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12 tition Plan to consider the USSR a friend, an abrupt demoralized and depressed by these conditions ternations Communism is not strong in Israel. The and will, therefore, be more susceptible to ex- recent deterioration of Israeli-Soviet relations, as previou tremist propaganda. The government is aware save Jeru of the urgency of this problem, but it is severely following Soviet support for the internation- Qol Haan alization of Jerusalem, convinced most of the handicapped both by lack of funds and by its line. Th fellow-travellers that they were essentially inability to curtail immigration effectively. tact with Any announced change in government policy Israeli nationalists rather than Communist rounding internationalists. Traditional Soviet opposi- would almost certainly result in a decrease of Commun Jewish contributions from the US, and the tion to Zionism, Soviet support of the interna- and func tionalization of Jerusalem, the refusal of the genuine pressure of immigration strongly sup- ICP thr ports Israel's refusal to take back any signifi- USSR to permit the emigration of its 2,500,000 missions Jews, and its recently revived campaign cant number of Arab refugees. Russian The problem shows no signs of becoming less against "bourgeois Zionism" are largely re- sponsible for the failure of the Israeli Com- appear serious. Forty thousand Yemenite Jews have trate Is munist Party to attract a wide following. fled to Aden and are currently being trans- The I ported to Israel; 30,000 Polish Jews, under the The Israeli Communist Party platform in its cour conditions of their exit visas, must leave Po- January 1949 stressed the fight against "im- the "Pt land by August 1950; and thousands of North perialism" and foreign concessions and de- ern "in African Jews are also planning to enter Israel manded closer ties with the USSR and more cal all during the coming year.* In 1949 the United socialism in Israel. One Arab and three Jew- derline Jewish Appeal (UJA) in America, the Jewish ish delegates were sent to the Israeli Assembly. USSR Agency's chief source of funds, raised only One Jewish delegate, however, in the course of reduce $115,000,000 of a goal of $250,000,000. The ICP purges of "Titoist" elements, was ousted nation Jewish Agency has already had to borrow from from the ICP and now is with MAPAM. i The smacl the Israeli Government in order to provide ICP is not represented in the cabinet but does furth for the current needs of the 100,000 immi- participate in the activities of Histadruth. fund grants in camps in Israel, and the UJA is urg- However, the eighteen Communist representa- is su ing its affiliated organization to borrow against tives in Histadruth, the total membership of is fr anticipated 1950 receipts. Although the pros- which is about 500, have little influence. the pects for the 1950 UJA campaign are somewhat The ICP's vociferousness and the noisiness disc better than in 1949, the donations are expected of its leaders give it an appearance of impor- com to fall far short of the $272,000,000 goal. tance out of all proportion to its size. (Al- C So long as Israel seeks to maintain a policy though no exact figure is known, the hard-core fun of neutrality between the US and the USSR, of the ICP is estimated at not more than 3,000.) the remains unable to resolve its difficulties with A certain number of Eastern European im- lar the Arabs, experiences a badly unbalanced migrants, with a scattering of planted Com- col economy, and emphasizes the socialist charac- munist agents, will undoubtedly join the ICP, ha ter of its economy, it is unlikely to attract the but membership is not likely to increase sig- C foreign investment on the scale required. nificantly so long as the internal situation in Without such investment, unlimited immigra- Israel remains stable. The ICP's awareness tion will either drive Israel into bankruptcy or of its own weakness explains its continual ef- compel it to reduce its comparatively high forts to form a united front with MAPAM, standard of living to such an extent that po- which, although willing to cooperate with the litical instability might well result. ICP on certain issues, rejects any idea of union e. Communism. with it. Although a substantial minority in Israel As an orthodox Communist party, the ICP was induced by Soviet support of the UN Par- obediently alters its stand on various issues to coincide with that of the USSR. When the In March 1950 Iraq passed a law permitting USSR strongly supported the GA resolution of Iraqi Jews to emigrate. A quarter to a half of December 1949 to internationalize Jerusalem, Iraq's 125,000 Jews may well go to Israel, whether the ICP, although after some hesitancy, did legally or illegally.

