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DEPARTMENT
CHAPTER VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
For the reasons enumerated in the preced-
and West, it appeared less interested than in
ing section, future developments in Israel and
the past in retaining the good will of the USSR
between Israel and the Arab states will sig-
and more anxious to improve its relations with
nificantly affect US strategic interests in the
the US. Although essentially it did not alter
Near East. The precise form which these de-
its attitude toward the Arab states, it appeared
velopments will take is particularly difficult
sincerely desirous of reaching a peace settle-
to foresee because of the revolutionary effects
ment, at least with Jordan. At the same time
of Israel's existence in the heart of the Arab
it took special measures to check inflation, in-
world. The cultural, political, and economic
crease production, and reduce the imbalance
backgrounds of Jews and Arabs differ widely.
in its foreign trade. These new policies were
So far as the Arabs are concerned, Israel is
designed directly or indirectly to. bolster the
an alien, aggressive interloper.
foundations of Israel's economy. Not only
would they (if successful) reduce defense, and
other internal costs, but they might also be
The clash between Arab antag-
expected, as evidence of Israel's Western sym-
onism toward Jew and Jewish condescension
pathies, its desire for peace with the Arabs,
toward Arab is certain to produce instability
and its determination to put its economic
in the Near East for a great many years.
house in order, to attract a substantial in-
In any assessment of future developments,
crease of Western capital investment to Israel.
two considerations stand out. The first of
The Israeli Government was probably confi-
these is that, by all the accepted standards of
dent that such an increase, together with con-
economics, Israel, with a population planned
tinued contributions from American Zionists,
to exceed 2,000,000 within ten years' time,
would be sufficient to carry Israel through the
probably cannot become viable under existing
next few emergency years of immigrant ab-
conditions. The second consideration is that
sorption and industrial infancy.
the Israeli people and their international
It is extremely unlikely, however, that
Zionist supporters are imbued with so great a
Israel's expectations of a substantial influx of
faith in their mission that they will refuse in
foreign capital will be fulfilled. Israel cannot
the future, as they have refused in the past,
convincingly claim to be a good credit risk
to recognize the possibility of defeat when
when at the same time it admits its depend-
confronted by obstacles which by all materi-
ence on annual Zionist contributions of over
alistic standards appear insurmountable.
$100 million from the US alone, as well as
Although this second consideration cannot be
lesser amounts from other countries. Al-
accurately assessed, it must be used to temper
though Zionists may be willing indefinitely to
the unfavorable forecast made by assessing
subsidize Israel for sentimental reasons, they
the more tangible prospects for Israel's devel-
are unlikely to sink capital in Israel unless
opment.
there is a reasonable expectation of some re-
In an attempt to overcome some of the for-
turn. At the same time it is unlikely that
midable problems which confront it, the Is-
Israel can significantly improve its relations
raeli Government in the latter part of 1949
with the Arab states for some time to come.
made some basic modifications in its political
Mutual distrust between Jews and Arabs has
and economic policies. Although officially it
resulted in competitive arms programs which
maintained its neutral attitude between East
neither Israel nor the Arab states can afford.
31
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"ocrText": "DEPARTMENT\nCHAPTER VI\nPROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nFor the reasons enumerated in the preced-\nand West, it appeared less interested than in\ning section, future developments in Israel and\nthe past in retaining the good will of the USSR\nbetween Israel and the Arab states will sig-\nand more anxious to improve its relations with\nnificantly affect US strategic interests in the\nthe US. Although essentially it did not alter\nNear East. The precise form which these de-\nits attitude toward the Arab states, it appeared\nvelopments will take is particularly difficult\nsincerely desirous of reaching a peace settle-\nto foresee because of the revolutionary effects\nment, at least with Jordan. At the same time\nof Israel's existence in the heart of the Arab\nit took special measures to check inflation, in-\nworld. The cultural, political, and economic\ncrease production, and reduce the imbalance\nbackgrounds of Jews and Arabs differ widely.\nin its foreign trade. These new policies were\nSo far as the Arabs are concerned, Israel is\ndesigned directly or indirectly to. bolster the\nan alien, aggressive interloper.\nfoundations of Israel's economy. Not only\nwould they (if successful) reduce defense, and\nother internal costs, but they might also be\nThe clash between Arab antag-\nexpected, as evidence of Israel's Western sym-\nonism toward Jew and Jewish condescension\npathies, its desire for peace with the Arabs,\ntoward Arab is certain to produce instability\nand its determination to put its economic\nin the Near East for a great many years.\nhouse in order, to attract a substantial in-\nIn any assessment of future developments,\ncrease of Western capital investment to Israel.\ntwo considerations stand out. The first of\nThe Israeli Government was probably confi-\nthese is that, by all the accepted standards of\ndent that such an increase, together with con-\neconomics, Israel, with a population planned\ntinued contributions from American Zionists,\nto exceed 2,000,000 within ten years' time,\nwould be sufficient to carry Israel through the\nprobably cannot become viable under existing\nnext few emergency years of immigrant ab-\nconditions. The second consideration is that\nsorption and industrial infancy.\nthe Israeli people and their international\nIt is extremely unlikely, however, that\nZionist supporters are imbued with so great a\nIsrael's expectations of a substantial influx of\nfaith in their mission that they will refuse in\nforeign capital will be fulfilled. Israel cannot\nthe future, as they have refused in the past,\nconvincingly claim to be a good credit risk\nto recognize the possibility of defeat when\nwhen at the same time it admits its depend-\nconfronted by obstacles which by all materi-\nence on annual Zionist contributions of over\nalistic standards appear insurmountable.\n$100 million from the US alone, as well as\nAlthough this second consideration cannot be\nlesser amounts from other countries. Al-\naccurately assessed, it must be used to temper\nthough Zionists may be willing indefinitely to\nthe unfavorable forecast made by assessing\nsubsidize Israel for sentimental reasons, they\nthe more tangible prospects for Israel's devel-\nare unlikely to sink capital in Israel unless\nopment.\nthere is a reasonable expectation of some re-\nIn an attempt to overcome some of the for-\nturn. At the same time it is unlikely that\nmidable problems which confront it, the Is-\nIsrael can significantly improve its relations\nraeli Government in the latter part of 1949\nwith the Arab states for some time to come.\nmade some basic modifications in its political\nMutual distrust between Jews and Arabs has\nand economic policies. Although officially it\nresulted in competitive arms programs which\nmaintained its neutral attitude between East\nneither Israel nor the Arab states can afford.\n31"
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