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    "localId": "486501401",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Vulnerabilities of Communist China, Special Estimate 5",
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    "id": "486501401",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Vulnerabilities of Communist China, Special Estimate 5",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 22,
            "logicalDate": "1951-05-22",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1951
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-006.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nresistance units would be difficult because these groups do not possess a\nsecure base of operations. Opposition between Nationalist and non-\nNationalist forces is not likely to become acute unless guerrilla activity\ngrew to proportions of a full-scale civil war.*\n4. Presently contemplated US aid, provided restrictions on Nationalist\noperations against the mainland were removed, would increase National-\nist capability for commando operations on the mainland, but would not\nenable the Nationalists to conduct sustained or large-scale military\noperations on the mainland. Such raids would probably result in the\nCommunists' diverting additional forces, possibly as many as 200,000,\nto the coastal areas opposite Taiwan and would encourage anti-Communist\nmovements throughout China. A diversion of this sort would lessen\nChinese Communist capabilities for operations elsewhere.\n5. Excluding the element of Soviet participation, we believe US logistic\nbut not operational support to the Nationalists on Taiwan, if expanded\nso as to provide materiel needed for the ground, air and naval forces,\nwould probably, after the minimum period of time required to train the\nNationalists, enable them to establish a sizeable bridgehead in South\nChina without further US participation. Whether or not a bridgehead\ncould be consolidated and expanded into a successful invasion would\ndepend to a great degree on the reliability of the Nationalist armies\nand on the Nationalists' ability to organize, train, and equip sizeable\nforces on the mainland. A consolidated bridgehead or a successful\ninvasion would relieve Chinese Communist pressure against Southeast\nAsia, would weaken Communist internal controls, and probably would\nforce the Chinese Communists to reduce their effort in Korea.\n* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes\nthat opposition between Nationalist and non-Nationalist leaders is,\nin some instances, already acute, and therefore the text tends\nunduly to minimize the very real difficulties presented by the lack\nof unity of anti-Communist guerrilla forces.\n- 3 -\nSECRET"
}