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ECRET
CHAPTER VI
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Costa Rica's positive strategic value to the
tine or open operations against the US. In
US is measurable in terms of its capacity to
general, Costa Rica's constitutional system of
produce abacá, ipecac root, and certain woods
government, its Western cultural orientation,
such as balsa and mahogany. In 1948, 6,275
and its well-defined political and economic ties
metric tons of abacá were exported and eight
to the US render very unlikely any develop-
metric tons of ipecac root. These amounts
ments that would make such an eventuality
were equivalent to approximately 10 percent
possible.
of US consumption requirements for abacá
Specifically, however, there are elements in
and 3.8 percent of US imports of ipecac root.
the political life and governmental structure
The production of strategic materials could
of Costa Rica that could conceivably impair
be considerably increased if desired.
the ability of the country to meet this strategic
The presence on its territory of a transcon-
requirement. Costa Rica can be expected to
tinental railway that could conceivably be of
ally itself with the US in the event of a US-
some use in the event of wartime damage to
USSR war and to fulfill its obligations under
the Panama Canal is another strategic con-
the Rio pact. Its armed forces are not, how-
sideration, as is the willingness of the country
ever, sufficiently alert or organized to be able
to permit the US to establish wartime naval
to deny an enemy of the US portions of its
and air bases on its territory for the protec-
territory for operations against the US. Thus
tion of the Panama Canal and Caribbean ship-
patrol of Costa Rica's coastline by the US
ping. Beyond this, the country offers no
would be necessary to prevent, for example, its
positive strategic advantages to the US.
use as a refuge and base for enemy submers-
ible craft. Also, US installations on its ter-
In a negative sense, however, Costa Rica's
proximity to the Panama Canal, the Venezue-
ritory such as airfields and radar posts could
not depend entirely on Costa Rican armed
lan oil fields, and the sea routes over which
forces for protection from Soviet-inspired or
the majority of US strategic and critical im-
directed sabotage by members of Communist
port tonnage passes, makes it imperative that
cells known to exist in the country. (For ad-
an enemy of the US be denied the use of Costa
ditional information on Communism and sabo-
Rican waters and territory for either clandes-
tage, see Chapters V and VII.)
25
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"ocrText": "ECRET\nCHAPTER VI\nSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nCosta Rica's positive strategic value to the\ntine or open operations against the US. In\nUS is measurable in terms of its capacity to\ngeneral, Costa Rica's constitutional system of\nproduce abacá, ipecac root, and certain woods\ngovernment, its Western cultural orientation,\nsuch as balsa and mahogany. In 1948, 6,275\nand its well-defined political and economic ties\nmetric tons of abacá were exported and eight\nto the US render very unlikely any develop-\nmetric tons of ipecac root. These amounts\nments that would make such an eventuality\nwere equivalent to approximately 10 percent\npossible.\nof US consumption requirements for abacá\nSpecifically, however, there are elements in\nand 3.8 percent of US imports of ipecac root.\nthe political life and governmental structure\nThe production of strategic materials could\nof Costa Rica that could conceivably impair\nbe considerably increased if desired.\nthe ability of the country to meet this strategic\nThe presence on its territory of a transcon-\nrequirement. Costa Rica can be expected to\ntinental railway that could conceivably be of\nally itself with the US in the event of a US-\nsome use in the event of wartime damage to\nUSSR war and to fulfill its obligations under\nthe Panama Canal is another strategic con-\nthe Rio pact. Its armed forces are not, how-\nsideration, as is the willingness of the country\never, sufficiently alert or organized to be able\nto permit the US to establish wartime naval\nto deny an enemy of the US portions of its\nand air bases on its territory for the protec-\nterritory for operations against the US. Thus\ntion of the Panama Canal and Caribbean ship-\npatrol of Costa Rica's coastline by the US\nping. Beyond this, the country offers no\nwould be necessary to prevent, for example, its\npositive strategic advantages to the US.\nuse as a refuge and base for enemy submers-\nible craft. Also, US installations on its ter-\nIn a negative sense, however, Costa Rica's\nproximity to the Panama Canal, the Venezue-\nritory such as airfields and radar posts could\nnot depend entirely on Costa Rican armed\nlan oil fields, and the sea routes over which\nforces for protection from Soviet-inspired or\nthe majority of US strategic and critical im-\ndirected sabotage by members of Communist\nport tonnage passes, makes it imperative that\ncells known to exist in the country. (For ad-\nan enemy of the US be denied the use of Costa\nditional information on Communism and sabo-\nRican waters and territory for either clandes-\ntage, see Chapters V and VII.)\n25"
}