports, 7 percent of Moroc-\nof 1943 through 1945, and by postwar infla-\nco's exports and 4 percent of Algeria's exports.\ntionary forces which have raised prices of ex-\nPhosphate rock from Morocco and Tunisia ac-\nport products above world market prices. In\ncounted for 88 percent of the UK's imports of\naddition to a reduction in foreign exchange\nphosphate from all sources in 1947 and 1948.\nincome, the deficit has been enlarged by ex-\nNorth African iron ore exports to the UK were\ntraordinary expenditures on imports used in\nof even greater value and represented 25 per-\nreconstruction and by higher world prices\ncent of the UK's total iron ore imports for\n(which affect adversely all countries with an\n1947 and 1948.\nimport surplus).\n34\nSECRET\nTwo trends have been important in the post-\never, are initiated in Paris and are in line with\nwar balance of payments on current accounts.\nthe French Government's devaluation poli-\nOne is heavy dollar expenditures and the other\ncies. At the time of each successive devalu-\nis increasing trade in the French franc. The\nation it was hoped that no substantial increase\nformer is attributable to purchases of US man-\nin the cost of living would result and prices\nufactured goods, a large portion of which has\nwould remain steady, in order that more goods\nbeen financed by ECA aid; the latter can be\ncould be sold to the hard currency countries.\nlargely accounted for by the French North\nThe cost of living is still increasing, however,\nAfrican export price situation. Commodities\nand wages and prices are rising. Following\nout-priced in world markets (grains, fruits,\neach devaluation, export prices have gener-\nwines, and minerals such as manganese) can\nally aligned themselves with the new rates of\nbe sold in France, which is ready and willing\nexchange, and increased exporting to coun-\nto pay above world prices for goods that can\ntries other than France has been largely\nbe purchased with francs. Not only does in-\nthwarted.\ncreased trade with its overseas territories fit\n(4) ECA Aid.\nin with the French conception of overseas\nterritorial functions, but also exports of metro-\nHeavy postwar imports have been made pos-\npolitan France have tended since World War\nsible in large part by reallocations to French\nI to be too highly priced for sale in world mar-\nNorth Africa of US aid to France. Of the $1.3\nkets. Hence, overseas territorial trade has\nbillion of ECA shipments realized to France\nappeared to the French to be doubly advan-\nand its overseas territories as of 31 January\ntageous. The combined trends of increased\n1950, $96 million, or 7.1 percent of the total,\ntrade with France and increased imports from\nhave been shipped to French North Africa.\nthe US permitted foreign exchange other than\nThis value is almost 50 percent greater than\ndollars and French francs to constitute but a\nthe value of shipments to the other French\nsmall part of the postwar international cur-\noverseas territories combined. It now appears\nrency transactions in French North Africa\nthat the program for overseas territories will\nuntil 1948, when increasing receipts of sterling\nrequire some 20 percent of all ECA dollars\ndeveloped from the reviving export trade to\navailable to France through the fiscal year\n1951-52.\nthe UK.\nThe governments of the three territories\nA breakdown of aid to each of the three\nhave taken similar measures to combat the\ncountries is not available, but statistics on the\npayments problem. Foreign commerce, other\nkinds of commodities shipped to the area as a\nthan with France and the French overseas ter-\nwhole are indicated in the following chart.\nritories, has been subject to licensing since the\nThat the lion's share is in fuels and equip-\nbeginning of World War II. Foreign currency\nment indicates a trend, however small, toward\nis allocated, in principle, only for importation\nindustrialization.\nof goods essential to the economy and unob-\nIn addition to the outright allocation of\ntainable in France or its possessions. A con-\nECA funds, a total of 19,730 million francs in\nsiderable quantity of exchange, however, en-\ncounterpart funds were loaned by France to\nters and leaves the countries through smug-\nFrench North Africa in 1948-49 (Algeria\ngling operations, especially to Tangier, where\n11,132, Morocco 3,848, and Tunisia 4,750 mil-\nthere is a free market for all currencies.\nlion francs). These funds are, for the most\nThe devaluations of the franc in December\npart, expended for equipment and materials\n1945, January 1948, and September 1949 tem-\nused in public works, such as irrigation and\nporarily helped bring prices more nearly into\npower projects and port and road construc-\nline with world markets. Such changes, how-\ntion.\nSECRET\n35\nECA AID TO FRENCH NORTH AFRICA-as of 31 January 1950\nCoal and related fuels\n$8,577,000\nOther industrial supplies\n$11,064,000\nTotal food and agricultural\n$13,549,000\nOcean freight\n$16,126,000\nCrude oil and petroleum products\n$23,348,000\nEquipment\n$23,697,000\nTOTAL $96,361,000 = 7.1% of US Aid to France\nWE 1150\nSECRET\nCHAPTER III\nFOREIGN AFFAIRS\n1. Genesis of Present Foreign Policies.\npended just prior to the second World War.\nBecause Morocco and Tunisia are French\nDiscussions are once more in progress, but\nprotectorates and Algeria is an integral part\non a lower level, not only in regard to extra-\nof the French Republic, the foreign affairs of\nterritorial but also in respect to certain com-\nFrench North Africa are directed by the Quai\nmercial rights.\nThe French have at times seemed on the\nd'Orsay.\nThe French have become SO accustomed to\npoint of submitting the question of US capitu-\nconducting the diplomatic business of these\nlatory rights to the International Court of\nJustice. Should the US be divested of these\nstates that they regard the activities of the\nUnited Nations involving Tunisia, Algeria, and\nrights, the Sultan would lose one of the last\nMorocco as invasions of French prerogatives.\nevidences which support Morocco's claim to\nFrench foreign policy directives are imple-\nstatus as an international personality.\nmented, and negotiations with foreign diplo-\nUnder the terms of a tripartite agreement\nmatic representatives are conducted by the\nbetween US, UK, and France, US civil and\nResident Generals of the Tunisian and Moroc-\nmilitary aircraft are permitted to overfly\ncan protectorates, in their capacities as For-\nFrench North Africa and land at designated\neign Ministers for the Bey and Sultan, and by\nairfields in stipulated numbers.\nthe Governor General of Algeria.\n3. Significant International Issues.\n2. Significant Relations with Other Nations.\nAlgeria is included in the North Atlantic\nThe most-favored-nation treaties between\nTreaty as an integral part of France; Morocco\nthe Sultan of Morocco and the US, signed in\nand Tunisia, being protectorates, are not in-\n1787 and 1836 and reaffirmed by the Act of\ncluded. There can be little doubt, however,\nAlgeciras in 1906, gave the US extraterritorial,\nthat any substantial increment of US arms to\nor capitulatory, rights. Under them US citi-\nthe French Army will further strengthen\nzens have broad economic rights. Moreover,\nFrench control of the whole of French North\nthey and their proteges are subject only to\nAfrica.\nUS law enforced by the Consular Courts at\nNative politicians are fully aware of this and\nTangier and Casablanca.\nhave expressed the hope that US arms will not\nIn 1871 the Sultan, fearing even then that\nbe employed by the French against native na-\nhis empire was on the point of being dismem-\ntionalist movements. Despite these appre-\nbered by the European powers, asked the US\nhensions, native opinion continues to be sym-\nto establish a protectorate in his country. The\npathetic toward US policies in general and to\nUS declined, but is today the only foreign\nthe over-all intent of the North Atlantic\npower that maintains a diplomatic mission\nTreaty.\n(its Tangier legation) accredited to the\nAlthough French North Africa is not di-\nSultan.\nrectly represented in the United Nations, vari-\nFranco-American relations in this area have\nous nationalist leaders have been attempting\nbeen in frequent dispute despite the qualified\nto stimulate UN interest in the social and eco-\nrecognition of the French protectorate by the\nnomic conditions existing under the French\nUS in 1917. The French would like to termi-\nprotectorate administrations of Morocco and\nnate US extraterritorial rights, and negotia-\nTunisia. Their hope is that an investigating\ntions having that end in view were suspended\ncommittee of the UN would make a report that\nwhen the US entered the first World War.\nwould be favorable to the cause of native na-\nSubsequently renewed, they were again sus-\ntionalism.\nSECRET\n37\nSECRET\nCHAPTER IV\nMILITARY SITUATION\n1. Genesis of Present Military Policies.\n90,000 French troops were in the whole area.\nUnder the Protectorate Treaties which de-\nThere is every indication that this figure will\nbe maintained, pending further clarification of\ntermine French military policy in Tunisia and\nthe situation in Indochina. The distribution\nMorocco, the native rulers may not maintain\nof ground forces is approximately as follows:\nregular military establishments. Internal se-\nMorocco, 40,000; Algeria, 40,000; Tunisia,\ncurity in both protectorates, as in Algeria, is\n10,000. The Fezzan is garrisoned by several\na responsibility of the French Army, approxi-\nhundred men, chiefly located in and around\nmately twenty percent of which is usually dis-\nSebha, capital of the region.\nposed in French North Africa. A number of\nFrench Air Force planes sufficient for internal\n(1) Composition and Morale.\nsecurity purposes is assigned to the area; but\nArmy units are made up of regulars, volun-\nthey would be valueless against invasion. The\nteers, and French and Algerian conscripts.\nFrench Navy maintains three bases in North\n(There is no compulsory military service in\nAfrica: Bizerte, Casablanca, and Mers-el-\nthe protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco.)\nKebir (Oran). The last is being developed\nThe Berber segments of the populations pro-\nand may well become the main operating base\nduce good soldiers; the famed \"Goumiers\" are\nof the French Navy in North Africa.\namong the world's best fighting men. Com-\nLarge-scale military operations by the\ning from the rural tribes, they fought magnifi-\nFrench in North Africa would be handicapped\ncently under Abd-el-Krim, who led them in\nlogistically by the absence of industrial and\nrebellion against the French and Spanish two\nmanufacturing plants, although local repair\ndecades ago, and again (83,000 strong) under\nfacilities are adequate for normal peacetime\nFrench officers in World War II. Some doubt\nrequirements.\nexists, however, as to the loyalty of these na-\ntive troops in the event of a large-scale na-\n2. Strength and Disposition of the Armed\ntionalist uprising. Inasmuch as they consti-\nForces.\ntute 37 percent of the French Army in North\na. Army.\nAfrica, defection on their part might seriously\nAfter the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the\ncompromise French security.\nFrench gradually increased their effective\nConsiderable improvement has recently\nmilitary strength in North Africa until by the\nbeen noted in the morale of French army offi-\nend of 1947 approximately 125,000 men were\ncers in North Africa, which has, in turn,\nin the area. This force, about one-fifth of the\ngreatly improved the effectiveness of the\nFrench Army, was deemed adequate to meet\nground forces. Despite a sharp reduction in\nany contingency short of concerted, wide-\npersonnel since 1947, the ground forces have\nspread, native rebellion.\nbeen transformed into an effective military\nIn the past two years, revolts in Madagascar\nmachine. The credit for this metamorphosis\nand Indochina and budgetary considerations\nis due to the able leadership of General Juin,\nhave obliged France to withdraw troops from\nwhose work has been assisted by the arrival\nNorth Africa. In December 1948, General\nof many experienced regular soldiers now be-\nJuin, Commander in Chief of all Armed Forces\ning rotated from Indochina.\nin North Africa, set 104,000 men as the mini-\nA General Staff, originally planned by and\nmum number required for the maintenance\nintended for the use of the late General Le-\nof order. Nevertheless, by 1 March 1950 only\nclerc, has been established in Algiers. Its\nSECRET\n39\n40\nSECRET\nsize, its scope, and the high rank of its mem-\nautey. The naval base at Mers-el-Kebir is\nbers indicate that a new and important phase\nundergoing reconstruction and extension de-\nof discussions on the strategic defense of the\nsigned to make it the most completely\narea has begun. This development suggests\nequipped French naval base in Africa and to\nthat General Juin may be compelled to devote\nserve as the southern terminus of the France-\nmore of his efforts to his duties as Commander\nNorth Africa lifeline in the event of an emer-\nin Chief, and to relinquish some of his political\ngency. The shore establishments have repair\nresponsibilities as Resident General of\nfacilities which are employed by units of the\nMorocco.\nFrench Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets.\n(2) The Native Military Academy.