Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486501401",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Vulnerabilities of Communist China, Special Estimate 5",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401"
}

{
    "id": "486501401",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Vulnerabilities of Communist China, Special Estimate 5",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 18,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
    "naId": 486501401,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 22,
            "logicalDate": "1951-05-22",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1951
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 10,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-010.tif",
    "mediaId": "bf01bbb7a3681b10",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nrequired to uphold the Chinese Communist regime, including, as a\nlast resort, the open commitment of Soviet forces against US forces.*\n16. The USSR may well consider it unnecessary to formalize or\nacknowledge its support of the Chinese Communist regime. However,\nin view of Soviet security sensibilities and the definiteness of Moscow's\npublished commitments to Peiping, formal Soviet support of Communist\nChina under terms of the Sino-Soviet pact must be considered a distinct\npossibility. In any event, if the Soviet Union did provide major overt\nsupport to the Chinese Communists, it probably would cite the pro-\nvisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in an effort to justify its actions before\nworld opinion.\n* It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA; the Director\nof Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, US Air Force; and\nthe Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, that paragraph 15\nshould read as follows:\n\"15. Full US logistical and operational support of a Chinese\nNationalist invasion of the mainland would almost certainly be regarded\nby the USSR as a serious threat to its security interests in the Far East.\nAlthough we are unable, on the basis of intelligence, to determine what\nmeasures the USSR would take to meet such a threat, we believe that\nthe USSR would take steps which would increase the risk of general\nwar. So long as the Kremlin estimated that the existence of the Chinese\nCommunist regime was not in jeopardy, we believe that the USSR, while\ngiving support against the invasion, probably would not openly commit\nits own forces against US forces. If, however, the Kremlin estimated\nthat the existence of the regime was in jeopardy, there is a serious\npossibility that the Kremlin would openly commit Soviet forces against\nUS forces actively engaged in operational support of the invasion. We\nbelieve, however, that the Kremlin probably would not deliberately initiate\na general war for the sole reason that its security interests in the Far\nEast were thus threatened.\"\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET"
}