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6. Excluding the element of Soviet participation, we believe that a
Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland with full US logistical
and operational support, excluding only the commitment of US ground
troops, but including intensive and sustained air attacks by US forces
against selected vital targets and a maximum naval blockade and bom-
bardment of the China coast, would have the following effects on the
Chinese Communists: (a) their war-making capabilities would be
drastically and immediately reduced; (b) their lines of communication
and the importation of needed supplies and war materials would be
severly disrupted; (c) the industrial segment of their economy would
become progressively paralyzed; and (d) their administrative control
of China would be severely strained. We believe further that the CO-
ordinated Nationalist-US operations might imperil the stability of the
Chinese Communist regime.
7. Although considerable discontent exists in Communist China, most
opposition is passive. Any increase in the activities of anti-Communist
forces might gain the sympathy of many of the discontented, but such
forces would have to offer the promise of success to enlist active
support of large groups. It would appear that, while there are still
strong anti-Nationalist feelings among elements of the population, the
initial acceptance and popularity of the Communist regime have generally
waned and, in some areas, have turned to grudging tolerance and dislike
as a result of the police-state methods of the Chinese Communists and
their failure to improve the living standards of most elements of the
population. These police state methods have, on the other hand, elimi-
nated hundreds of thousands of persons suspected of actual or potential
anti-Communist activities.
8. In the event of a Nationalist landing on the mainland with US logistical
support to the Nationalists on Taiwan, but without further US participation,
there would be a "wait and see" attitude among the general populace. They
would wait, on the one hand, to measure the potentialities and conduct of
the Nationalist forces and, on the other, to judge the nature and extent of
Chinese Communist reprisal measures. In short, the more successful the
invasion operation, the wider would be the popular support, although the
residuum of anti-Kuomintang sentiment may retard the growth of such
support.
- 4 -
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"ocrText": "OP SECRET\n6. Excluding the element of Soviet participation, we believe that a\nChinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland with full US logistical\nand operational support, excluding only the commitment of US ground\ntroops, but including intensive and sustained air attacks by US forces\nagainst selected vital targets and a maximum naval blockade and bom-\nbardment of the China coast, would have the following effects on the\nChinese Communists: (a) their war-making capabilities would be\ndrastically and immediately reduced; (b) their lines of communication\nand the importation of needed supplies and war materials would be\nseverly disrupted; (c) the industrial segment of their economy would\nbecome progressively paralyzed; and (d) their administrative control\nof China would be severely strained. We believe further that the CO-\nordinated Nationalist-US operations might imperil the stability of the\nChinese Communist regime.\n7. Although considerable discontent exists in Communist China, most\nopposition is passive. Any increase in the activities of anti-Communist\nforces might gain the sympathy of many of the discontented, but such\nforces would have to offer the promise of success to enlist active\nsupport of large groups. It would appear that, while there are still\nstrong anti-Nationalist feelings among elements of the population, the\ninitial acceptance and popularity of the Communist regime have generally\nwaned and, in some areas, have turned to grudging tolerance and dislike\nas a result of the police-state methods of the Chinese Communists and\ntheir failure to improve the living standards of most elements of the\npopulation. These police state methods have, on the other hand, elimi-\nnated hundreds of thousands of persons suspected of actual or potential\nanti-Communist activities.\n8. In the event of a Nationalist landing on the mainland with US logistical\nsupport to the Nationalists on Taiwan, but without further US participation,\nthere would be a \"wait and see\" attitude among the general populace. They\nwould wait, on the one hand, to measure the potentialities and conduct of\nthe Nationalist forces and, on the other, to judge the nature and extent of\nChinese Communist reprisal measures. In short, the more successful the\ninvasion operation, the wider would be the popular support, although the\nresiduum of anti-Kuomintang sentiment may retard the growth of such\nsupport.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET"
}