\nA new development is underway at Arzew,\nA military academy for natives, known as\nnear Oran, where the French have established\nDar El Beida (White House), was established\na joint amphibious training center. The arti-\nat Meknes, Morocco, in 1919 by Marshal\nficial harbor, which is not a commercial port,\nLyautey. Its organization was entrusted to\nserves also as a submarine and seaplane base.\nthe capable hands of General Juin, then a cap-\nThis site was selected outside metropolitan\ntain; General Leclerc, then a lieutenant, was\nFrance for strategic reasons.\namong the school's earliest instructors.\nc. Air Force.\nLyautey's objective was to provide basic civil\nBecause of its favorable climate and geo-\neducation and training in a military atmos-\ngraphic situation, Morocco is the principal\nphere for sons of prominent native families.\nbasic training area for the entire French Air\nStudents were to be trained for important\nForce, as well as the concentration area for\nposts in the Sherifian Government (Makh-\nthe operational units assigned for service in\nzen). Lyautey believed that the nomadic and\nNorth Africa. The French Air Force has its\nwarlike Berbers of the interior would be more\nfighter training school at Meknes. While the\neffective friends for France than would the\nNorth African air command is totally inade-\ntimid and sedentary Arabs of the littoral. The\nquate for large military operations, and is\nschool has, therefore, graduated only four\nseverely handicapped by dwindling and obso-\nnon-Berbers since its foundation. The ability\nlescent materiel, it is able to carry out such\nwhich the school's graduates have demon-\nlight bombing, patrol, reconnaissance, and\nstrated in various civil and military posts has\nliaison activities as may be required to con-\njustified Lyautey's expectations.\ntrol the natives.\nDar El Beida can accommodate about a\nBomber units are composed of old US,\nhundred students; at present slightly more\nFrench, and British types. The fighter force\nthan eighty are in attendance. Graduates\nconsists of British and US World War II air-\nare eligible on equal terms with French stu-\ncraft; the types most serviceable and in con-\ndents for admission to French military\nstant use are: Mosquitoes, Thunderbolts, Air-\nschools. Of the seventeen students graduat-\ncobras, and Spitfires. Total aircraft in North\ning in June 1949, eight applied for admission\nAfrica number 341, assigned as follows:\nto the French Military Academy at Coëtqui-\nFrench Air Force tactical units 137, trainers\ndan, in Brittany.\n142, naval air units 30, naval trainers 32.\nb. Navy.\nPresent personnel, including 200 pilots, con-\nWhile the French Navy maintains a few\nsists of 450 officers and 3,500 other ranks.\nminor ships on permanent duty in North Afri-\nIn this area there are 139 existing airfields:\ncan waters, the area's proximity to southern\n48 in French Morocco, 71 in Algeria, and 20 in\nFrance renders it valuable for naval logistic\nTunisia. Most of them are small, natural-\nsupport and as an alternate principal base\nsurfaced fields which are used infrequently.\narea for the French fleet. In addition to the\nThirteen of the French Moroccan fields are\nnaval bases at Bizerte, Casablanca, and Mers-\nconsidered important to military operations.\nel-Kebir, naval air stations are operated at\nIn this group, Casablanca/Cazes, Khouribga,\nAgadir, Khouribga, Arzew, Lartigue and Ka-\nMarrakech, and Rabat/Salé airfields are suit-\nrouba, and jointly with the US at Port Ly-\nable for limited medium bomber operations.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n41\nAgadir/Ben Sergao, Meknes, and Port Lyautey\n3. War Potential.\nare classified as light bomber fields. With\na. Manpower.\nminor improvements, five others could be used\nBecause Algeria is part of metropolitan\nby light bombers.\nFrance, its male population is subject to con-\nAlgeria has twenty airfields of military sig-\nscription under the laws that require military\nnificance, including: Algiers/Maison Blanche,\ntraining throughout the Republic. Tunisia\nsuitable for medium bomber operations;\nand Morocco, on the other hand, being pro-\nOran/La Senia, capable of limited medium\ntectorates, are not subject to this law. In\nbomber use after runway repair; Blida and\nthese areas, the French rely on voluntary en-\nTafaraoui, for light bombers (nine other air-\nlistment, chiefly from nomadic tribesmen, to\nfields have runways suitable for light bombers,\nfill the ranks of native units of the French\nbut completely lack base facilities); and seven\nArmy.\nfields requiring runway repairs and provision\nAlthough there are over one million males of\nof base facilities to accommodate light\nmilitary age in Algeria fit for some kind of\nbombers.\nmilitary service, conscription in Algeria aver-\nTunis/El Aouina and Bizerte/Sidi Ahmed\nages only 30,000 a year. Voluntary enlist-\nments on an annual basis from the protecto-\nairfields, suitable for light bomber operations,\nare the best airfields in Tunisia. The runway\nrates and from Algeria average far less. Vol-\nat Kairouan/Hami is suitable for light bomb-\nunteers are, for the most part, professional\ners, but has no base facilities. Three other\nsoldiers interested in adventure, plunder, and\nfields show possibilities for light bomber oper-\npensions.\nations, but runway repairs and complete in-\nAt present there is a general lack of equip-\nstallation of field facilities would be required.\nment and training facilities in the area.\nb. Industry and Natural Resources.\nThe French and US Air Forces are con-\nstructing jointly a large airfield in Morocco\nLocal industry cannot support even the\nat Nouaseur, fifteen miles south of Casa-\npresent relatively small military forces; nor is\nblanca. This project is expected to be com-\nthis situation likely to be remedied in the im-\npleted in 1951, providing space and facilities\nmediate future, for lack of essential fuels,\nfor future US maintenance and repair require-\nequipment, and skilled labor.\nments similar to the US Naval Air Activity in-\nFood production is little more than adequate\nstallations at Port Lyautey.\nto meet the normal peacetime requirements\nof the native population, and would be insuffi-\nd. Police and Security Forces.\ncient to supply the needs of a military force.\nAlthough uranium ores are reported, it is\nRural Morocco, northern Algeria, and Tu-\nbelieved that the quantity available is insig-\nnisia are policed by units of the Gendarmerie\nnificant. Some monazite (a source of thor-\nNationale and the Garde Républicaine (some-\nium) has been reported. (See Chapter II,\ntimes referred to as the Garde Mobile), which\nMineral Resources.)\nare under the direction of the French Ministry\nc. Science.\nof the Interior, but controlled in French North\nAfrica by the Residents General of Morocco\nThere are no industrial plants or equipment\nand practically no research facilities suitable\nand Tunisia and the Governor General of Al-\nfor the manufacture of atomic weapons.\ngeria. Although para-military in organiza-\nA guided missile and rocket testing range\ntion, training, and discipline, these three or-\nand experimental station is located at Colomb\nganizations are distinct from the military\nBéchar (Algeria). The range has limited in-\nforces in North Africa. The cities maintain\nstrumentation; it will be completed in 1952.\ntheir own police departments. The vast\nAnother testing range located at Abadla is in\nsouthern territories, which embrace more\nthe initial project stage.\nthan half of Algeria, and the whole of the Fez-\nA field testing station, operated by the\nzan, remain under direct military control.\nFrench Army, for biological and chemical war-\n42\nSECRET\nfare experiments is located at Beni-Ounif, near\ntoral. It is generally paralleled by a single-\nthe oasis town of Figuig (Algeria). The\ntrack steam and electric railroad system.\nPasteur Institutes in North Africa are not be-\nSince the road and the railroad cross moun-\nlieved to be engaged in biological warfare re-\ntains, many rivers and ravines, traffic can be\nsearch.\neasily interrupted by bombing the numerous\ntunnels, passes, and bridges which are essen-\n4. Military Intentions and Capabilities.\ntial to the operation of the systems. Both the\nThe military resources of this area in an\nroads and railroads are scarcely adequate for\nemergency could be placed under the complete\nnormal peacetime traffic and would have to be\ncontrol of the French national defense estab-\nsubstantially strengthened to sustain large-\nlishment. The 90,000 troops in the area are\nscale military operations. The north-south\nbarely sufficient to maintain internal order,\nroad systems which communicate with the in-\nand could not repel a determined invasion by\nterior are, to a large extent, primitive.\na modern attacking force.\nThe internal logistic situation is approxi-\nIn the event of another invasion the move-\nmately what it was at the end of World War\nment of supplies would be dominantly a ma-\nII. A single east-west highway runs along\nrine problem. Port facilities are open to both\nthe Mediterranean and skirts the Atlantic lit-\nsea and air attack.\nSECRET\nCHAPTER V\nSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nFrench North Africa is strategically im-\nare capable of further development in a rela-\nportant to the United States because of its\ntively short period of time.\ngeographic location in relation to the Eura-\nSo long as France remains amenable to US\nsian land mass. It is essential to the security\npolicy, and so long as Algeria, Tunisia, and\ninterests of the United States that this area\nMorocco remain peaceful and under French\nbe denied to the USSR in that it could serve\ncontrol, US security is enhanced offensively\nas a base from which military operations could\nand defensively. Political instability in\nbe launched onto the European Continent and\nFrance, the strain on French manpower and\nas a buffer area to a power in possession of the\nfinance incident to the war in Indochina, the\ncontinent. Control of the area thus would be\npersistent but as yet ineffective nationalist\nvital to control of the western Mediterranean\nclaims for independence, and Communist ac-\nand its Atlantic approaches. Although lack-\ntivities within the area are all matters which\ning in industrial facilities of any consequence,\naffect French policy but they are not likely,\nFrench North Africa presently possesses sub-\nsingly or collectively, to overthrow French rule\nstantial air, naval, and ground facilities which\nin North Africa.\nSECRET\n43\nSECRET\nCHAPTER VI\nFUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nFuture developments in French North\nfor Communist doctrine also precludes the pos-\nAfrica affecting US security depend almost\nsibility that Communism will come to power\nwholly upon the conditions which will pre-\nin these areas in the foreseeable future. It is\nvail in metropolitan France and upon the will\nfar more likely, on the other hand, that France\nof the French Government to maintain the\nwill continue in a somewhat slow and halting\nstatus quo in the continent of Africa. So long\nmanner to foster the industrial development\nas France is not forced into the role of a\nof the region and to yield gradually and as-\nSoviet Satellite and so long as US policy and\ntutely to the pressures exerted by the native\nFrench policy are compatible, no change will\npopulation for better living conditions, equal-\ntake place in the present situation. The na-\nity of opportunity, and finally, for more po-\ntives of French North Africa are politically so\nlitical power.\ndivided and apathetic as to prevent for a con-\nIt is probable that France will make every\nsiderable time the native nationalist move-\neffort to maintain its position in French North\nments from gaining sufficient electoral or mili-\nAfrica and that, unless France itself is com-\ntary power to alter the situation. The same\nmunized, conditions in French North Africa\ngeneral condition plus the antipathy of Islam\nwill not adversely affect US security.\n45\nSECRET\nCHAPTER VII\nTHE FEZZAN\nAny consideration of French North Africa\nToubou, a black race speaking a Sudanese dia-\nmust include mention of the little-known\nlect, completely Islamized and renowned as\nFezzan, a vast topographic depression com-\ncameleers.\nparable in size to France itself, situated in\nThe population of the Fezzan totals 60,000,\nsouthwest Libya, and separated from the\nof which about one-third is sedentary and two-\nMediterranean to the north by Tripolitania.\nthirds nomadic or semi-nomadic. The seden-\nReaching from the southern part of Tunisia\ntary Fezzanese live in the valleys and on the\nsoutheast to the mountains of the Tibesti\nescarpments. The oases produce principally\nrange, the Fezzan skirts southern Algeria to\ndates and grain.\nthe west, French West and Equatorial Africa\nto the south, and invades the Libyan Desert to\n2. French Administration.\nthe east. Before 1942, the Fezzan was part\nAfter its occupation by the French, the ad-\nof the Italian-controlled southern military\nministration of the Fezzan was entrusted\nzone of Libya. During the winter of 1942-43,\nto the Government General of Algeria by a\nGeneral (then Colonel) Leclerc's Free French\ndecree of 1 September 1943 issued by General\ntroops occupied this territory in the course of\nde Gaulle's French Committee of National Lib-\ntheir famous forced march from Pointe Noire\neration. A senior officer of the Native Affairs\nin French Equatorial Africa, up the Congo,\nService of Algeria was named Military Gover-\nand overland around Lake Tchad to El Gatrun\nnor of the Territory, provided with a few hun-\nin southern Fezzan to join forces with Gen-\ndred troops, and established at Sebha.