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    "ocrText": "12\ntition Plan to consider the USSR a friend,\nan abrupt\ndemoralized and depressed by these conditions\nternations\nCommunism is not strong in Israel. The\nand will, therefore, be more susceptible to ex-\nrecent deterioration of Israeli-Soviet relations,\nas previou\ntremist propaganda. The government is aware\nsave Jeru\nof the urgency of this problem, but it is severely\nfollowing Soviet support for the internation-\nQol Haan\nalization of Jerusalem, convinced most of the\nhandicapped both by lack of funds and by its\nline. Th\nfellow-travellers that they were essentially\ninability to curtail immigration effectively.\ntact with\nAny announced change in government policy\nIsraeli nationalists rather than Communist\nrounding\ninternationalists. Traditional Soviet opposi-\nwould almost certainly result in a decrease of\nCommun\nJewish contributions from the US, and the\ntion to Zionism, Soviet support of the interna-\nand func\ntionalization of Jerusalem, the refusal of the\ngenuine pressure of immigration strongly sup-\nICP thr\nports Israel's refusal to take back any signifi-\nUSSR to permit the emigration of its 2,500,000\nmissions\nJews, and its recently revived campaign\ncant number of Arab refugees.\nRussian\nThe problem shows no signs of becoming less\nagainst \"bourgeois Zionism\" are largely re-\nsponsible for the failure of the Israeli Com-\nappear\nserious. Forty thousand Yemenite Jews have\ntrate Is\nmunist Party to attract a wide following.\nfled to Aden and are currently being trans-\nThe I\nported to Israel; 30,000 Polish Jews, under the\nThe Israeli Communist Party platform in\nits cour\nconditions of their exit visas, must leave Po-\nJanuary 1949 stressed the fight against \"im-\nthe \"Pt\nland by August 1950; and thousands of North\nperialism\" and foreign concessions and de-\nern \"in\nAfrican Jews are also planning to enter Israel\nmanded closer ties with the USSR and more\ncal all\nduring the coming year.* In 1949 the United\nsocialism in Israel. One Arab and three Jew-\nderline\nJewish Appeal (UJA) in America, the Jewish\nish delegates were sent to the Israeli Assembly.\nUSSR\nAgency's chief source of funds, raised only\nOne Jewish delegate, however, in the course of\nreduce\n$115,000,000 of a goal of $250,000,000. The\nICP purges of \"Titoist\" elements, was ousted\nnation\nJewish Agency has already had to borrow from\nfrom the ICP and now is with MAPAM. i The\nsmacl\nthe Israeli Government in order to provide\nICP is not represented in the cabinet but does\nfurth\nfor the current needs of the 100,000 immi-\nparticipate in the activities of Histadruth.\nfund\ngrants in camps in Israel, and the UJA is urg-\nHowever, the eighteen Communist representa-\nis su\ning its affiliated organization to borrow against\ntives in Histadruth, the total membership of\nis fr\nanticipated 1950 receipts. Although the pros-\nwhich is about 500, have little influence.\nthe\npects for the 1950 UJA campaign are somewhat\nThe ICP's vociferousness and the noisiness\ndisc\nbetter than in 1949, the donations are expected\nof its leaders give it an appearance of impor-\ncom\nto fall far short of the $272,000,000 goal.\ntance out of all proportion to its size. (Al-\nC\nSo long as Israel seeks to maintain a policy\nthough no exact figure is known, the hard-core\nfun\nof neutrality between the US and the USSR,\nof the ICP is estimated at not more than 3,000.)\nthe\nremains unable to resolve its difficulties with\nA certain number of Eastern European im-\nlar\nthe Arabs, experiences a badly unbalanced\nmigrants, with a scattering of planted Com-\ncol\neconomy, and emphasizes the socialist charac-\nmunist agents, will undoubtedly join the ICP,\nha\nter of its economy, it is unlikely to attract the\nbut membership is not likely to increase sig-\nC\nforeign investment on the scale required.\nnificantly so long as the internal situation in\nWithout such investment, unlimited immigra-\nIsrael remains stable. The ICP's awareness\ntion will either drive Israel into bankruptcy or\nof its own weakness explains its continual ef-\ncompel it to reduce its comparatively high\nforts to form a united front with MAPAM,\nstandard of living to such an extent that po-\nwhich, although willing to cooperate with the\nlitical instability might well result.\nICP on certain issues, rejects any idea of union\ne. Communism.\nwith it.\nAlthough a substantial minority in Israel\nAs an orthodox Communist party, the ICP\nwas induced by Soviet support of the UN Par-\nobediently alters its stand on various issues to\ncoincide with that of the USSR. When the\nIn March 1950 Iraq passed a law permitting\nUSSR strongly supported the GA resolution of\nIraqi Jews to emigrate. A quarter to a half of\nDecember 1949 to internationalize Jerusalem,\nIraq's 125,000 Jews may well go to Israel, whether\nthe ICP, although after some hesitancy, did\nlegally or illegally."
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