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    "ocrText": "CUNI IDENTIAL\nNLT 113\nSECRET\n01\n027266\nSPECIAL ESTIMATE\nINTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF A CENSUS\nAND VERIFICATION OF ARMED FORCES\nAND ARMAMENTS\nINTELLIGENCE\nLIGENCE\nCENTRAL\nAGENCY\nJUNITED STATES JUNITED D STATES OF AMERICAN\nHARRYS\nNARA\nN LIBRARY\nSE - 4\nPublished 12 May 1951\nDocument It\nNo Change In Class.\nDeclassified\nClass. Changed to: TS S C\nNext Review Date:\n1992\nAuth.: HR 70-2\nDate: 27 APR 82\nBy: 103430\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority NLT 2007-007 #2\nBy so NARA, Date 12/2/09\nCONFIDENTIAL\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE\nNATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE\nMEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE U.S.\nCODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATIONOF\nITS CONTENTS TO ORRECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PER-\nSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\n1\nTOP SECRET\n027266\nDISSEMINATION NOTICE\n1. This copy of this publication is for the information and\nuse of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individ-\nuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the\ninformation for the performance of their official duties.\nNARA\n2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burn-\ning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned\nto the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of\nCollection and Dissemination, CIA.\nDISTRIBUTION:\nThe President\nNational Security Council\nIntelligence Advisory Committee\nTOP SECRET\nFOP SECRET\nSPECIAL ESTIMATE\nINTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF A CENSUS AND VERIFICATION\nOF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS\nNumber 4\nPublished 12 May 1951\nThe intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,\nthe Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-\nticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members\nof the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this\nestimate on 10 May.\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nSE-4: INTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF A CENSUS AND\nVERIFICATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS\nTHE PROBLEM\nTo analyze, from the intelligence point of view, the implications\nof a census and verification of armed forces and armaments (including\natomic).\nASSUMPTION\nThat a continuing census and verification of all armed forces*\nand armaments, including atomic weapons, of the US and the USSR is\nto be undertaken on a phased basis as the first step of an agreed inter-\nnational system for control, regulation, and limitation of armed forces\nand armaments, including atomic energy activities.\n* Including para-military, internal security, and police forces.\nApp SECRET\nSECRET\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. We are convinced that the USSR would enter into any agreement\nof census and verification in bad faith and would carry it out in\nbad faith.\n2. Since the USSR has far more information on the US than vice-\nversa, it is probable that a census and verification could be so\ndevised that in the initial phases the US would secure more valuable\ninformation than would the Soviet Union. This would require that the\nUSSR be prevented from securing in those initial phases information\nintended to be withheld until a later phase, or not to be disclosed at\nall.\n3. Beyond the initial stages, phasing of such a census and verifi-\ncation will become increasingly difficult and there will be a corre-\nspondingly greater danger that the USSR would secure information\nof relatively greater value than would the US.\n4. Adoption of the following principles in the phasing of census and\nverification would aid in protecting US interests:\na. In the earlier phases, only the least sensitive information\nshould be released.\nNARA\nb. Sensitive aspects of research and development in all\nfields, manufacturing processes and details of new weapons (the\nmeasure of US technological superiority) should be excluded\naltogether.\nc. The freedom of movement and access of inspection teams\nshould in general be carefully limited to quantitative verification of\nnumbers, types, sizes, etc., although within these limits inspection\nshould be as full and free as possible. Detailed inspection of\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ntechnical specifications, performance data, etc., should be avoided.\nAlthough this limitation on the freedom of inspection would reduce\nthe amount of intelligence the US would acquire, it would be neces-\nsary in order to guard against exposure of the highly sensitive in-\nformation excluded from the census and against premature disclosure\nin an earlier phase of information reserved for a later phase.\nd. Each phase, and within it each step in the inspection proc-\ness, should be carried out simultaneously in the US and USSR.