\neral Montgomery's Eighth Army on the Mar-\neth Line in Tunisia.\nFor administrative purposes the Fezzan has\nbeen divided by the French into three areas:\n1. The Land and People.\n(1) the Fezzan proper, composed of the sub-\nThe territory is composed of several chains\ndivisions of Brach, Sebha, and Murzuch, gov-\nof permanently watered oases scattered along\nerned by a Military Governor directly respon-\nfour relatively fertile valleys. These lie like\nsible to and deriving authority from Paris;\nthe spread-open fingers of a hand, the palm of\n(2) the regions of Serdeles and Gat, subject\nwhich is on Sebha, the capital, in what is\nto the control of the military commandant\notherwise a wilderness of desert and rocky\nof the Southern Territories of Algeria; and\nridges. These luxuriant oases contrast strik-\n(3) the region of Gadames, under the author-\ningly with the surrounding desert which is\nity of the Commanding General of the South-\nboth desolate and forbidding.\nern Territory of Tunisia.\nThe Fezzan is one of the principal caravan\nIn the hope of retaining the Fezzan, the\ncrossroads and camel train supply stations for\nFrench have expended a considerable amount\nthe peoples of the Sahara. It is supplied with\nof effort and some money upon its economic\n7,000 camels, 16,000 sheep and goats, and more\nimprovement and cultural advancement, in-\nthan 6,000 donkeys.\ncluding small-scale land reform, local tax ex-\nThe area is a zone of contact for three prin-\nemptions, water distribution and irrigation\ncipal nomadic groups: (1) from the north and\nmodernization, seed loans, sanitary and medi-\nnortheast, the Arabized tribes, mostly of Ber-\ncal attention, and the initiation of modern\nber origin; (2) from the west, the Touareg,\neducational facilities. French schools in the\npicturesque, blue-veiled, camel-borne warriors\nregion can accommodate 500 children and\nof the desert; and (3) from the south, the\nKhattab (religious) schools, 2,000.\nSECRET\n47\n48\n3. Trade.\nfrom nowhere to nowhere, with a date-and-\ncamel economy,\" and as a place without in-\nUnder French control, Fezzanese trade has\nterest to the world at large. The French,\nbeen diverted from the former centers of\nhowever, view the matter differently. They\nTripoli and Misurata to Tunisia, Algeria, and\nconsider the Fezzan to be strategically impor-\nthe French Sudan. Factors contributing to\ntant to France as a relay point for air traffic\nthis change include the construction of a road\nbetween France, central Africa, and Madagas-\nto Tunisia, the use of the Algerian franc\ncar, and politically important as a means of\n(which is at par with the French franc) as\nconsolidating the frontiers of French North,\nlegal tender, foreign exchange controls, im-\nWest, and Equatorial Africa. Moreover, they\nport and export licensing requirements, and\nhave expended considerable effort in search\nrationing of almost all imported goods.\nof petroleum.\nThe principal commodities with which the\nThe French have been forced, however, to\nFezzanese traders and farmers are concerned\nmodify their plans in accordance with the re-\nare dates, winter wheat, barley, millet, sor-\ncent resolution of the United Nations General\nghum, and tobacco. Dates are the chief ex-\nAssembly to establish an independent and\nport, while green tea, coffee, sugar, cotton\nsovereign Libya by 1952. In order to main-\ngoods, fats, and oils are the leading imports.\ntain a maximum foothold in the area, there-\nFrom 1943 through 1947 the foreign trade,\nfore, the French in February 1950 established\nunder French occupation and administration,\nthe framework of a semi-autonomous adminis-\nincreased in value, but the balance of trade\ntration under Bey Ahmed Seif en Naceur, chief\nbecame even more unfavorable.\nof the local Ouled Sliman tribe. This action,\nas well as that of the British in establishing\n(in French francs)\nquasi-autonomy in Cyrenaica, has been a\n1944\n1947\nsource of concern to the United Nations Com-\nTotal imports\n50,368,000\n94,658,000\nmissioner for Libya, who is charged with as-\nTotal exports\n27,135,000\n38,065,000\nsisting in the formation of an independent\nstate. The High Commissioner feared that\nThe total annual import-export trade for the\nthe hasty establishment of autonomous re-\nperiod from 1944 to the second quarter of\ngimes under the aegis of the French and the\n1948 never exceeded two thousand tons. Cus-\nBritish might intensify tribal animosities and\ntoms barriers are non-existent.\njeopardize the ultimate creation of a unified\n4. Future Status.\nLibyan state. When Libya acquires state-\nhood, it is probable that France will endeavor\nThe Fezzan is frequently referred to dis-\nto maintain its predominant influence in the\nparagingly as \"that distant spot on the way\nFezzan.\nSECRET\nAPPENDIX A\nTERRAIN AND CLIMATE\n1. General.\n2. Terrain.\nFrench North Africa lies between Libya on\na. Coastal Lowlands.\nthe east and Spanish Sahara and the Atlantic\nThe Atlantic coastal lowland is a narrow\nOcean on the west. French West Africa is\nplain that rises gradually eastward to the\nto the south and Spanish Morocco and the\nMediterranean Sea to the north. The total\nMoroccan Meseta and the Atlas ranges. The\nplain is somewhat wider between the Tensift\narea of the three political units of French\nand Umm er Rbia rivers than to the north or\nNorth Africa-Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia-\nsouth.\nis 1,053,248 square miles, and the total popu-\nlation is approximately 20,510,000 (1948).\nThe Sebou Basin in the north is a broad,\nFrench North Africa is divided into four\nU-shaped valley between the Rif and Middle\nprincipal physiographic regions: (1) a discon-\nAtlas ranges. The valley narrows in the east\ntinuous coastal plain, narrow along the west-\nto approximately a mile and a half near Taza,\nern and northern coasts and widening to the\nforming a gap through which pass the main\neast along the coast of Tunisia; (2) the Atlas\nroutes of trade between Morocco and Algeria.\nMountains and associated plateaus and inter-\nEast of the Taza Gap the tributaries of the\nmontane valleys, which extend across the en-\nMoulaya River form another basin that drains\ntire northern section; (3) the Saharan De-\ntoward the Mediterranean.\npression, south of the Anti-Atlas and Saharan\nThere is no continuous Mediterranean plain\nAtlas ranges; and (4) the Ahaggar Massif, in\nin either Algeria or northern Tunisia. The\nsoutheastern Algeria. (See accompanying\ncoast ranges that closely parallel the north-\nmap.)\nern coast jut out into the sea in the form of\nClimatically, French North Africa may be\nrocky headlands, and plains are found only\ndivided into three zones: (1) a narrow zone\nwhere wadis or rivers cut through the moun-\nof Mediterranean Climate in the north; (2)\ntains to the sea. In Algeria, the elongated\na low latitude steppe zone in the central sec-\nvalley of the Chêlif River, which flows south\ntion; and (3) a low latitude desert zone in the\nof and parallel to the coastal range; the Mit-\nsouth.\nidja Sahel, near Algiers; and the plain of Bône\nLand use in French North Africa reflects the\nare the only large coastal plains east of Oran.\nclimate and the relief of the various regions.\nIn northeastern Tunisia, the narrow discon-\nThe coastal lowlands and adjacent terraced\ntinuous coastal plain merges into the broad\nuplands are farm lands. The lower seaward-\ndelta of the Medjerda River. This is the only\nfacing slopes of the coastal mountains are\ndelta area in northwest Africa, although there\neither under cultivation or used for grazing;\nare other areas of alluvium. South along the\nthe higher slopes are forested. In the interior,\nthe steppelands of the High Plateaux region\ncoast from Bon Peninsula to the Libyan border\nand the slopes of the mountains that face it\nis a continuous plain that varies in width\nare used for grazing sheep and goats and for\nfrom 15 to 40 miles. Near Gabes a gap be-\ngrowing alfa grass. The desert south of the\ntween the mountains of northwestern Tunisia\nAnti-Atlas and the Saharan Atlas ranges and\nand the Ksour Mountains provides access to\nin southwestern Tunisia is a region of oasis\nan extensive area of salt marshes and shallow\nagriculture and nomadic sheep herding.\nlakes known as the Shott region.\nSECRET\n49\n50\nSECRET\nb. Atlas Mountains and Associated Pla-\nrier to the north-south movement of people\nteaus and Intermontane Valleys.\nand trade.\nThe Atlas Mountains and associated pla-\nStill farther east the Saharan and Tell At-\nteaus and intermontane valleys extend south-\nlas ranges become higher and converge, unit-\nwest to northeast completely across French\ning in the Aures Massif, a region of bold re-\nNorth Africa from south of Agadir in Morocco\nlief and elevations up to 7,500 feet. Although\nto the Bon Peninsula in northeastern Tunisia.\nthe massif is structurally a part of the Sa-\nThe area is a series of highly complex parallel\nharan Atlas, it is separated from the main\nphysiographic regions.\nrange by the Hodna Depression.\nA southern arc of the Rif Mountains of\nNorthern Algeria is in general a region of\nSpanish Morocco extends into Morocco to the\nenclosed basins and interior drainage. The\nFez-Taza region, where it is separated from\nSeybouse, Chêlif, Soummam, and Rummel are\nthe Middle Atlas range by a synclinal depres-\nthe only wadis that cut through the Tell Atlas\nsion. This depression is drained toward the\nand divert the drainage of small portions of\nwest by the Sebou River and toward the north-\nthe High Plateaux to the Mediterranean. For\neast by a tributary of the Moulaya River. The\nthe most part, drainage from both the Sa-\nmain watershed of Morocco is the Middle At-\nharan and Tell Atlas ranges is toward the cen-\nlas Range, which extends northeastward from\nter of the Plateaux, where the surface water\nthe central part of the High Atlas and forms\ncollects in depressions and forms salt marshes\nthe divide from which the Umm er Rbia and\nand lakes (shotts). The southern slopes of\nSebou rivers flow westward to the Atlantic\nthe Saharan Atlas are drained by wadis that\nand the Moulaya flows northeastward to the\nflow into the desert and disappear in the sandy\nMediterranean. The High Atlas and the Anti-\nwastes.\nAtlas ranges function as watersheds in the\nIn northern Tunisia, the Kroumirie High-\nsouth, but a scarcity of surface water reduces\nland and the Medjerda Mountains paral-\ntheir importance as divides. The Tensift and\nlel the coast; and the Tunisian Dorsal, the\nSus are the most important rivers flowing\neasternmost extension of the Atlas system,\nfrom these ranges. Elevations are in general\nextends across the north-central section of\nhigher in the southwest and lower toward\nthe country, terminating in the Bon Penin-\nthe northeast. From 13,000 feet in the High\nsula. Between the two ranges are the high\nAtlas Range, the elevation declines to about\nplains of northwestern Tunisia. The Med-\n5,000 in eastern Morocco. At the southern\njerda River, which flows south of and parallel\nend of the High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas Range\nto the northern coastal mountains for 150\nseparates the basins of the Sus River and the\nmiles, drains the high plains and the border-\nWadi Draa.\ning mountain slopes.\nThe pattern of parallel ridges and valleys\nThe Ksour Mountains, which have occa-\ncontinues eastward, with the high ranges of\nsional flat-topped summits with elevations of\nMorocco merging into the Tell Atlas, the High\n2,000 feet, parallel the southeastern coast of\nPlateaux, and the Saharan Atlas. The Tell\nTunisia from the vicinity of Medenine to the\nAtlas is a series of disconnected plateaus\nLibyan border. These mountains present a\nalong the coast, between which are long, nar-\nbold escarpment to the east and slope gently\nrow river plains and terraced uplands. These\nto the sandy lowlands in the west.\nplains and uplands are the most fertile part of\nC. Saharan Depression.\nthe Tell region.\nSouth of the Saharan Atlas is a region of\nElevations in the High Plateaux average\nlowland plains and plateaus. The region is\nover 3,500 feet in the western part but de-\nprincipally one of vast sand dunes and lime-\ncrease to 1,375 feet in the Hodna Depression,\nstone hammadas. Elevations range from be-\nat the narrower eastern end. South of the\nlow sea level, in the Shott Region of west-\nPlateaux is the Saharan Atlas, a chain of iso-\ncentral Tunisia, to approximately 3,000 feet.\nlated massifs that rise barely 400 feet above\nThe lowland plains of west-central Tunisia\nthe level of the Plateaux and present no bar-\nand southern Algeria are enclosed basins with\nSECRET\n51\ninterior drainage. The increase in elevation\nslopes of the coast ranges lie within the Medi-\ntoward the margin is more rapid toward the\nterranean climatic zone. Olive and evergreen\nAtlas Mountains in the north than toward\noak trees are typical vegetation. Climatic\nthe plateaus in the south and east and the\nconditions may vary locally, but there is gen-\nhighlands to the west.\neral conformity throughout the region.\nThe Plateau of Tademait, rising above the\nOver most of the area, average annual rain-\ndepression between the Ahaggar Massif and\nfall ranges between 16 and 32 inches. The\nthe Western Erg, divides the plain into two\nKroumirie Highlands in northwestern Tu-\nbasins. The eastern basin includes south-\nnisia, however, receive as much as 60 inches\nwestern and central Tunisia and east-central\nof rain annually, whereas in the area west\nAlgeria. The western basin is a part of the\nof Oran, which lies in the rainshadow of the\ngreat depression of the western Sahara. In-\nIberian Peninsula and the Rif Mountains, the\ntermittent streams flow from the margins to\naverage annual rainfall is only 8 inches. Most\nthe centers of these basins, where salt marshes\nof the rain in the region is the result of the\nand lakes are formed during the rainy season.