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    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala, Situation Report 46",
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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala, Situation Report 46",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 27,
            "logicalDate": "1950-07-27",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1950
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{
    "seq": 45,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875515/875515-01-045.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nCHAPTER VII\nPROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS\n1. Political.\ntime, a force which can be used in opposition\nAlthough it is more probable than not that\nto the traditionally conservative army, whose\nleaders are largely drawn from the upper\nPresident Arévalo will complete his term in\nstrata of Guatemalan society. Although it is\noffice, which expires in March 1951, the presi-\nunlikely that the armed proletariat, even with\ndential elections scheduled for late 1950 may\nthe aid of the National Police, could effectively\nbe accompanied by bitter factional disputes\nprevent a coup d'état backed by the army (un-\nwhich may involve violence of unprecedented\nless the army were divided within itself), it is\nseverity. The possibility of violence has been\ncapable of strong opposition to the army and\ngreatly increased as the result of the assas-\n(particularly in rural areas) a good deal of\nsination of Colonel Francisco J. Arana on 18\nviolent, indiscriminate aggression and ter-\nJuly 1949, since this deprived the more moder-\nrorism.\nate supporters of the present administration\nPresident Arévalo is probably desirous of\nof a potential candidate who might also have\ncompleting his legal term of office without inci-\nbeen acceptable to a certain portion of the con-\ndent, and he undoubtedly would prefer to re-\nservative opposition. Because Arana had con-\nmain aloof from the current presidential cam-\nsistently refused to lead a conservative revolt\npaign. This should lead him to pursue a rela-\nagainst Arévalo and staunchly defended the\ntively moderate course, to delay or circumvent\nprincipal of legal election to office, his murder\ndecisions on controversial matters, and to\nwill be used by the conservative opposition as\navoid giving offense or support to competing\nan argument that truly democratic processes\nfactions. Such a trend has been noticeable\nare impossible in Guatemala as long as the\nsince the Arana assassination, and may be\npresent administration is in power. Con-\nexpected to continue during the coming year.\nvinced that they will be denied fair elections,\nThe character of the next administration\nthe conservative opposition, aided by adminis-\nwill depend upon the personal policies and\ntration moderates, will possibly concentrate\nobjectives of the next President, even as the\ntheir efforts upon perfecting an organization\ncharacter of the present administration has\ncapable of seizing the government through a\nreflected Arévalo's personal philosophy of the\ncoup d'état, or controlling the elections\n\"polystructural state\" in which a balance is\nthrough force. Moreover, President Arévalo,\nsought between various semi-autonomous so-\nLieutenant Colonel Arbenz, and other political\ncial institutions (see p. 5).\nleaders will be in danger of assassination by\npersons desirous of avenging the murder of\nAt the present time, Lt. Col. Jacobo Arbenz\nGuzmán, candidate of the PAR (Partido Ac-\nColonel Arana.\ncion Revolucionaria), the PRN (Partido Reno-\nThe possibility that violence, if it occurs,\nvación Nacional), and the newly formed PIN\nwill be of unprecedented severity is a result\n(Partido de Integridad Nacional), is in a far\nof the development, during the Arévalo ad-\nstronger position than any of the other candi-\nministration, of a strong, organized, and po-\ndates (Dr. Victor M. Giordani, Lic. Jorge Gar-\ntentially militant labor movement. This\ncía Granados, Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes).\nmovement has been fostered and armed by ad-\nArbenz is a ruthless opportunistic, ambitious\nministration leftists and opportunists, and\narmy officer. While Minister of Defense. he\nhas been infiltrated by Communists or Com-\nhelped to arm and strengthen the militant\nmunist sympathizers. It provides, for the first\nleftist labor organizations, possibly as a means\n45"
}