\n5. It is certain that the USSR would attempt to exploit any system of\ncensus and verification to its advantage and there is grave danger\nthat the USSR might succeed in so exploiting it. Although a system\nbased on the principles enumerated in 4 above would in the initial\nphases theoretically secure for the US more information on the USSR\nthan vice-versa, and aid in protecting the technological superiority\nof the US, we believe that these results would be extremely difficult\nto achieve in practice. It would be particularly difficult to implement\nthe system in detail in such a way as to prevent the USSR from securing\nin an earlier phase information which was to be withheld until a later\nphase, or not disclosed at all. An analysis of these difficulties, as\nwell as the possibilities of surmounting them, will require careful\nand extensive study by operating as well as intelligence agencies of\nthis government.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nDISCUSSION\nPART I. RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO\nTHE US\nRelative Superiority of Soviet Intelligence on the US\n1. We believe that in almost every field the USSR has far better\nintelligence on the US than the US does on the USSR. The intelligence\navailable to the Soviet Union from overt US sources alone is of in-\ncalculable value. The postwar atomic espionage trials in the US,\nUK, and Canada, among other things, are ample evidence of the\nextent of Soviet covert penetration. While the effectiveness of\nSoviet intelligence penetration may well be declining as a result of\ngrowing Western security consciousness, it is only prudent to\nassume that the USSR will continue to secure relatively superior\nintelligence on the Western Powers in many fields. Under these\ncircumstances, the USSR might consider that the value of the\nadditional intelligence it could gain through census and verification\nwould be relatively less than that which might accrue to the US.\n2. On the other hand, as a result of its superior intelligence on\nthe US, the USSR would be far better able to \"pinpoint\" critical\nactivities which it wished to inspect without being diverted to less\nimportant targets or following false leads. Moreover, because\nmuch of its intelligence is gained overtly or semi-overtly, the\nSoviet Union would find it less necessary to risk compromising\nsensitive sources. Owing to the paucity of overt data on the USSR,\nthe US would be far more hampered by fear of compromising such\nsources.\n3. The relative advantages and disadvantages of a system of\ncensus and verification must also be assessed against the back-\nground of present and potential US intelligence on the Soviet sphere.\nLargely because of the exceedingly effective and all-inclusive\nSoviet security system, US intelligence on many aspects of the\n- 3 -\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSoviet bloc is gravely inadequate and based on fragmentary and\nscattered evidence. US estimates of Soviet plutonium and atomic\nweapons production, for example, are probably accurate only to\nwithin 50 percent. Because of the Iron Curtain on the one\nhand and the large reservoir of Communist informants and easier\nSoviet access to the US on the other, the US is far less able to\ncollect overt and also covert intelligence than the USSR.\n4. However, the relative superiority of Soviet intelligence on the\nUS might be turned to US advantage through a census and verifi-\ncation. It might be possible to release a good deal to the USSR\nwithout materially adding to its knowledge. For example, Soviet\nknowledge of US and NATO order of battle is probably relatively\ncomplete, as is the USSR's knowledge of plant locations, production\nfacilities, military installations, etc. Soviet intelligence on the\nsize of our forces and equipment stockpiles is probably also sub-\nstantial. Therefore, any system which merely allowed the USSR to\nconfirm these details, while assuring the US opportunity of securing\ncomparable intelligence, might be relatively advantageous to the\nUS. If such categories could be included in the initial phases of any\ncensus and verification, they might serve as a means of securing\nvaluable intelligence at minimum cost and testing the efficacy of\nthe system.\nRelative Advantages of Disclosure in Various Categories\n5. In the following fields even partial Soviet disclosure through\ncensus and verification might be relatively advantageous to the US\nfrom an intelligence point of view:\na. Size, composition, and equipment of existing forces; size\nof conventional arms stocks; and location of these forces and stocks.\nSoviet intelligence in this category probably is relatively complete,\nwhile US intelligence is largely based on fragmentary and scattered\nevidence.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSoviet bloc is gravely inadequate and based on fragmentary and\nscattered evidence. US estimates of Soviet plutonium and atomic\nweapons production, for example, are probably accurate only to\nwithin 50 percent. Because of the Iron Curtain on the one\nhand and the large reservoir of Communist informants and easier\nSoviet access to the US on the other, the US is far less able to\ncollect overt and also covert intelligence than the USSR.