\nmovement of low-pressure areas from west to\nd. Ahaggar Massif.\neast through the Mediterranean in winter.\nThe Ahaggar Massif, in the southernmost\nIn general, the average annual precipitation\npart of Algeria, is an extremely rugged,\ndecreases southward along the Atlantic coast\nmountainous highland surrounded by a belt\nof Morocco and the Mediterranean coast of\nof sandstone plateaus. Elevations range up\neastern Tunisia, and inland from all coastal\nto 10,000 feet in the mountains, but the sur-\nregions.\nrounding plateaus are mostly below 5,000 feet.\nAlthough temperatures are relatively uni-\nBoth the Ahaggar and the surrounding pla-\nform throughout the area, they are higher in\nteaus are deeply trenched by wadis. Although\nsummer and lower in winter along the Medi-\na few of the streams in the higher areas are\nterranean coast than along the Atlantic.\nperennial, wadis flowing from the highlands\nMean temperatures for the warmest month\ninto the desert during the rainy season pro-\nvary from 67° to 77° along the Atlantic coast\nvide the principal drainage.\nand from 75° to 82° along the Mediterranean.\nThe mean temperature for the coldest month\n3. Climate.\nvaries from 54° to 56° along the Atlantic and\nThe three climatic types of French North\nfrom 50° to 54° along the Mediterranean. On\nAfrica are differentiated on the basis of win-\nboth coasts temperatures occasionally drop to\nter climate. The distinguishing features of\nfreezing, and snow sometimes falls. Along\nthe Mediterranean type of climate are cool,\nthe Mediterranean, temperatures in general\nwet winters, with the mean temperature of\nincrease from west to east. In the Atlantic\nthe coldest month between 45° and 65° F., and\ncoastal region, the cool Canaries current mod-\nhot, dry summers. The characteristics of a\nifies the influence of latitude, which normally\nLow Latitude Steppe Climate are cool winters\ncauses an increase in temperature toward the\nand hot summers, with a mean annual tem-\nEquator.\nperature of over 64°, low relative humidity,\nThe seaward slopes of the mountains rising\nand a marked diurnal range of temperature.\nbehind the coastal lowlands have a modified\nMost of the rain falls during a short period\nMediterranean climate. Temperatures are\nin the spring. The Low Latitude Desert Cli-\nlower in winter; average annual precipita-\nmate has a lower average annual rainfall than\ntion is higher; snow falls more often and\nthe steppe, rains occur more irregularly, the\nremains on the ground longer; and there is\naverage annual temperature is higher, and\na greater likelihood of summer rainfall.\nthe diurnal range of temperature is much\nb. Low Latitude Steppe Climate.\ngreater.\nThe steppe zone includes the High Plateaux\na. Mediterranean Climate.\nand bordering mountains, the coastal low-\nThe coastal plains of Algeria, northern Mo-\nlands in Morocco south of approximately\nrocco, and northern Tunisia and the seaward\n31° N., and in Tunisia south of 36° N., and\nSECRET\n52\nwest-central Tunisia. The Atlas Mountains\nnial vegetation, although an ephemeral plant\nto the north and west partially exclude from\ngrowth appears for a short time after a rain.\nthe Plateaux the influence of both the Medi-\nPrecipitation averages less than 8 inches in\nterranean and the Atlantic, and the Saharan\nthe northern portion of the desert, and in the\nAtlas range on the south modifies the influ-\nsouthern portion years may pass without\nence of the desert. Typical vegetation of the\nrain. Life, other than a nomadic existence,\nLow Latitude Steppe is alfa grass in the north\ncan be maintained only in the scattered oases\nand xerophytic shrubs in the extreme south.\nand along wadi beds in which the water table\nAverage annual precipitation ranges from\nis near the surface.\n16 inches in the north to 8 inches at the foot\nNearly all of the desert region is included\nof the Saharan Atlas and in the southern\nwithin the area having an average annual\ncoastal regions of Morocco and Tunisia. Along\ntemperature of at least 79°; in much of the\nthese coasts the rainfall regime is similar to\narea the average is 86°. Mean values are im-\nthat in the Mediterranean climatic zone, with\nportant only in obtaining a general picture,\nwinter maximum and June-to-September\nfor while the days are extremely hot, the\ndrought. Inland from the coastal regions,\nnights are nearly always cool.\nthe regime changes rapidly to that of the\nIn the Ahaggar, extreme temperatures OC-\nPlateaux, where the maximum rainfall is in\ncur both in the summer and in the short win-\nthe spring. Thunderstorms occasionally OC-\nter season, a minimum of 19° having been\ncur in summer, and some rain and snow fall\nrecorded at Ft. Laperrine, at 4,429 feet eleva-\nduring the winter. On the steppe both the\ntion. Precipitation is extremely unpredict-\nseasonal distribution and the total amount of\nable, both as to quantity and the season in\nprecipitation fluctuate greatly from year to\nwhich it may occur. Snow falls quite often\nyear.\nat elevations above 8,000 feet, but it never re-\nTemperatures also reflect the difference be-\nmains more than 24 hours.\ntween the coastal steppe regions and the\n4. Land Use.\nsteppe region on the Plateaux. On the coastal\nsteppe, the mean temperatures from the cold-\na. Coastal Lowlands and Terraced Uplands.\nest and warmest months and for the year\nThe types of agriculture practiced in the\nare a little higher than in the Mediterranean\ncoastal lowlands and the terraced uplands are\nregion to the north, but the Mediterranean\ndetermined by the average amount of rain-\nclimatic regime is recognizable. On the Pla-\nfall, its seasonal distribution, and its depend-\nteaux, temperatures reflect the continental\nability. The regions that have a Mediter-\nlocation of the region. North winds sweep\nranean climate are primarily croplands and\nacross the Plateaux at below-freezing temper-\nsecondarily grazing lands, whereas the regions\natures during the winter months. Minimum\nthat have a Steppe climate are primarily graz-\ntemperatures are often below 32° F., and the\ning lands and secondarily croplands.\nmean temperature for the coldest month is\nThe coastal plains and highlands are the\nonly 40°. During the summer there is less\nmain regions of cereal production. Wheat is\ncontrast between the coastal region and the\nmost important in the coastal plains and ter-\nPlateaux. Mean temperatures for the warm-\nraced uplands of northern Tunisia, and barley\nest month vary between 79° and 83°. The\nis grown more extensively in the high plains\ndiurnal range of temperature is greater dur-\naround Constantine and the northern section\ning the summer than the winter and in the\nof the coastal lowland of Morocco. Oats are\ninterior than on the coast.\ngrown to some extent in the plains around\nOran and along the lower Medjerda River.\nC. Low Latitude Desert Climate.\nCorn is grown around Constantine, Casa-\nThe area south of the Saharan Atlas and\nblanca, Marrakech, and in the well-watered\nAnti-Atlas ranges and the southwestern por-\ndistricts of northern Tunisia, but the total\ntion of Tunisia have a Low Latitude Desert\nacreage is small.\nClimate. Xerophytic shrubs, sparsely scat-\nGarden crops are raised near the larger\ntered through the desert, are the only peren-\ncities, in the valleys of the principal wadis,\n53\nand especially in the plains south of Bizerte\npine throughout the regions of lower rainfall\nand the Bon Peninsula. Beans, lentils, chick-\nin Algeria. Cork oak forests dominate the\npeas, potatoes, and tomatoes are the principal\narea eastward from Bougie in Algeria to the\ncrops.\nvicinity of Bizerte in Tunisia. Cedar forests\nOlive culture is important in all the coastal\nare found in those areas of northeastern Mo-\nplains regions and in the terraced uplands\nrocco and eastern Algeria which receive the\nup to 2,000 feet. Tunisia has nearly 19 mil-\nhighest annual rainfall. The higher slopes\nlion trees, over half the total in French North\nof the Tunisian Dorsal are covered with thuya\nAfrica; Algeria has 9 million; and Morocco\nand Aleppo pine forests. An evergreen oak\n7 million. Most of the olive oil is produced\nthicket covers the upper slopes of the Anti-\nin the plains area between Sousse and Sfax\nAtlas. In southwestern Morocco, both the\nin Tunisia; in the Sebou Basin around Fez\ncoastal lowlands and the lower slopes of the\nand in the area surrounding Marrakech, in\nAnti-Atlas range support a steppe vegetation.\nMorocco; and in the eastern section of the\nc. The Plateaux and Adjacent Mountains.\nDepartment of Algiers and the western part\nThe interior slopes of the Atlas Mountains\nof the Department of Constantine, in Algeria.\nin Morocco and the Tell Atlas in Algeria, the\nThe principal wine-producing regions are\nHigh Plateaux, the Shott Region of Tunisia,\nthe Sebou Basin and the central portion of\nand both slopes of the Saharan Atlas are cov-\nthe coastal plain in Morocco, and the areas\nered with a steppe vegetation, except for scat-\naround Oran and Algiers in Algeria and\ntered forests on the higher and better watered\naround Tunis in Tunisia. The citrus indus-\nslopes of the Saharan Atlas. The primary\ntry is centered in the coastal lowlands and\neconomic use of this region is for grazing.\nthe valleys of the principal wadis of Algeria\nAlfa grass grows wild over about 15,700 square\nand northern Morocco. Almond trees are\nmiles of the Plateaux.\ngrown principally on the dry interior plain\nd. The Desert.\naround Marrakech. Tobacco is grown in the\nregions around Bône and Algiers.\nVegetation in the Saharan Depression and\nthe desert area of southwestern Tunisia is of\nThe important livestock of French North\ntwo types: ephemeral flowers that spring up\nAfrica are sheep, goats and cattle. The prin-\nimmediately after a rain, mature, bloom, and\ncipal regions for raising sheep and goats in\ndie within a few days; and xerophytic shrubs\nTunisia are the plains around Sousse and\nwhich are able to exist in the desert only\nSfax and the southern coastal region, and in\nbecause they are structurally adapted to con-\nAlgeria the high plains behind Oran. The\nserve the small amount of water that is avail-\ncattle industry is concentrated in the Bizerte-\nable. Both types are sparsely distributed and\nTunis region of Tunisia, the Department of\nare of no economic value. The few inhabit-\nConstantine in Algeria, and the northern\nants in the region live in the oases that are\ncoastal region of Morocco.\nscattered throughout the area. In the oases\nb. Seaward-facing Slopes of the Atlas\ndate palms, some grains, and enough garden\nRanges.\nvegetables to satisfy local needs are grown\nunder irrigation.\nThe lower parts of the seaward-facing slopes\nof the Tell Atlas in Algeria and Tunisia and of\ne. Ahaggar Massif.\nthe High and Middle Atlas ranges in Morocco\nIn the Ahaggar Massif and the surround-\nare cultivated, but the higher slopes bear var-\ning plateaus three distinct vegetation types\nious types of natural vegetation. Maquis veg-\nare present. Below 6,000 feet the vegetation\netation extends from the upper limits of the\nis of a tropical desert type and is very sparsely\ncultivated zone to approximately 3,500 feet.\ndistributed over the area. Between 6,000 and\nAbove the maquis zone are forests of thuya\n8,000 feet permanent vegetation of a low-\n(arborvitae) in southeastern Morocco and\naltitude Mediterranean type covers the slopes\nwestern Algeria, evergreen oak in northeast-\nof the mountains and the plateau regions.\nern Morocco and central Algeria, and Aleppo\nVegetation of high-altitude Mediterranean\n54\nECR ET\ntype is found in the region above 8,000 feet.\naround such settlements and in the better\nSufficient water is available at the lower levels\nwatered beds of the wadis. The raising of\nof the Massif for the maintenance of perma-\ncamels, sheep, and goats is the principal occu-\nnent settlements, and gardens are cultivated\npation of the people.\nECR\nAPPENDIX B\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nFacilities for communication in French\n(8) Rabat-Salé has irregular traffic.\nNorth Africa compare most unfavorably with\n(9) Mehdia, west of Port Lyautey, on the\nthose of most Western European countries.\nAtlantic coast, is a small port under construc-\nThe coastal regions are adequately served by\ntion.\nrail and road networks, but few roads or rail-\nThe merchant marine registered under the\nroads into the interior have been constructed,\nSherifian flag consists of thirty ships, eight\nbecause of the difficulty of terrain and the\nof which were added during 1949. The total\nrelative unimportance of inland desert wastes.\ngross tonnage of this fleet is approximately\n35,000 metric tons with a total cargo capacity\n1. Ports.\nof 50,000 metric tons. In 1948 the Sherifian\na. Morocco.\nfleet moved five percent (or 400,000 metric\n(1) Casablanca is by far the most impor-\ntons) of the total movement in French Moroc-\ntant of the French Moroccan ports, and ranks\ncan ports.\nfourth of all French ports. Over 80 percent\nb. Algeria.\nof all merchandise entering and leaving\nFrench Morocco passes through Casablanca;\nAlgeria is amply supplied with good ports.