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    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala, Situation Report 46",
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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala, Situation Report 46",
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            "day": 27,
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{
    "seq": 19,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875515/875515-01-019.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nCHAPTER II\nTHE PRESENCE OF SABOTEURS AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS\n1. Sabotage.\ncurred as a result of such cooperation. If the\nPotential saboteurs can be assumed to exist\nUnited States were unable to guarantee Gua-\nin Guatemala among sincere native Commu-\ntemala its economic security, however, Guate-\nnists, among foreign Communists who have\nmala might hesitate to enter the war on the\nside of the United States, or might even re-\nbeen allowed entry by the present govern-\nment, and among maliciously inclined per-\nmain neutral throughout a war. The Guate-\nsons who, for pay or personal satisfaction,\nmalan Army should be able and willing to con-\nmight desire to destroy property useful to the\ntrol sabotage to military installations within\nUnited States. However, the importance of\nthe country, except for initial and minor\npossible sabotage activities in case of a war\ndamage.\nbetween the US and the USSR is restricted by\n2. Subversive Activity.\nthe limited strategic significance of the coun-\nThe facilities of Guatemalan governmental\ntry. At the present time, Guatemala pro-\nagencies, notably the foreign service, have pos-\nduces no strategic materials of sufficient\nsibly been used by Communists whose activi-\nrarity, or in sufficient quantity, to make their\nties benefit the Soviet Union. This, rather\nloss a severe handicap to military prepared-\nthan sabotage, constitutes the most immedi-\nness or military operations. Sabotage to air-\nate threat to US security. President Arévalo,\nfields and military installations would be of\nwith apparent personal satisfaction, regards\nimportance only in relation to the degree to\nhis country as a citadel of democracy where\nwhich these are built up and used by US forces\nexiled liberals and intellectuals from dictator-\nin event of war.\ncontrolled countries are free to gather. It\nThe most effective sabotage activities might\nhas been the policy of his government to aid,\nbe directed against the IRCA railway line and\ncovertly or overtly, leftist expatriates from\nthe port facilities at Puerto Barrios, as such\nSpain, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic,\naction would virtually stifle Guatemala's im-\nVenezuela, and other countries. Some of\nport and export trade. Damage to United\nthese (such as José Leon Depetre and Dr. Ra-\nFruit Company property, which might be of\nfael de Buen, both Spanish republicans, and\nsome use to military operations, might be ex-\nManuel Edwardo Hubner, a Chilean) have\npected. However, such sabotage activities\nbeen awarded minor positions in the govern-\nwould injure the Guatemalan economy far out\nment, where, in conjunction with extreme\nof proportion to their adverse effect on the\nleftist Guatemalans, they could serve effec-\nUS war potential. Because of its dependence\ntively as Communist agents devoted to the ex-\nupon the US as a market and a source of im-\ntension of Soviet propaganda and influence.\nports, and a widespread aversion to Commu-\nNo official Communist Party exists in Gua-\nnism among the propertied class, Guatemala\ntemala, because the 1945 Constitution under\ncan be expected to adopt a policy of sympathy\nwhich the present government operates for-\nand cooperation with the US after the out-\nbids international political parties. Unsuc-\nbreak of war-assuming that the United\ncessful efforts were made to establish a dis-\nStates were willing and able to compensate\nguised Communist Party within the Escuela\nGuatemala for economic and other losses in-\nClaridad in 1945, and under the name of the\n15"
}