\n4. However, the relative superiority of Soviet intelligence on the\nUS might be turned to US advantage through a census and verifi-\ncation. It might be possible to release a good deal to the USSR\nwithout materially adding to its knowledge. For example, Soviet\nknowledge of US and NATO order of battle is probably relatively\ncomplete, as is the USSR's knowledge of plant locations, production\nfacilities, military installations, etc. Soviet intelligence on the\nsize of our forces and equipment stockpiles is probably also sub-\nstantial. Therefore, any system which merely allowed the USSR to\nconfirm these details, while assuring the US opportunity of securing\ncomparable intelligence, might be relatively advantageous to the\nUS. If such categories could be included in the initial phases of any\ncensus and verification, they might serve as a means of securing\nvaluable intelligence at minimum cost and testing the efficacy of\nthe system.\nRelative Advantages of Disclosure in Various Categories\n5. In the following fields even partial Soviet disclosure through\ncensus and verification might be relatively advantageous to the US\nfrom an intelligence point of view:\na. Size, composition, and equipment of existing forces; size\nof conventional arms stocks; and location of these forces and stocks.\nSoviet intelligence in this category probably is relatively complete,\nwhile US intelligence is largely based on fragmentary and scattered\nevidence.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nb. Size, location, capacity, and production rates of conven-\ntional military installations and munitions production facilities. In\nthis field, too, existing and potential Soviet knowledge is relatively\nfull and far superior to that of the US, at least in the conventional\narms sphere.\nc. Economic information. In view of Soviet secrecy with\nregard to all types of economic information, as compared to\npractically full US disclosure, inclusion of as much as possible of\nthis data in any census would be of distinct relative advantage to the\nUS. Knowledge of armed forces and armaments, and even of muni-\ntions plants, is incomplete without knowledge of overall production\ncapacity, industries supporting military end-item production, trans-\nportation, labor force, raw materials, etc.\nd. Certain aspects of military research and development\n(except atomic). Even in the research and development category,\nthere are certain aspects which it might be relatively advantageous\nfor the US to disclose if there were reasonable prospect for com-\nparable Soviet disclosure. From an intelligence point of view, the\nUSSR's probable greatest need is: (1) for detailed drawings and\nspecifications to enable it to bridge the gap between a prototype\nand quantity production; and (2) for insurance against the surprise\nappearance of decisive new weapons. With respect to (1), relatively\nlittle gain might accrue to the USSR from mere physical survey of\nresearch and development facilities and prototypes without detailed\ninspection. With respect to (2), however, such a survey of prototypes\nnot already known to the USSR might to some extent remove the\nsurprise element from a new weapon which had reached the prototype\nstage.\nBecause of the probable continuation of its current techno-\nlogical lead for the next few years, the US need is not so much for\ndetailed technical data to permit exploitation of Soviet developments\nas for indications of those areas in which the USSR is giving priority\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nto development and procurement of new weapons. This requirement\ncould largely be satisfied by such a survey of research and develop-\nment facilities and prototypes, with comparable access to production\nfacilities. In this phase the US might stand to gain relatively more,\neven considering probable Soviet bad faith.\ne. Certain aspects of atomic energy. A similar situation pre-\nvails in this field. As long as inspection included only uranium and\nthorium mining, fissionable material production facilities, and even the\ncurrent stockpile (excluding new prototype models), the US should gain\nconsiderably or at least break even from reciprocal inspection.\n6. On the other hand, in the three categories below there would be\nmajor risks in US disclosure which might well outweigh the advantages\nto the US. These categories are doubtless among the highest priority\nSoviet intelligence targets, as it is in these fields that the existing or\npotential US lead over the Soviet Union largely counterbalances superior\nSoviet conventional strength in being.\na. Production processes and manufacturing \"know-how.\" In\nthis field the relative advantage to the USSR would rise sharply as in-\nspection became more detailed. So long as plant inspections were\nbrief and general, the US might gain more in general intelligence,\nthough it would have little to gain in knowledge of production techniques.\nOn the other hand, the USSR would gain substantially from detailed and\nfrequent inspections of US production processes, designs, machinery,\netc.\nb. Details of military research and development (except atomic).