\nthis traffic in 1949 amounted to 5,750,000\nA total of 9,000,000 metric tons of cargo was\nmetric tons. Because of the increasing needs\nhandled by all Algerian ports in 1948.\nof the port, local authorities have considered\n(1) Algiers port is one of the principal coal-\nthe construction of an extensive \"avant-port\"\ning and fueling stations in the Mediterranean,\nto increase the total sheltered harbor area\nand ranks second in importance of all French\nfrom 200 to 440 hectares, but these improve-\nports for passenger traffic. 400,000 metric\nments have not been effected because of lack\ntons of commodities are handled monthly.\nof funds.\nGood marine repair facilities are available.\nCompletion of projected improvements should\n(2) Safi is a phosphate and fishing port.\nmaterially increase the port capacity.\nIn 1948, 1,024,300 metric tons of cargo were\nhandled. With the exception of Casablanca,\n(2) Oran is one of the more important ports\nSafi is outstripping all other ports in Morocco\nof French North Africa. The port can handle\nin rate of growth.\nabout 350,000 metric tons of merchandise per\nmonth. Four steamship lines make Oran a\n(3) Port Lyautey, located 12 miles inland\nregular port of call.\non the Sébou River, is a useful small port.\n(3) Mers-el-Kebir, 4 miles west of Oran\nOnly small cargo boats or coasters can navi-\nhas the best natural anchorage on the Al-\ngate the shallow channel of the river.\ngerian coast and is being developed into a new\n(4) Fedala, 17 miles north of Casablanca, is\nharbor and naval base.\na peacetime oil discharge port. A sizable sar-\n(4) Bône is a small commercial port with\ndine fleet is based in the port.\nmodest facilities. It is located near a rich\n(5) Agadir is a port for fishing craft and\nagricultural area. Cargo handling capacity\nmiscellaneous traffic. It handles about 50,000\nis 280,000 metric tons per month. The port\ntons annually, all effected by lighters. A port\nis also equipped for handling phosphates and\nimprovement project is under study in Paris.\niron ore.\n(6)\nMazagan\n}\nreceive small coasters and\n(5) Arzew, a small port with limited facili-\n(7) Mogador\nfishing craft.\nties, is used principally as a training area and\n55\n56\nseaplane base. Maximum cargo handling\n(5) Gabès is a small fishing port, although\ncapacity is 30,000 metric tons monthly.\ncertain agricultural products are exported.\n(6) Mostaganem port can handle 50,000\nThe Tunisian merchant marine is insignifi-\nmetric tons of cargo monthly. Facilities are\ncant and is wholly engaged in coastwise ship-\nlimited, but because of its location and the\nping.\nrich hinterland the port will probably increase\nin importance.\n2. Navigable Inland Waterways.\n(7) Bougie is a small commercial port with\nThere are no navigable waterways in either\nlimited facilities. The export of iron and zinc\nAlgeria or Tunisia. The Sébou and Moulouya\nores, phosphates, and agricultural products is\nrivers in Morocco, however, are navigable to\nincreasing and the port is becoming more im-\nsmall boats and barges for 50 and 30 miles\nportant.\ninland, respectively.\n(8) Philippeville, with a capacity of 40,000\nmetric tons monthly, is the principal outlet\n3. Roads.\nfor agricultural products of the Department\nOf the three territories, Tunisia is best\nof Constantine. Port and rail facilities are\nequipped with constructed roads with about\nbeing improved.\n0.25 miles of road per square mile. Compara-\n(9) Béni-Saf is a privately owned port used\nble figures for Algeria and Morocco are 0.035\nprincipally for the export of iron ore.\nand 0.025. These figures compare most un-\n(10) The port of Nemours in western Al-\nfavorably with those of most Western Euro-\ngeria is being extended and modernized with\npean countries. Actual mileage is as follows:\nfinancial help from French Morocco.\nSecond-\nA few Algerian ships, registered as a part\nMain\nary\nMinor\nTotal\nof the French merchant marine, are engaged\nTunisia\n3, 730\n8, 700\n3, 730\n16, 160\nin coastwise shipping.\nMorocco\n3,500\n2,500\n12,500\n18,500\nAlgeria\n4,982\n25,500\n?\n30, 482+\nc. Tunisia.\nTotal\n12, 212\n36,700\n16, 230-\n(1) Port facilities at the twin ports of\nTunis-La Goulette are being modernized, but\nThe coastal and mountain regions are well\nseveral years will probably elapse before recon-\nserved by engineered roads which become\nstruction is completed owing to the shortage\nfewer and of poorer quality inland until in\nof building materials and skilled labor. Traf-\nthe desert regions few are better than natural\nfic in 1947 totalled 1,288,143 metric tons for\ntracks. The roads are the main lines of trans-\nboth ports.\nportation and are adequate for the present\n(2) Sfax is one of the more important ports\nneeds of the population.\nin eastern Tunisia and handles the greatest\nIn Tunisia the roads radiate from the four\ntonnage of any Tunisian port. It serves both\ncoastal cities of Tunis, Sousse, Sfax, and\nas an outlet for phosphates, and as an impor-\nGabès and from the town of Medenine. These\ntant fishing and sponge center. Reconstruc-\nfive centers are linked by a coastal road that\ntion necessitated by the considerable wartime\npasses from Morocco through Algeria and\ndamage has not been completed.\nTunisia into Libya. The network in the north\n(3) Bizerte is the less important of the two\nis fairly dense with numerous connecting\nFrench naval ports in North Africa. War\nroads between the radial routes, but in the\ndamage has been cleaned up, but planned\nsouth the network is open. Extending into\nexpansion cannot be carried out because of the\nAlgeria are three good roads, roughly parallel,\nlack of funds. The base is equipped with re-\nfrom Tunis. The roads southwest of Gabès\npair facilities.\nand Medenine are principally ancient caravan\n(4) Sousse is a small commercial port with\nroutes, slightly improved but in many places\na capacity of 25,000 metric tons monthly. The\nobstructed to motor traffic by drifting sands.\nprincipal exports are phosphates, salt, olive\nThe two principal routes in Algeria are the\noil, grain, and esparto grass.\ninternational highways connecting Morocco\n57\nand Tunisia through Algeria. One closely\nThe Moroccan system consists of two main\nfollows the coastline, and the other parallels\nlines. The main east-west line runs eastward\nit 50 miles inland. Both are two-lane thor-\nfrom Casablanca and joins the Tangier-Fez\noughfares except the section from Constantine\nline at Petitjean. It continues eastward from\nto the Tunisian border where the road is\nFez through Oujda into Algeria. From Oujda\nscarcely wide enough for double traffic. Nu-\na branch line, utilized principally for ore ship-\nmerous roads connect these east-west high-\nments, extends 285 miles south to the iron\nways. Hard-surfaced roads to the south\nmines of Kenadsa (Algeria). The main north-\nbranch off at Mascara, Algiers, and Constan-\nsouth lines extend from the Spanish Moroccan\ntine, and after crossing the high plateaus and\nborder to Petitjean and from Casablanca to\npenetrating the Sahara Atlas mountains, be-\nMarrakech. Branch lines connect with the\ncome trans-Saharan motor routes to French\ncoastal city of Safi and the inland town of\nWest Africa.\nOued Zem. The main line from Marrakech\nMoroccan motor roads link the ports with\nthrough Casablanca and Petitjean to Fez and\nthe principal cities of the interior and with\nthe branch line to Oued Zem are electrified.\nAlgeria. The main roads are 26 feet wide, of\nThe Casablanca to Benguerir section of the\nwhich the paved surface is 13 feet. The prin-\nCasablanca-Marrakech line has a capacity of\ncipal routes are:\n12 trains daily, each of 300-ton capacity.\nTangier-Rabat-Casablanca-Marrakech (385\nOther sections of the system have only half\nmiles)\nthis capacity.\nCasablanca - Mazagan - Marrakech (182\nThe Algerian railways are localized along\nmiles)\nthe Mediterranean. Most of the lines are\nPort Lyautey-Fez-Taza-Oujda (319 miles)\nsingle track with capacities ranging from six\nMazagan-Mogador-Agadir (271 miles)\ntrains each way daily on the narrow gauge\nlines to twelve a day on the standard gauge\n4. Railroads.\nCasablanca-Tunis line. The interior is pene-\nThe railways of French North Africa consist\ntrated by four lines that connect with the\nof separate but interconnected lines operating\nprincipal east-west lines. The longest of these\non three main track gauges over a total route\nextends from Oran to Abadla 478 miles south-\nlength of 5,468 miles. All, except 139 miles\nwest. The three interior lines connect Djelfa\nof normal gauge and 10 miles of meter gauge,\nto the main line at Blida, Touggourt to the\nare single track. In Morocco about 42 per-\nmain line at El Guero, and Tebessa to both\ncent and in Algeria about 4 percent of the\nOuled-Rahmoun and Souk-Ahras on the main\ntotal route length is electrified. There are\nline.\nno electrified lines in Tunisia other than\nThe Tunisian standard gauge system is re-\nabout 29 miles worked as a tramway in and\nstricted to northern Tunisia. The main line\nnear the city of Tunis.\n(120 miles) has branches from Djedeida to\nBizerte (45 miles), from Mateur to Tabarka\nROUTE LENGTH\n(By Gauges and Traction)\n(64 miles), and from Mateur to Mastouta (50\nmiles). The narrow gauge system is composed\nMOROCCO\nALGERIA\nTUNISIA\nof three east-west lines branching off a north-\nMiles\nMiles\nMiles\nsouth coastal line extending from Tunis\n1.435 meter (4'81/2\")\nthrough Sousse and Sfax to Gabès (261 miles).\nSteam\n670\n1,371\n317\nThe northernmost of the east-west lines runs\nElectric\n477\n127\nfrom Tunis to Algeria (162 miles) and con-\n1.055 meter (3'51/2\")\nSteam\n875\nnects with other lines of the system. The\n1 meter (3'35/8\")\ncentral line extends west from Sousse for 179\nSteam\n484\n1, 056\nmiles and is connected to the southernmost\n0.60 meter (1'115/8\")\nline by a 29-mile branch line. The southern-\nSteam\n91\nmost line extends from Graiba, on the coast to\nTotal\n1, 147\n2,948\n1, 373\nthe inland town of Tozeur (146 miles).\n58\nSECRET\nThe three largest undertakings are the\ntercontinentaux (TAI) and Aigle Azur, supple-\nstate-controlled national systems of the Com-\nment the activities of Air France in linking\npagnie des Chemins de Fer du Maroc (CFM),\nthe mother country with the French North\nthe Chemins de Fer Algériens (CFA), and the\nAfrican territories. In addition to the serv-\nCompagnie Fermière des Chemins de Fer\nices flown from Paris, Air France maintains\nTunisiens (CFT) which together operate 88\nair services in North Africa conducted from its\npercent of the total route mileage of French\nbase in Algiers.\nNorth Africa.\nLocal airline companies have been estab-\nThe present over-all system is adequate for\nlished in each of the three areas: several small\nthe normal needs of the region. The equip-\ncarriers in Algeria, two in French Morocco,\nment, however, has been overtaxed for years\nand one in Tunisia. The leading Algerian\nand needs substantial repairs and modern re-\ncarrier, Air Algérie, organized in 1947, links\nplacement. The main source of revenue is\nAlgeria with Tunisia, in addition to conduct-\ntraffic in minerals and agricultural products.\ning services to France and Western Europe.\nCurrent plans call for: (a) in Morocco, the\nThe organization has a fleet of 11 DC-3's. Its\nextension of coalfield and mineral lines, the\nmain depot shop is located in Algiers. A sta-\nextension of main-line electrification eastward\ntistical comparison of this company's opera-\nto Taza, and the replacement of steam by\ntions gives some indication of the growing im-\ndiesel electric traction on the Safi and Abadla\nportance of air transportation in this area.\nlines; and (b) in eastern Algeria the comple-\ntion of the conversion to standard gauge and\nOct 47- Oct 48-\nelectrification of the Oued Keberit-Kouif line.\nSept 48 Sept 49\nNumber of hours flown\n10, 184 14, 710\nThe long-projected trans-Saharan railway\nNumber of passengers carried\n14,720 35, 692\nwhich was to link the North African systems to\nFreight hauled (in metric tons)\n3,930\n4,\n819\nSénégal and the Niger is in abeyance. Also\nplans for the doubling of the Oran-Algiers\nThe two French Moroccan carriers are Air\nmain line and the extension of the Oran-Ain\nAtlas and Air Maroc (the former a subsidiary\nTemouchant branch to rejoin the main line\nat Marnia are shelved.\nof the French nationalized airline Air France).\nBoth carriers fly services to Spain and France,\n5. Airlines.\nAir Atlas flying additional local and regional\nCivil aviation in French North Africa func-\nservices, including a service to Algiers. Air\ntions under control of the French Secretariat\nAtlas has six DC-3 aircraft; Air Maroc, six\nGeneral for Civil and Commercial Aviation in\nDC-3's and two C-46's. During 1949 these\nParis. Control is exercised through a District\ncompanies carried a total of 23,102 passengers,\nDirector in the Overseas Department of Al-\n1,253 tons of air freight, and 95 tons of mail.\ngeria, and a Regional Director in each of the\nThe Tunisian carrier, Tunis Air, is also a\nprotectorates of French Morocco and Tunisia.\nsubsidiary of Air France. This company con-\nForeign scheduled air services into the area\nducts scheduled passenger services to Nice and\nare confined to a long-range service conducted\nRome, as well as a regional service to Algiers,\nby Trans World Airline (US), which stops at\nall connecting with Air France schedules. Its\nAlgiers and Tunis on a trunkline air route to\nfleet is composed of 4 DC-3's.