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difficulty in building up, without detection,
sufficient military strength in North Korea
to change the military balance of power
materially.
(ii) The Kremlin would have to recognize that if
INSURANCE
serious Communist violations of the cease
THANK
fire and armistice agreements were detected,
the UN might resume hostilities.
(iii) The abrupt resumption of hostilities by the
Communists after an armistice would in-
crease the risks of extending the conflict.
CONCLUSION OF A CEASE FIRE AND AN ARMISTICE IN ORDER
TO CLOSE OUT THE KOREAN CONFLICT
16. The Communists could follow either of two possible courses
of action in pursuing this objective. The first would be to con-
clude an armistice and to prolong it indefinitely. The second
would be to use the armistice as a first step toward achieving a
final settlement of the Korean conflict or even of broader Far
Eastern issues.
17. The Communists might hope by means of the first course
of action not only to halt the Korean conflict, but also, in
effect, to reestablish the division of Korea on the 38th Parallel,
thus achieving a de facto settlement.
a. Arguments for such a course of action:
(i) In the light of the heavy cost of the Korean
war thus far, the Communists might well
feel that de facto control over the area
-9 -
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"ocrText": "difficulty in building up, without detection,\nsufficient military strength in North Korea\nto change the military balance of power\nmaterially.\n(ii) The Kremlin would have to recognize that if\nINSURANCE\nserious Communist violations of the cease\nTHANK\nfire and armistice agreements were detected,\nthe UN might resume hostilities.\n(iii) The abrupt resumption of hostilities by the\nCommunists after an armistice would in-\ncrease the risks of extending the conflict.\nCONCLUSION OF A CEASE FIRE AND AN ARMISTICE IN ORDER\nTO CLOSE OUT THE KOREAN CONFLICT\n16. The Communists could follow either of two possible courses\nof action in pursuing this objective. The first would be to con-\nclude an armistice and to prolong it indefinitely. The second\nwould be to use the armistice as a first step toward achieving a\nfinal settlement of the Korean conflict or even of broader Far\nEastern issues.\n17. The Communists might hope by means of the first course\nof action not only to halt the Korean conflict, but also, in\neffect, to reestablish the division of Korea on the 38th Parallel,\nthus achieving a de facto settlement.\na. Arguments for such a course of action:\n(i) In the light of the heavy cost of the Korean\nwar thus far, the Communists might well\nfeel that de facto control over the area\n-9 -"
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