\nSince the USSR's probable greatest need in this field is for detailed\ndrawings and specifications of research and development projects,\nwhile the US has no comparable need, disclosure in this category would\nentail major risks for the US.\nc. Atomic energy. If inspection should become detailed and\ninclude atomic research and development, the USSR would gain heavily\nunless it has made wholly unexpected progress or its espionage has\nbeen much more successful than believed.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n7. In any census and verification, each side would be bound to gain a\ncertain amount of \"collateral\" information (data on general conditions\nin the country, economic conditions, quality of weapons, standards of\ntraining, level of maintenance of equipment, etc.) in fields not directly\ncovered by any census phase. While the USSR, as a police state, could\nmore effectively control the collateral intelligence obtained in the\ncourse of inspection and verification, we believe on balance that the\nUS might gain more in this field. Even assuming Soviet bad faith, the\npaucity of US intelligence on most aspects of the USSR gives a corre-\nspondingly high value to almost any collateral information that might\nbe gleaned, while much of the collateral information available to the\nUSSR could be easily secured in any case.\n8. Inevitably, any phased inspection system will leave, as an after-\nmath, increased internal security problems for the US. The Soviet\ninspection teams will note the places and facilities they are not\nallowed to visit, and some of these facilities will then become targets\nfor intensive covert intelligence exploitation. Since Soviet intelligence\nfacilities in the US are extensive, the internal security problems will\nbecome more serious through such targeting.\nPART II. CENSUS AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES\n9. Any satisfactory census and verification procedure should meet\nfour criteria. It should provide for: (a) comprehensive and detailed\nspecifications for disclosure within agreed phases, thus reducing the\npossible scope of Soviet bad faith; (b) clear documentation of Soviet\nbad faith at any stage, thus providing the best possible case for\ntermination; (c) prompt termination at any stage in event of such bad\nfaith; and (d) protection of the US, insofar as possible, from dis-\nclosure of highly sensitive information, including premature dis-\nclosure in earlier phases of information reserved for later phases.\nScope of Census and Verification\n10. The physical and geographical scope of census and verification\nwould obviously have a great bearing on the overall advantages to\nEast versus West. The USSR has called for Big Four disarmament,\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nand presumably any census would include at least Britain and France,\nif not the other US allies. The state of existing \"open\" disclosure in\nother key Western countries appears almost as great as that in the\nUS, and Soviet intelligence penetration, largely through local sympa-\nthizers, is in many cases probably substantially greater. Since so much\nof the research and development, new and unconventional weapons,\narms production, and technical know-how of the Western Powers (which\nare probably the key Soviet intelligence targets) is concentrated in the\nUS, census and verification in other US allies (except the UK) might\nhave even fewer disadvantages arising from premature or unintended\ndisclosure than in the US. The potential disadvantages for the UK might\nbe roughly comparable to those for the US, however, because of extensive\nUK research and development, arms production, and technical \"know-\nhow\". As new and secret US or UK weapons are transferred to other\nallies and as US \"know-how\" and production processes are used to\nstimulate production overseas, the potential disadvantages arising\nfrom premature or unintended disclosure by these allies would tend\nto grow.\n11. Although presumably the USSR would strongly favor limiting any\ncensus and verification to the Big Four powers, we consider it im-\nportant, from the intelligence point of view, that any system cover\nthe European Satellites and Communist China as well. Inclusion of\nEast Germany and Czechoslovakia would be particularly important\nfrom the scientific standpoint, because they contribute substantially to\nSoviet research and development. If the Satellites and China were\nomitted, the USSR could conceivably conceal forces, stockpiles, and\nresearch and development activities by transferring them there. More-\nover, the Iron Curtain around other Soviet bloc countries, while by no\nmeans as impenetrable, is roughly comparable to that around the\nUSSR.