\nIndia, and a few regional services. Aero Por-\ntuguese of Portugal and Iberia of Spain fly\n6. Other Communications Facilities.\ninto neighboring French Morocco, while Linee\nTelephone and telegraph facilities operate\nAeree Italiane (LAI) of Italy and Air Malta fly\nunder government monopoly and in general\ninto nearby Tunisia. French scheduled air\nfollow the density pattern of population. Fa-\nservices into French North Africa are con-\ncilities are rudimentary in certain aspects, but\nducted primarily by Air France, which links\nthey have been greatly improved since World\nParis with Algeria, French Morocco, and Tu-\nWar II. Modernization and expansion have\nnisia. A number of French private air carriers,\nbeen due largely to the recognized strategic\nnotably Compagnie de Transports Aériens In-\nvalue of North African ports and air bases.\nSECRET\n59\nAside from division of administrative con-\nbe made up of US Army Signal Corps types\ntrol, the telecommunication systems in\nof World War II vintage.\nFrench Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia could\na. French Morocco.\noperate as one system. Equipment and prac-\nThe Moroccan Government owns and oper-\ntices are mainly French.\nates the country's domestic telecommunica-\nThe underground cable across French North\ntions facilities, through the PTT. The equip-\nAfrica originates in Casablanca. French\nment, operating techniques, and the essential\nMorocco, and extends via Oran, Algeria, to its\ntraining of native technicians are basically\nterminal point in Tunis. Its total length is\nFrench, although the introduction of Ameri-\nabout 1,428 miles. The decision to extend a\ncan equipment and operating methods during\ncable net across this area was made by the\nWorld War II has had considerable influence\nVichy Government in 1941. In 1943 actual\non the country. Morocco can produce only a\nconstruction began at various points, utilizing\nnegligible percentage of the equipment it\nsections which had been laid between certain\nneeds for telecommunications, and thus must\nlarge urban centers prior to 1941. Adminis-\ncontinue to rely almost entirely on France or\ntration of the system is handled by a Board\nthe US to meet its needs. The country has\nof Directors composed of representatives from\na domestic wire net that provides fair to good\nthe three Post Telegraph and Telephones\nservice. The PTT has its headquarters in\n(PTT) concerned. When this cable goes into\nRabat.\noperation, probably at the end of 1950, existing\nThe telephone system provides the widest\nfacilities will be almost doubled and service\ncoverage, and is thus the most important\nwill be comparable to any modern Western\nmeans of communication. Morocco has 45,-\ncable system.\n153 telephone subscribers; principal ex-\nInternational and domestic cable service to\nchanges are located in Rabat-Salé, Casa-\nFrance is adequate for present requirements;\nblanca, Marrakech, Fez and Meknes. The\noperations are excellent and efficient despite\nMoroccan Government depends heavily on this\nold equipment. The system is well integrated\nnetwork and, to a lesser degree, on the tele-\nwith the landline network of North Africa, and\ngraph system for administration of the coun-\nthe facilities could probably accommodate a\ntry, whereas the Army depends largely on\nlimited additional load with present equip-\nradio. Telegraph lines connect most of the\nment.\npopulation centers, and in many places, tele-\nRadio plays three primary roles in this area\ngraph and telephone wires are carried on the\ntoday: i.e., international communication,\nsame poles. An extensive telegraph net ex-\nbroadcasting, and military. Of these three\nists for the operation of the railway system.\nroles, international communication has pro-\nThe telegraph circuits follow along the rail-\ngressed rapidly since the end of World War II.\nway and are operated on a closed circuit sys-\nFrench stations at Rabat and Algiers handle\ntem.\nincreasing traffic loads, but their facilities\nThe French Army operates an extensive net-\nhave not changed materially since the war\nwork of radio stations, which provide the only\nyears.\nmeans of communication in the sparsely popu-\nRadio broadcasting has also made great\nlated regions of southern and southeastern\nstrides during the five years but is the subject\nMorocco. Although they are used primarily\nof more official enthusiasm than actual effec-\nfor military purposes, the stations also handle\ntiveness. Radio receiver density is very low,\nofficial and even public traffic.\nSO that only about 10-15 percent of the popu-\nb. Algeria.\nlation can be considered to be reached by this\nThe PTT system in Algeria is owned and\nmedium.\noperated by the government. The wire net is\nFrench military forces have widely scattered\nvery extensive and provides service for most of\nradio installations and operate numerous net-\nthe towns and villages in the country. Tele-\nworks linking France with its overseas col-\nphone service is more widely used than tele-\nonies. Most of their equipment is believed to\ngraph and is the most dependable means of\nSECRET\n60\ncommunication; there are 75,670 telephone\nfacilities for the French PTT, which owns the\nsubscribers. The telephone service is more\nsystems. Although the lines were in a total\nthan adequate for the country's needs. Main\nstate of disrepair following World War II, they\ntelephone centers are located at Algiers, Oran,\nhave since been repaired and modernized so\nand Constantine.\nthat they are now above their prewar\nThe telegraph system is not widely used in\nefficiency.\nAlgeria. Most of the circuits are carried on\nTelephone subscribers number 15,600.\ntelephone wire. There are six circuits to\nTunisia and six to Morocco.\nThere are 207 PTT telegraph stations and\n81 railroad telegraph stations located through-\nc. Tunisia.\nout Tunisia. Ninety percent of all telegraphic\nTunisia has an extensive network of tele-\nmessages in 1948 were relayed to and from\nphone and telegraph circuits with many inter-\nthe capital city of Tunis. Of these, some 29\nconnecting lines. The system is antiquated,\npercent were local, 37 percent international\nexcept for the city of Tunis. The Tunisian\n(mainly to France), and the remaining 34 per-\nGovernment operates all telecommunication\ncent to other North African stations.\nECRET\nSECRET\nAPPENDIX C\nPOPULATION\nThe population of French North Africa,\nBerber is the dominant native racial stock\nwhich had remained relatively static before\nof the area. Since the Arab conquerors first\nthe French conquests, has grown rapidly since\noverran the area in the seventh century A. D.,\nthe introduction of minimum European\nthere has been a considerable intermixture\nstandards of health and sanitation. Average\nbetween Berber and Arab. The Arab has im-\nlife expectancy is now about 35 years. The\nposed his religion, language, dress, and many\nnet population growth is 400,000 (or about 2\nof his customs on a large part of the Berber\npercent) annually. At this rate of growth the\ncommunity. The Berbers, however, have pre-\npopulation will soon expand beyond food pro-\nserved some distinct racial characteristics; a\nduction capabilities. The following table\nnegroid strain is evident in some sections.\ngives some indication of the population distri-\nGenerally speaking, the Berbers populate the\nbution. Figures are based on calculated esti-\nrural districts and the interior regions, while\nmates, rather than on actual census records,\nmost of the Arabs congregate in the urban\nbecause population tabulations in this semi-\nand coastal areas. About one-fourth of the\nprimitive area are not accurate.\nBerbers are nomads, and an equal or greater\nMost of the population is concentrated\nnumber are semi-nomadic. Arabic is the pre-\nalong the Mediterranean and Atlantic littorals\ndominant language among the urban natives,\nand the fertile river basins and interior oases.\na great many of whom also understand\nThe standard of living is low, similar to that\nFrench. In the isolated rural areas, various\nof other countries on the southern shores of\nBerber dialects predominate. Except for the\nthe Mediterranean. Among the vast majority\nupper-class minority engaged in the profes-\nof the native population the mode of life has\nsions, the natives are considered unskilled by\naltered little in centuries. Important chief-\nwestern standards.\ntains, senior functionaries, and wealthy trad-\nThe basis of native society is the authority\ners, on the other hand, enjoy a way of life now\nof the father over his family and dependents.\nrare in Europe.\nPolygamy is still common, but because of the\nThe European minority is predominantly\npoverty of the masses only about one family\nFrench, but also includes large numbers of\nin six in polygamous. Many tribal character-\nItalians, Spanish, Greeks, and Maltese.\nistics remain, although the tribe today tends\nFrench is the predominant and official lan-\nto be a territorial division. The markets are\nguage. The Europeans live in the large towns\nthe most important centers of rural life. Na-\nand are usually engaged in government, com-\ntive quarters (medinas) differ markedly from\nmerce, the professions, or skilled trades.\nthe European quarters; as in medieval English\nTOTAL FNA\nMOROCCO\nALGERIA\nTUNISIA\n1931\n14,250,000\n1936\n16,100,000\n1948\n20,510,000\n8,613,000\n8,666,000\n3,231,000\nDensity per square mile\n19\n53\n10. 2\n16. 9\nEuropeans and Jews\n1,874,600\n525,000\n1,040,000\n309,600\nNatives\n18,635,400\n8,088,000\n7,626,000\n2,921,400\nGainfully employed\n2,200,000\n1,600,000\n680, 000\n(1950)\n(1950)\n(1936)\nSECRET\n61\n62\nSECRET\ntowns, the members of one trade (guild) live\nBerbers, including fetishes such as the hanging\ntogether and have their shops in one particu-\nof bits of rag on sacred trees, a votive offering\nlar district.\nof the native women to ward off sterility.\nFewer than 10 percent of the native popula-\nHabous (religious endowed property) lands\ntion are literate. Although the French\nand buildings are scattered throughout the\nauthorities claim to be engaging in a cam-\narea, the income supporting religious and\npaign against illiteracy, school facilities are so\ncharitable works and such institutions as\ninadequate that fewer than one-fifth of the\nschools and hospitals.\nchildren can be enrolled in school.\nThe Moslem brotherhoods (confréries), or\nreligious organizations, also play an impor-\nThe Moslem religion permeates almost every\ntant role in native life. Membership is pre-\naspect of life and the Koran regulates rela-\ndominantly rural and Berber, and adherents\ntionships and actions. Mosques abound in\nare scattered widely throughout the area.\nboth urban and rural regions. Prayers are\nZaouias (headquarters) are located in all of\nsaid five times daily; and the month's fast of\nthe principal coastal and interior cities where\nRamadan is observed annually by the natives.\na particular group is dominant, and in villages\nComparatively few North African Moslems\none or another of the groups usually plays an\nmake the pilgrimage to Mecca, however.\nimportant role in communal affairs. The\nThere are local holy men, but no clergy in\nprincipal differences between the various\nthe European sense. The Moslem Sunni\nbrotherhoods are the initiatory ceremonies,\n(comparable to moderate Christian Protes-\nprayers, and religious rites. These organiza-\ntants) sect prevails, although a minority ad-\ntions lack efficient organization, and attach-\nheres to the Shiah (comparable to extreme\nment to the order in many instances seems to\nChristian Catholics) sect. Synagogues and\nbe limited to a feeling of reverence for the\nChristian churches are located in the principal\nSherif (hereditary leader). Ties to the\nurban areas. The Roman Catholic is the\nmother zaouia generally appear too loose to\nlargest of the Christian communities.\norganize an effective group. The Arabic word\nThe Arabs as a whole are fanatical and\nfor the orders is synonymous with the word\ndeeply superstitious. On the other hand, the\n\"way,\" indicating that the brotherhoods are\nBerbers are democratic by nature and, al-\nthought of as a way of life and not as a politi-\nthough occasionally liable to fanaticism, rare-\ncal or religious movement with determined\nly moved by religious enthusiasm. Many\nobjectives. The brotherhoods are a some-\nreligious customs common in the country be-\nwhat amorphous but substantial force on the\nfore the arrival of Islam survive among the\nside of tradition and conservatism.\nAPPENDIX D\nBIOGRAPHIES\nABBAS, FERHAT 1899-\npected to play a major role in the government\nBefore World War II Ferhat Abbas was ac-\nof an independent Morocco.\ntive in the pro-French assimilationist Fédéra-\nBOUMENDJEL, AHMED BEN MOHAMMED\ntion des Elus Musulmans. After the defeat\n1908-\nof France and during the Vichy regime in Al-\nProbable successor to Ferhat Abbas as leader\ngeria he became more pro-nationalist in senti-\nment, and in February 1943 was among the\nof the UDMA (nationalist) party of which he\nAlgerian Arab leaders who addressed a mani-\nhas been a member since 1945, Boumendjel is\nan Algerian who has accepted French citizen-\nfesto to the French authorities demanding\nreforms in the French administration. In\nship and a French wife. He studied law in\n1944 he founded the strongly pro-nationalist\nParis and at the University of Algiers and is\nAmis du Manifeste, the general aim of which\nregarded as much more intelligent and subtle\nthan Abbas. His influence in the UDMA is\nwas the eventual establishment of Algerian\ntoward moderation. He is a Moslem and at\nautonomy within the framework of the French\nUnion. The Amis was dissolved by govern-\npresent is a member of the Assembly of the\nmental decree in May 1945 and Abbas subse-\nFrench Union, having been elected to that post\nquently founded the Union Démocratique du\nby the Algerian Assembly in 1948.