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{
    "localId": "486501440",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Possible Communist Objectives in Proposing a Cease Fire in Korea, Special Estimate 8",
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{
    "id": "486501440",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501440",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Possible Communist Objectives in Proposing a Cease Fire in Korea, Special Estimate 8",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501440",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501440",
    "naId": 486501440,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 6,
            "logicalDate": "1951-07-06",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1951
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
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{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-07-004.tif",
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    "ocrText": "POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN PROPOSING\nA CEASE FIRE IN KOREA\nTHE PROBLEM\nLIBEAR\nTo examine possible Communist\na cease fire and armistice in Korea.\nobjective\nin proposing\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. We believe that, while the Kremlin has probably not definitely\ncommitted itself to any specific course of action, it is likely that\nthe primary Soviet objective in proposing a cease fire is to effect\na military disengagement in Korea. Although the Communists may\nexploit the discussions for a cease fire and the period of the\narmistice solely to improve their military position prior to the\nresumption of hostilities in Korea, we believe it more likely\nthat the Communists aim to achieve an indefinitely prolonged\narmistice. Such an armistice would, in effect, lead to a de facto\ndivision of Korea at the 38th Parallel and might, at the same time,\nserve to improve the Communists' prospects of attaining their\nobjectives in Korea and in larger Far Eastern issues by utilizing\na propaganda and diplomatic campaign where military action has\nbeen unsuccessful SO far.\n2. We believe that the Kremlin is fully aware that a military disen-\ngagement in Korea would permit utilization of Chinese Communist\nresources elsewhere in Asia, and would free Communist resources\ngenerally for utilization elsewhere in the world. The Kremlin may\nalso estimate that, after a disengagement in Korea, the proximity\nof Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria would require the re-\ntention of substantial US-UN forces in Korea and limit US-UN capa-\nbilities for employing armed forces against aggression elsewhere,\nSECRET"
}