\n12. Because of the serious risks to the US of disclosure of sensitive\ninformation in such fields as research and development, manufacturing\nprocesses, technical \"know-how\", and details of new weapons (the\nmeasures of US technological superiority), the US should exclude\nsuch sensitive information from any census. Protection of such\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nsensitive information would be facilitated if census and verification\ncould be construed as meaning only a numerical count and verifica-\ntion in the case of armed forces and armaments; this would avoid\ndetailed inspection which would reveal qualitative data. Similarly,\ncensus and verification of manufacturing facilities, research and\ndevelopment installations, and technical manpower might be limited\nto quantitative inspection of facilities and records to establish size,\nproduction rates, etc. Certain aspects of research and development,\nincluding atomic, might be included in this manner without revealing\nsensitive data. The great`difficulty would be in devising inspection\nprocedures which would permit quantitative verification without re-\nvealing qualitative details.\nPhasing of Census and Verification\n13. Because of probable Soviet bad faith, a careful phasing of any\ncensus and verification would be indispensable to minimize the risks\nto the US of disclosures without adequate compensatory disclosure\nfrom the USSR. Any phasing should be so designed as to allow\nbreaking off with minimum risk at any phase in event of demonstrable\nSoviet bad faith. In view of the propaganda disadvantage to the party\nwhich withdraws, the census and verification system should be so\nconstructed as to permit the strongest possible proof of Soviet bad\nfaith.\n14. The USSR clearly has much greater opportunities than the US\nto conceal data effectively: (a) the US cannot \"pinpoint\" targets as\neffectively as the USSR because of the relative paucity of US intelligence\non the USSR; (b) the USSR is much more skilled at large-scale conceal-\nment and evasion; (c) the Soviet Union has great physical capabilities\nfor concealment owing to the vastness and inaccessibility of much of\nthe USSR; and (d) the police state techniques of the USSR and their\nabsence in the US would hamper US inspection and facilitate that of\nthe USSR. Moreover, the USSR would probably take advantage of these\nopportunities for concealment while the US presumably must act in\ngood faith. Therefore, any phasing must be designed to minimize these\nSoviet advantages by first stressing those categories where the US has\nthe least to lose.\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n15. From the intelligence point of view, any phasing system should\ntake account of the relative superiority of Soviet intelligence on the\nUS. The implicit concept upon which such a system should be based\nshould be that of seeking initially to put the US on a \"comparable\"\nintelligence footing with the USSR. In other words, the initial phases\nof the system should be designed to make available to the USSR data\nwhich it is already known or believed the USSR has. By this means it\nmight be possible to guard against Soviet bad faith, and to reveal\nrelatively less of significance to the Soviet Union than it would be\ncompelled to reveal to the US. However, since the USSR will obviously\nseek the same advantages in its proposals, the US proposals would\nhave to appear reasonable to assure the maximum propaganda ad-\nvantage if the negotiations failed.\n16. We believe that any phasing should start with the general and\nnon-detailed quantitative aspects of conventional armed forces,\narmaments, and over-all economic potential, with inspection designed\nto verify numbers, types, and locations. Only after these phases\nwere completed to the satisfaction of the US should the US even\nconsider implementing further phases with access to detailed\nqualitative data. Phased disclosure in the field of atomic and\nother unconventional weapons and in research and development\nmight begin concurrently but there should be excluded from any\ncensus and verification the following items in these fields:\na. In the atomic field: details of plants producing fis-\nsionable materials and all research and development work.\nb. In the non-atomic field: detailed drawings and\nspecifications of research and development projects.\nTypes of Census and Verification Procedures\n17. Aside from phasing, the types of census and verification pro-\ncedures employed in each phase would be of vital importance in\nminimizing the risks to the US and compelling maximum dis-\nclosure by the USSR. It is apparent that these two objectives are\n- 10 -\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nlargely contradictory. The more frequent, thorough, and unrestricted\nthe inspection the less would be the possibility of Soviet concealment,\nbut the greater would be the risks of sensitive disclosures by the US.\nThis contradiction is further apparent when we examine two basic\nproblems implicit in any verification system. While it is probably\nfeasible to verify such quantitative data as had previously been\ndisclosed in a census, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to\ndetermine whether all relevant data had actually been disclosed.\nIt would be impossible to determine whether there had been full\ndisclosure unless the inspectors were allowed to travel anywhere\nto look for anything included in the particular phase. On the other\nhand, only by careful restrictions on the movement of inspectors\ncould the USSR be prevented from acquiring in the earlier phases\ninformation reserved for later phases, or not to be disclosed in any\nphase.