\nManifeste Algérien (UDMA) and was elected\nBOURGHIBA, HABIB 1904-\non this ticket to the Constituent Assembly in\nAlthough friendly to France and French cul-\nJune 1946. He recently resigned from mem-\nture, Bourghiba is the outstanding leader of\nbership in the Assembly of the French Union.\nArab nationalism and opponent of French pol-\nAlthough he has been reported to have close\nicy in Tunisia. Politically astute, he has re-\nrelations with the Algerian Communist Party\njected the repeated efforts of the French to\nand to have received subsidies from the Com-\nwin him over. In 1933 he founded the Neo-\nmunists, he has recently been extremely criti-\nDestour Party, of which he is president. Re-\ncal of Communist activities in Algeria.\ngarded as the inspiration for the hard core of\nBALAFREJ, AHMED 1912-\nnationalism in Tunisia, he nevertheless has a\ndefinite moderating influence and is attempt-\nBalafrej is the principal policy-maker and\ning to negotiate with France for concessions\nstrategist of the Istiqlal (Independence)\nleading to independence.\nParty, which he helped to form in 1944, and is\nbelieved to have the confidence of the Sultan.\nBourghiba represented Tunisia on the Com-\nHe envisages the abrogation of the Treaty of\nmittee for the Liberation of North Africa from\nFez (1912) and its replacement by a French-\nits inception in Cairo in 1948 until late 1949\nMoroccan Treaty under which an independent\nwhen he returned to Tunisia to reassume the\nMorocco would rely on French guidance and\nactive leadership of the Neo-Destour Party.\nadvice.\nHis efforts to date have had no notable success.\nWell educated and intelligent, he is the most\nBourghiba is a Moslem and a graduate of\nwesternized of the Istiqlal leaders and is be-\nthe Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris.\nlieved to be largely responsible for the party's\nDuring the war he refused to collaborate with\nmoderate approach to the Moroccan problem.\nthe Axis. He is an anti-Communist but might\nHe is not unfriendly toward the United States,\nbe persuaded to collaborate with the Commu-\nalthough he believes the US is indifferent to\nnists if hope of other help were lost and he\nMoroccan nationalist aims. He could be ex-\nhad become convinced that the Communist\nSECRET\n63\n64\ncollaboration furnished the only possibility of\ncome. He is thought to be friendly toward\ngaining independence.\nthe US. On the whole, Farhat's views are\nBOURQUIA, ABDESLAM circa 1920-\ntypical of conservative Tunisian Arabs who\nwere educated in France.\nA French Moroccan journalist, Bourquia is\na die-hard Communist. Fairly intelligent and\nFASSI, SI ALLAL EL 1910-\nwell educated, he is a useful propagandist for\nSecond only to Balafrej in the leadership of\nthe Moroccan Communist Party. In 1948 he\nthe Istiqlal Party, Fassi has been associated\nwas said to be completely under the control\nwith the Moroccan nationalist movement since\nof the French members of the Secretariat of\nits inception. Exiled to French Equatorial\nthe Moroccan Communist Party who found\nAfrica in 1937 by the French because of his\nhim useful in proselyting among the natives.\nnationalist activities, he was not permitted to\nCABALLERO, PAUL\nreturn until 1946. He served in Cairo as the\nVery little is known of this Secretary Gen-\nIstiqlal representative on the Committee for\neral of the Algerian Communist Party. He\nthe Liberation of North Africa from January\nto December 1948. Fassi now resides in the\nmay be one of the large group of Spanish Loy-\nalists who settled in Oran after fleeing from\nInternational Zone of Tangier because he fears\ncurtailment of his movements should he re-\nSpain during the Civil War. He and other\nprominent members of the Politburo of the\nturn to the French Zone. A religious zealot\nAlgerian Communist Party are alleged to re-\nand fiery orator, he has given indications of\nceive their directives at secret meetings with\nbeing out of sympathy with the conservative\nLeon Feix, permanent representative of the\npolicies of Balafrej. So long as he remains in\nFrench Communist Party in Algeria.\nTangier, however, he probably will have little\nchance of success in a program of gathering\nENNAFAA, MOHAMMED BEN BRAHIM BEN\ndissident party members about himself.\nSAID 1920-\nHACHED, FARHAT\nEnnafaa is one of the principal members of\nthe Central Committee of the Tunisian Com-\nLeader of the nationalist-sponsored Union\nmunist Party. He is reported to have the dif-\nGénérale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),\nficult assignment of endeavoring to obtain a\nHached is reputed to have such intelligence\nrapprochement with the Neo and Old Destour\nand ability that he is head and shoulders\n(nationalist) Parties in order to achieve a\nabove other French and Tunisian labor lead-\n\"National Front\" of all Moslem and Commu-\ners. He is energetic, and has a large fol-\nnist elements. His chief labors are said to be\nlowing. In his writings, he uses slogans in-\naddressing Party cells and city and regional\nstead of facts. He has had years of intensive\nconferences and writing articles for the Com-\ntraining under French labor leadership and\nmunist Party organ, L'Avenir de la Tunisie.\nhas been engaged for several years in organ-\nHe closely follows the Cominform line in at-\nizing Tunisian labor. Held responsible for\ntacking the US, the Marshall Plan and the\nthe bloodshed during strikes and riots at Sfax\nAtlantic Pact. Although he is considered to\nin August 1947, he waged a vigorous and suc-\nbe well educated for a Tunisian Moslem born\ncessful campaign to have strikers reinstated\nin humble circumstances, Ennafaa is not be-\nand his union representation restored to the\nlieved to be as able and forceful as Ali Djerad,\nlabor commission. Efforts by the Commu-\nwhom he replaced in May 1948 as the Party's\nnist-backed USTT to affiliate the UGTT with\napologist among the Moslems.\ntheir organization failed, although the unions\nhave collaborated in limited local objectives\nFARHAT, SALAH 1890-\nfrom time to time. It is generally thought\nThis Tunisian lawyer has been Secretary\nthat Hached has no love for the Communists\nGeneral of the Old Destour Party since its\nand that he will work with the USTT only\nfoundation in 1933. Moderate on most issues,\nas long as something can be gained locally\nhe apparently believes that Tunisian inde-\nby intermittent and joint action. Although\npendence will not be realized for some time to\nHached accepted affiliation for the UGTT with\n65\nthe Communist-dominated WFTU, he prob-\nthe French cabinet had been purged of Com-\nably would be disposed to collaborate with\nmunists and had decided to impose a more\nany international labor organization with a\nstringent administration upon Morocco. Juin\nworld-wide audience.\nbrought to this task the conservatism of a\ncareer soldier, substantial administrative ca-\nHASSAN V, SIDI MOHAMMED BEN YOUS-\npacity, powerful anti-Communist convictions,\nSEF BEN EL Sultan of Morocco, 1912-\nand a devout adherence to the traditional\nThe present Sultan of Morocco-the nomi-\nrights and privileges of Frenchmen at home\nnal ruler of three areas, French Morocco,\nand abroad. These characteristics account\nSpanish Morocco, and the International Zone\nfor the fact that Juin has always had the\nof Tangier-was elected to this position at\ncomplete confidence of General de Gaulle\nFez on 18 November 1927 by an assembly of\ndespite the fact that he commanded the\nVizirs and Elders of the Mosques. His elec-\nFrench Army of the Vichy Government. They\ntion is said to have been engineered by the\nalso explain the somewhat strained relation-\nFrench because he presumably could be\nship which exists between the General and\nmolded and controlled more easily than his\nthe Sultan of Morocco.\nolder and more intelligent brothers. In re-\nFrom the French point of view, Juin's civil-\ncent years, however, he has asserted his inde-\nian administration has been successful in that\npendence of French authority. He is reported\nhe has reestablished French prestige and\nto visualize himself as the leader of the Arab\nmaintained internal security. In recent\nworld in northwest Africa, and in Tangier in\nmonths, his military duties have become more\n1947 he made a ringing defense of the Arab\nimportant with his appointment as chief of\nLeague. His relations with General Juin are\nthe Southern European-Western Mediterra-\nstrained. The Sultan has felt that Juin over-\nnean military region under the Atlantic Pact.\nsteps his authority. He is the virtual, al-\nthough not nominal, head of the Istiqlal\nKAAK, MUSTAPHA 1893-\nParty, the principal nationalist organization\nKaak is the son of a Tunisian Government\nin French Morocco, and is in close contact\nofficial and from 1911-17 served in the Section\nwith the party leaders. Because he is aware\nd'Etat of the Tunisian Government while\nof the sparsity of capable personnel among\nworking for a law degree. He was a member\nMoroccans and because he realizes a nation-\nof the Grand Council of Tunisia from 1928 to\nalist uprising would be futile and injurious\n1934, when he was believed to be a strong\nto his position, he advocates moderation for\nsympathizer, if not a member, of the Old\nthe national movement. Genuinely con-\nDestour Party. With Old and Neo-Destour\ncerned with the welfare of his people, he is\nParty members he signed a petition in 1944\ninterested in the betterment of education and\nasking for Tunisian autonomy. He was ap-\nliving conditions.\npointed Prime Minister of the Tunisian Gov-\nernment in July 1947 at the height of his\nJUIN, General ALPHONSE-PIERRE 1888-\npopularity with the nationalists. However,\nThe present Resident General for France\nthe Neo-Destourians now consider him a tool\nin Morocco and Commander in Chief of all\nof the French and a traitor and the Bey has\nFrench armed forces in North Africa began his\non several occasions publicly shown his dislike\ncolonial career by being born at Bône, Algeria,\nfor the Prime Minister. He is believed to be\nin 1888.\nhonest and capable, but ineffective in dealing\nThe General, who is the top-ranking mili-\nwith French authorities in the manner ex-\ntary figure of France, graduated from St. Cyr\npected by the nationalists. In fact he is re-\nand joined the First Regiment of Algerian\nsponsible to the Resident General and not to\nTirailleurs in 1911. His subsequent career\nthe Bey. He has remained in office primarily\nwas spent generally in Europe and North\nbecause it has been impossible to find a Prime\nAfrica.\nMinister who could be equally acceptable to\nJuin's appointment to the civilian post he\nFrench authorities, nationalists, and the\nnow occupies took place in May 1947 when\nBey.\n66\nLAMINE PASHA BEY, MOHAMMED Bey of\nannual congress in April 1949. In the ab-\nTunis 1881-\nsence of Ali Yata, he is the actual leader for\nLamine was appointed Bey of Tunis by Gen-\nCommunist activities in the area.\neral Giraud in May 1943 to succeed Mo-\nMESSALI HADJ circa 1903-\nhammed el-Moncef Bey, who was deposed by\nthe French for his pro-German activities.\nMost vocal of the extreme Algerian nation-\nThe manner of his appointment marked him\nalists, Messali studied at the University of\nas a tool of the French, and until the death\nParis and resided in that city from 1923 to\nof Moncef in 1948, Lamine was anathema to\n1937. In the latter year, he helped found\nthe Tunisian nationalists. Since that time,\nthe nationalistic Parti Populaire Algérien and\nLamine has been recognized as the legitimate\nwas imprisoned for two years. In 1941 Vichy\nBey, his prestige has been greatly increased,\ncondemned him to 16 years at hard labor.\nand the nationalists have given him their\nHe was released but immediately placed in\nsupport. He is believed to be somewhat un-\n\"forced residence\" by General Giraud the fol-\nder the influence of his son, Prince Chadly,\nlowing year. A strong anti-Communist, he\nwho is a close friend of Neo-Destour leader,\nalso opposes the inclusion of Algeria in the\nSalah ben Youssef. Lamine has recently\nAtlantic Pact. Although he opposes taking\nshown some reluctance to go along with the\nsides in the East-West conflict, in the event\nFrench, and has opposed various decrees pro-\nof war he would probably try to trade Algerian\nposed by the Resident General.\nMoslem assistance for support of Algerian in-\ndependence. Messali regards Ferhat Abbas,\nLYAUTEY, Marshal LOUIS HUBERT GON-\nthe Algerian UDMA leader, as an upstart.\nZALVE 1854-1934\nAlthough a professional soldier, Lyautey's\nNAEGELEN, MARCEL EDMOND 1892-\nreputation rests upon his creative genius as a\nNaegelen has been increasingly prominent\ncolonial administrator and defender of French\nin the French Socialist Party since 1934, and\ntradition and interests. In April 1912 he was\nfollowing World War II he emerged as one of\nappointed High Commissioner and Resident\nthe leaders of the Party. He also has been a\nGeneral in Morocco to quell disturbances at\nclose friend and admirer of Léon Blum. Nae-\nFez and to consolidate the recently established\ngelen succeeded Yves Chataigneau as Gov-\nprotectorate. His success is indicated by the\nernor General of Algeria in February 1948.