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{
    "localId": "486501379",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Implications of a Census and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments, Special Estimate 4",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Implications of a Census and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments, Special Estimate 4",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501379",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501379",
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 12,
            "logicalDate": "1951-05-12",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1951
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
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{
    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-03-008.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nDISCUSSION\nPART I. RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO\nTHE US\nRelative Superiority of Soviet Intelligence on the US\n1. We believe that in almost every field the USSR has far better\nintelligence on the US than the US does on the USSR. The intelligence\navailable to the Soviet Union from overt US sources alone is of in-\ncalculable value. The postwar atomic espionage trials in the US,\nUK, and Canada, among other things, are ample evidence of the\nextent of Soviet covert penetration. While the effectiveness of\nSoviet intelligence penetration may well be declining as a result of\ngrowing Western security consciousness, it is only prudent to\nassume that the USSR will continue to secure relatively superior\nintelligence on the Western Powers in many fields. Under these\ncircumstances, the USSR might consider that the value of the\nadditional intelligence it could gain through census and verification\nwould be relatively less than that which might accrue to the US.\n2. On the other hand, as a result of its superior intelligence on\nthe US, the USSR would be far better able to \"pinpoint\" critical\nactivities which it wished to inspect without being diverted to less\nimportant targets or following false leads. Moreover, because\nmuch of its intelligence is gained overtly or semi-overtly, the\nSoviet Union would find it less necessary to risk compromising\nsensitive sources. Owing to the paucity of overt data on the USSR,\nthe US would be far more hampered by fear of compromising such\nsources.\n3. The relative advantages and disadvantages of a system of\ncensus and verification must also be assessed against the back-\nground of present and potential US intelligence on the Soviet sphere.\nLargely because of the exceedingly effective and all-inclusive\nSoviet security system, US intelligence on many aspects of the\n- 3 -\nSECRET"
}