\n18. Although full Soviet disclosure could only be assured by com-\npletely free and unrestricted inspection in each phase, such a\nprocedure would entail serious risks for the US of prematurely\nrevealing at earlier phases information which the US planned to\ndisclose only in later phases or not at all. Consequently it is\ndoubtful whether in any phase the US should allow Soviet inspec-\ntors freedom to travel anywhere and inspect everything. The\nproblem, therefore, is to devise an inspection system which,\nwhile less than complete, would still increase the relative gains\nto the US while minimizing the risks of premature US disclosure.\n19. If inspection were restricted, the US would face a serious\nproblem in determining whether the USSR had made full dis-\nclosure. It would be exceedingly difficult to determine whether\nSoviet data already revealed in the census was either exaggerated\nor understated. The US would have nothing more than its pre-\nagreement intelligence to use as a test of possible Soviet exag-\ngeration or understatement. In some instances this intelligence\nis shadowy and incomplete; in others it is based on highly sensi-\ntive sources and is reasonably accurate. Thus, in the first\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ncase, pre-agreement intelligence might be considered insufficiently\nauthoritative to warrant challenging Soviet good faith; and in the\nsecond case, where the challenge was justifiable, the US might\nbe unable to do so without compromising its sources.\n20. The initial agreement on census and verification should be\nas comprehensive and clear as possible, spelling out in great detail\neach phase and step of the procedure. Moreover, the census itself\nshould call for as complete and detailed answers as possible, re-\nquiring exact disclosure of numbers, designations, sizes, locations,\netc., so that subsequent verification will be facilitated.\n21. There should be provision for immediate termination of the\ncensus in event of an act of bad faith, and the agreement and pro-\ncedures should be framed so as to facilitate the determination\nand proof of bad faith. At best an accusation of bad faith would\nbe difficult to sustain. In some cases the US could prove its\ncharge of bad faith only by revealing sensitive intelligence.\n22. The first over-all step in any census might be a compre-\nhensive aerial survey of all cities, towns, and installations\nserved by air, rail, or highway links. The intelligence value\nof this alone to the US would be extensive, while the gains to\nthe USSR would be minor by comparison. These air photos\nmight then be used as a means of identifying plants and instal-\nlations to be included in various phases of the census and verifi-\ncation.\n23. There should be simultaneous census and verification in each\nphase. For example, the USSR would not be permitted to inspect\nthe first US facility until the US team had arrived at the first\nSoviet facility and was ready to inspect. Each nation should be\nallowed to set its own priorities for inspection of facilities which\nhave already been revealed in the census, so that the US could in-\nspect highest priority targets first. The Soviet team would not be\npermitted to travel to the second US facility until the US team had\n- 12 -\nfor SECRET\nSECRET\nsatisfactorily completed inspection of the first Soviet facility. Each\nnew phase should begin only after both countries had agreed that the\nprevious phase had been satisfactorily concluded.\n24. Some means, short of unrestricted freedom to travel anywhere\nand inspect anything, would have to be devised to forestall probable\nevasion of full disclosure in the census on the part of the Soviet\nUnion. Some means of formal challenge of census figures at any\nstage of the verification process should also be provided.\n25. Inspection should be limited to quantitative rather than\nqualitative verification, and the freedom of action of inspection\nteams should be limited accordingly. Inspectors should be allowed\nto check visually the numbers, size, and type of forces and arma-\nments, and pertinent quantitative records, but not to make detailed\ninspections of weapons, equipment, or facilities to discover details\nof their design, construction, composition, etc. Special precautions\nmight be required in some cases to detect dummies.\n26. On the other hand, the fewer the restrictions on the number\nand frequency of inspections, the size and composition of in-\nspection teams, the timing and duration of inspections, etc.,\nthe more the US has to gain. Whenever possible, inspections\nshould be conducted by qualified US technical personnel. Other\nnationals might be less thorough or well-briefed, and perhaps\nsubject to Soviet intimidation.\n27. Verification would yield greater intelligence value if it in-\ncluded inspection of records at the ministry and chief adminis-\ntrative levels, partly to provide a cross-check on plant-by-plant\ninspections.\n- 13 -\nSECRET\nSECRET"
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