\nfact that during World War I, although the\nHis tenure of office has been renewed each six\nMoroccan interior was in effect demilitarized\nmonths since August 1948. Upon his arrival\nin order to free troops for service in Europe,\nin Algiers the Administration underwent a\nLyautey not only maintained order but en-\nmarked change from the complaisance of his\nlarged the area of French control. After\npredecessor. He returned to a firm hand in\nWorld War I, he conquered the Atlas region,\ndealing with both nationalist aspirations and\nestablished a defensive barrier to the north\nthe Communists. He has travelled exten-\nof Ouergha, and directed the final counter-\nsively in Algeria to revive French prestige and\nattack against Abd-el-Krim. Except for a\nto strengthen the psychological ties binding\nbrief period (December 1917 to March 1918)\nAlgeria to France. Naegelen is alert, intelli-\nwhen he served as French War Minister,\ngent, and personally ambitious.\nLyautey's service in Morocco was continuous\nNISARD, MAURICE 1914-\nuntil 1925. He was made a Marshal of France\nThis young Tunisian-Jewish lawyer is said\nin 1921 as a reward for his achievements in\nto be the ablest of the Tunisian Communist\nNorth Africa.\nofficials. He is one of the principal Party\nMAZELLA, MICHEL, 1907-\nSecretaries, a member of the Party's Polit-\nburo and Central Committee, and the chief\nA French Moroccan journalist and former\neditorial writer for the Party organ, L'Avenir\nteacher, Mazella was appointed Treasurer of\nde la Tunisie. He is quick and intelligent,\nthe Moroccan Communist Party at its second\nand is proficient in three languages-Arabic,\nECRET\n67\nItalian, and French. Described as agreeable\nHe is reported to be honest, industrious, but\nand well-mannered socially, Nisard has the\nsomewhat lacking in political sagacity.\nreputation of being an able lawyer. He is\nunquestionably the most competent of the\nSADAOUI, HASSEN, 1899-\nlocal Communist leaders and the \"spark plug\"\nA militant member of the Tunisian Commu-\nof the Politburo and the Central Committee.\nnist Party, Sadaoui was \"elected\" President\nHis energy and keen mind constitute an im-\nof the Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs\nportant element in the local Communist strat-\nde Tunisie (USTT) to provide the union with\negy and activity. His attitude toward the US\na Moslem president. He is a quiet but indus-\nis one of violent hostility and his editorials\ntrious labor leader of importance in Tunisia's\nconsistently follow the Cominform line in at-\nlabor movement, although he is considerably\ntacking American \"imperialism.\"\nless active politically than Georges Poropane,\nPERILLIER, MARCELLIN MARIE LOUIS\nthe USTT's Secretary General.\n1900-\nWAZZANI (OUAZZANI), MOHAMMED BEN\nIn June 1950 Perillier was selected to re-\nHASSAN 1910-\nplace Socialist Jean Mons as Resident General\nWazzani has long collaborated with other\nof Tunisia. A career civil servant of Rightist\nnationalist elements in demanding reforms\nsympathies, Perillier has had considerable ex-\nfrom the French. Released in 1946 after ten\nperience in North African affairs. He is in-\nyears' exile, he disagreed with the ideas of the\ntelligent, capable, extremely ambitious, and\nIstiqlal leaders and established a new group\nan astute politician. He is said to owe his\ncalled the Shoura (Democratic) Party, but he\nappointment in Tunisia not only to his ad-\nhas not succeeded in building up a large fol-\nministrative ability but to his friendship and\nlowing. He is reported to have close connec-\nclose association with French Foreign Min-\ntions with the French Residency, and is con-\nister Robert Schuman.\nsidered by the more active nationalists to be\nAlthough he is still in the process of be-\nan agent of the French Administration.\ncoming acquainted with his new duties, Peril-\nThere were indications in 1949 that he was\nlier apparently intends to rule Tunisia firmly\nmildly pro-Communist.\nand the reform program which he will im-\nplement will be introduced cautiously, with-\nYATA, ALI 1920-\nout relinquishing France's prerogatives in the\nAli Yata, Secretary of the Moroccan Com-\narea.\nmunist Party, disappeared in July 1948 when\nHe is reported to be favorably disposed to-\nhis arrest was ordered by the Protectorate au-\nward Great Britain and the US.\nthorities in connection with the illegal distri-\nPOROPANE, GEORGES 1902-\nbution of Communist propaganda through the\nmails. Although his whereabouts are not\nAs Secretary General of the Union des Syn-\ndefinitely known, he probably is in close touch\ndicats des Travailleurs de Tunisie (USTT),\nwith events in Morocco and directs the Party\nPoropane is the effective leader of this Com-\nactivities from his underground headquarters.\nmunist-controlled and WFTU-recognized Tu-\nnisian labor union. Poropane is a French-\nYOUSSEF, SALAH BEN 1908-\nJewish skilled worker at the French naval ar-\nThis Paris-trained Tunisian lawyer, who has\nsenal at Sidi Abdallah (Ferryville). He\nspent six years in French prisons because of\ngained his experience as a union organizer\nwith the Tunisian section of the French CGT\nhis nationalistic convictions, is Secretary Gen-\nuntil the schism in October 1946. As a mem-\neral of the Neo-Destour Party. He is regarded\nber of the Central Committee of the Tunisian\nas fiery by temperament and politically some-\nCommunist Party, Poropane is the apologist\nwhat immature. It is reported that he and\nfor Communist labor doctrines and writes the\nhis colleagues still hold the US high in esteem\nprincipal articles for the USTT in the Com-\nand that at heart he is less anti-French than\nmunist Party organ, L'Avenir de la Tunisie.\nhis speeches suggest. It is believed that ben\nSECRET\n68\nSECRET\nYoussef will not urge his followers to violence\ncause the French refused to accept an all-\nuntil all peaceful means toward Tunisian inde-\nDestour government. Although formerly a\npendence have been exhausted. It is also said\nclose associate of Bourghiba, during the lat-\nthat he has considered joining forces with the\nter's absence in Cairo ben Youssef established\nlocal Communists as a means of furthering\nhis political position so effectively that his\nTunisian nationalism. In July 1947, he de-\nclosest associates were disgruntled at Bour-\nclined a post in the new Tunisian cabinet be-\nghiba's resumption of leadership.\nAPPENDIX E\nCHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS\nB. C. 525 Introduction of the camel into North Africa by the Persian conquest.\nA. D. 647 First of the three Arab invasions of North Africa.\n682\nConversion of the Berbers to Islam.\n732\nOrigin of Zeitouna University, Tunis, oldest of the three celebrated Arab\nuniversities in North Africa. (The other two are Karaouiyine in Fez\nand El Azhar in Cairo.)\n1358 Treaty with Pisa granting capitulations in Morocco; the first instance of\nextraterritorial jurisdiction in North Africa.\n1577 Agreement establishing a French consul in Tunis.\n1603\nCapitulations in Morocco granted to France by treaty.\n1665\nAgreement guaranteeing pre-eminence of the French consul in Tunis.\n1705 Inception of the Regency of Tunis under the ruling Husseinite dynasty\nfollowing the non-recognition of the Sultan of Constantinople by the\nBey of Tunis, Hussein ben Ali.\n28 May 1767\nTreaty between Morocco and France extending rights of protection not only\nto foreigners but also, for the first time, to natives in their employ.\n1787\nExtraterritorial rights in Morocco granted to the US by a most-favored-\nnation treaty.\n1814-1815 Congress of Vienna, marking the disintegration of the First French Empire.\n1827\nAffront tendered the French consul by the Dey of Algiers.\n5 July 1830\nCapture of Algiers, followed by the conquest and occupation of Algeria\nby the French.\n16 September 1836\nRe-negotiation of the terms of the US-Moroccan treaty of 1787. This treaty\nis the basis of the special US privileged position throughout Morocco.\n9 December 1856\nTreaty of peace and commerce between UK and Morocco, granting limited\ncapitulatory rights.\n1861 Treaty of commerce between Spain and Morocco.\n1871\nUS declined offer by Sultan to obtain a protectorate over Morocco.\n12 May 1881\nThe treaty of Le Bardo establishing a French protectorate over Tunisia.\n8 June 1883\nThe Convention of La Marsa modifying the Le Bardo treaty.\nJuly-August 1898\nThe Fashoda incident.\n8 April 1904\nAnglo-French general agreement known as the \"Entente Cordiale\" delimit-\ning their respective spheres of influence, particularly in relation to the\nMoroccan question.\n31 March 1905\nVisit of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor von Bulow to Tangier to insist\non Germany's interest in Morocco and full independence of the Sultan.\n7 April 1906 Act of Algeciras derived from the International Conference designed to\neffect governmental reorganization and economic reforms in Morocco.\n1 June 1911 German gunboat \"Panther\" dispatched to Agadir, to protect German inter-\nests in Morocco.\n69\n70\n30 March 1912 The Treaty of Fez establishing a French protectorate over Morocco.\n1914-1918 French North Africa emerged from World War I with French hegemony\npreserved by the untiring efforts of General Lyautey.\nMay 1926 Abd-el-Krim, leader of the Rif revolt in Morocco, surrendered to the French.\n18 November 1927 Accession to the throne of H. M. Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef ben El-Hassan\nV, present Sultan of Morocco.\n1934 Termination of successful military operations engaged in pacification of\nlast dissident tribes in Morocco.\n7-8 November 1942\nAllied landings in French North Africa.\n17 November 1942\nClark-Darlan Agreement, Algiers.\nDecember 1942-\nConquest and occupation of the Fezzan by General Leclerc's Free French\nJanuary 1943\nForces.\n12 May 1943 El Moncef Pasha, Bey of Tunis, deposed by the Allies following their victory\nover the Axis troops in Tunisia.\n3 June 1943 Constitution in Algiers of the French Committee of National Liberation\nby Generals de Gaulle and Giraud following their Casablanca agreement.\n30 January 1944 The Brazzaville Conference of French colonial administrators.\n8 May 1945 Bloody repression by French of nationalist-instigated native uprisings at\nSétif and Guelma in the Kabyle regions of Algeria.\n27 October 1946 Adoption of the French Constitution of the Fourth Republic providing for\nthe organization of the French Union.\n10 April 1947 During Tangier visit while he was relatively free from French control, the\nSultan in a politically-slanted religious speech backed the Arab League\nas a unifying influence among the Moslems of the Maghreb.\n1\nJune 1947 Escape of Abd-el-Krim while en route to France after twenty-one years of\nexile on Reunion Island.\n7 June 1947 Replacement of Eirik Labonne by General Alphonse-Pierre Juin as Resi-\ndent General of France in Morocco.\n20 September 1947\nAlgerian Statute, approved by French National Assembly, became a law.\n5 January 1948\nAnnouncement by the Maghreb Office of the Arab League of the organiza-\ntion in Cairo of the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa under\nthe chairmanship of Abd-el-Krim.\n4-11 April 1948 First general elections ever held in Algeria to vote for members of the Al-\ngerian Assembly established by the Algerian Statute.\n1 September 1948 Death of El Moncef Pasha, deposed Bey of Tunis, left Sidi Mohammed El\nLamine the undisputed native ruler of Tunisia.\n29 May 1949 Visit of Vincent Auriol, President of the Fourth Republic, to Algiers, the\nfirst French chief of state to do so since the visit of Gaston Doumergue,\nPresident of the Third Republic, in 1930.\n21 November 1949 Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly for an inde-\npendent and sovereign Libya (including the French-occupied Fezzan) no\nlater than January 1952.\nSECRET\n11410\nITALY\nPORTUGAL\nSARDINIA\nBALEAR(Spain) ISLANDS\n(Italy)\nSPAIN\n0\nATLANTIC\nITERRANEAX\nN\nS E A\nINTANGIER ZONE Я\nE\nD\nM\nMITIDJA\nALGIERS\nBougie\nilippeville\nKROUMIRIE\nSICILY\nTETUAN\nLegales\nBizerte\nOCEAN\nSP.\nMOROCCO\nMers-el-Kebir\nArzew\nTUNIS\nCape Bon\nBo\nKelibia\nPort Lyautey\nA\nT\nS\nConstantine\nHenchir-Lebna\nE\nSouk Ahras\nRABAT\nMazagan\nCasablanca\nGap Taza\nOujda\nAin Beida\nFez\nSousse\nBou Saada\nMALTA\nMeknes\nAURES\nHaidra\n(U.K.)\nTebessa:\nTHE\nBerguent\nKhouribga\nATLAS\nHIGH\nATLAS\nS\nKasserine\nle\nSafi\nKreider\nOumach\nSTEPPE\nZem\nGentil\nMogador\nSSAHARAN\nLaghouat\nSHOTT\nSfax\nM-MIDDELAS\nREGIONI\nGabes\nTozeur\nANTIVATLASOC\nTouggourt\nBeni Ounit\nKenadsa\nALGERIA\nTUNISIA\n/\nBechar\nKSOUR\nTRIPOLI\nSidi Ifni\nAbadia\nTENT\nCape\nWESTERN ERO\nTUNISLAN\nSPANISH\nDEPRESSI\nGadames\nSAHARA\nPLATEAU OF\nTADEMAIT\nLIBYA\nZ\n28\nSAHARAN\nBrach\nSebha\nFRENCH\nWEST AFRICA\nSerdeles\nFEZZAN\nGat\nAHAGGAR\nMASSIF\nFt Laperrine\n(Tamanrasset)\nFRENCH NORTH AFRICA\n20\nSELECTED RAILROAD\nELECTRIFIED SECTION OF RAILROAD\nFRENCH\nSELECTED MAIN ROAD\nWEST\n+\nNAVAL BASE\nGENERALIZED TERRAIN REGIONS\nNAVAL AIR STATION\nAFRICA\nPlain or Lowland\nAIR BASE\nPlateau\nMountains\n20\nBASE: EUROPE ET AFRIQUE DU NORD 1:5,000,000 Sheets No. 3 (1944)\nand No. 5 (1942) Institut Géographique National, Paris\nScale 1:6,500,000\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\nMILES\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\nThe international boundaries shown on this map do not\nKILOMETERS\nnecessarily correspond in all cases to the boundaries recog-\nnized by the U.S. Government\n11410 Map Division, CIA, 6-50\nCIA Reproduction\nHARTY ARCHIVES REGORDS NATIONAL TRUNAN AND\nSOVERNM SERVICE\nGPO-SSO-5690"
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