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Ashida cabinets represented a victory for advocates of such cooperation, the policy
compromises required by the coalitions have led to increasingly militant opposition by
left-wing elements, whose position in the party has become stronger with the passage
of time. While left-wing strength, reinforced in December 1947 by the withdrawal of
a group of right-wing Socialists from the party, was sufficiently great to precipitate the
fall of the Katayama cabinet, the subsequent participation of two important left-wing
leaders in the Ashida cabinet reflected a split in the ranks of the left itself that has
made it unlikely that this group will succeed to the leadership of the party.
e. The Communist Party (Nippon Kyosanto).
The Communist Party is dominated by a nucleus of prewar leaders most of
whom spent many years in prison before the Occupation. From the time of its re-
vival to the present, the Communist Party has insisted that it seeks to bring about
through peaceful means first the bourgeois democratic revolution and then the so-
cialist revolution. Although the Communists have officially ruled out the use of force
as a means of obtaining these objectives, except as a form of self-protection against
counter-revolutionary violence, their emphasis on democratic and peaceful change does
not imply a corresponding emphasis on securing control of parliamentary machinery.
Rather, the Communists believe that the opposition to the establishment of democracy
and socialism by what they regard as reactionary elements will be expressed through
organizations outside the Diet and that, therefore, Communist participation in and
control of mass organizations is more important than control of Diet seats. This policy
has been evident in Communist united front proposals, in penetration or organization
of economic, political, and social movements with a variety of purposes, and in utiliza-
tion of popular grievances in campaigns of direct action against the government.
Unsuccessful as the Communists have been in their election campaigns, polling only
somewhat less than 4 percent of the total vote in the 1946 and 1947 lower house elections,
their influence on mass organizations, particularly trade unions, has been considerable.
The Communist-dominated National Congress of Industrial Organizations (NCIO),
set up to compete with the Socialist-controlled Japan Federation of Labor Unions
(JFLU), includes about one-sixth of Japan's 6 million organized workers, and a number
of important independent unions have also been subjected to varying degrees of Com-
munist influence.
f. Minor Parties and Groups.
Several minor parties and groups are represented in the House of Representa-
tives, with a combined strength of approximately 50 seats. These groups are of im-
portance only insofar as the major parties compete for their support in order to alter
the balance of power within the Diet.
The Social Renovation Party, with 21 seats in the lower house, is composed of
individuals who resigned from the Socialist Party early in 1948. The Japan Liberal
Party, with 6 seats, is a splinter group that declined to join with other Liberals in the
organization of the DLP. The Dai Ichi Giin Club is composed of non-affiliated lower
house members who joined together for the sole purpose of obtaining a greater voice
in Diet affairs than is accorded non-affiliated members. The Japan Farmers' Party,
I-17
SECRET
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"ocrText": "Ashida cabinets represented a victory for advocates of such cooperation, the policy\ncompromises required by the coalitions have led to increasingly militant opposition by\nleft-wing elements, whose position in the party has become stronger with the passage\nof time. While left-wing strength, reinforced in December 1947 by the withdrawal of\na group of right-wing Socialists from the party, was sufficiently great to precipitate the\nfall of the Katayama cabinet, the subsequent participation of two important left-wing\nleaders in the Ashida cabinet reflected a split in the ranks of the left itself that has\nmade it unlikely that this group will succeed to the leadership of the party.\ne. The Communist Party (Nippon Kyosanto).\nThe Communist Party is dominated by a nucleus of prewar leaders most of\nwhom spent many years in prison before the Occupation. From the time of its re-\nvival to the present, the Communist Party has insisted that it seeks to bring about\nthrough peaceful means first the bourgeois democratic revolution and then the so-\ncialist revolution. Although the Communists have officially ruled out the use of force\nas a means of obtaining these objectives, except as a form of self-protection against\ncounter-revolutionary violence, their emphasis on democratic and peaceful change does\nnot imply a corresponding emphasis on securing control of parliamentary machinery.\nRather, the Communists believe that the opposition to the establishment of democracy\nand socialism by what they regard as reactionary elements will be expressed through\norganizations outside the Diet and that, therefore, Communist participation in and\ncontrol of mass organizations is more important than control of Diet seats. This policy\nhas been evident in Communist united front proposals, in penetration or organization\nof economic, political, and social movements with a variety of purposes, and in utiliza-\ntion of popular grievances in campaigns of direct action against the government.\nUnsuccessful as the Communists have been in their election campaigns, polling only\nsomewhat less than 4 percent of the total vote in the 1946 and 1947 lower house elections,\ntheir influence on mass organizations, particularly trade unions, has been considerable.\nThe Communist-dominated National Congress of Industrial Organizations (NCIO),\nset up to compete with the Socialist-controlled Japan Federation of Labor Unions\n(JFLU), includes about one-sixth of Japan's 6 million organized workers, and a number\nof important independent unions have also been subjected to varying degrees of Com-\nmunist influence.\nf. Minor Parties and Groups.\nSeveral minor parties and groups are represented in the House of Representa-\ntives, with a combined strength of approximately 50 seats. These groups are of im-\nportance only insofar as the major parties compete for their support in order to alter\nthe balance of power within the Diet.\nThe Social Renovation Party, with 21 seats in the lower house, is composed of\nindividuals who resigned from the Socialist Party early in 1948. The Japan Liberal\nParty, with 6 seats, is a splinter group that declined to join with other Liberals in the\norganization of the DLP. The Dai Ichi Giin Club is composed of non-affiliated lower\nhouse members who joined together for the sole purpose of obtaining a greater voice\nin Diet affairs than is accorded non-affiliated members. The Japan Farmers' Party,\nI-17\nSECRET"
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