Ask the Scholar
Page 14 of 18
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TOP SECRET
would divert increasing numbers of UN aircraft from missions
of close support and interdiction to the mission of maintaining
air superiority.
(c) Initiation of offensive air operations against UN air, ground, and
naval forces on the Korean peninsula and adjacent waters. Ex-
ploitation of this capability might:
(i)
Disrupt UN air operations and logistic support of UN
ground forces by airborne attacks on UN air bases, lines
of communications, and supply bases.
(ii) Divert UN air effort from direct support of ground action
and interdiction of lines of communications.
(iii) Hamper the rreedom of movement of UN ground forces.
(iv) Hinder UN airlift operations.
(v) Harass UN naval operations and the present freedom of
UN sea communications.
17. Soviet Assistance. Soviet assistance to Communist forces in Korea
to date has consisted of advisory, technical, and logistical support and
limited participation of antiaircraft personnel and possibly other
specialized Soviet combat troops. Virtually all heavy combat equip-
ment for the North Korean Army has been furnished by the USSR. In
addition, most of the electronic and antiaircraft equipment for both
North Koreans and Chinese Communists, POL supplies, and some
vehicles and ammunition, have been supplied by the USSR. The USSR
has the capability to increase considerably the level of its present type
of assistance to the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces. UN
attacks on lines of communications will continue to hamper the delivery
of supplies to the front, however, and Chinese Communist forces thus
far engaged in Korea appear to have lacked the skilled personnel re-
quired to operate modern heavy arms and equipment. The Soviets have
supplied all the jet aircraft and most of the piston-engined aircraft in
the Chinese Communist and North Korean air forces. They have also
- 9 -
TOP SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 14
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 0d1b5a12854369d0
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486501458
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486501458",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501458",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Immediate Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire Negotiations in Korea, Special Estimate 9",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501458",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-001.tif",
"imageCount": 18,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486501458",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Immediate Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire Negotiations in Korea, Special Estimate 9",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501458"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486501458",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501458",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Immediate Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire Negotiations in Korea, Special Estimate 9",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501458",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-001.tif",
"imageCount": 18,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501458",
"naId": 486501458,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 6,
"logicalDate": "1951-08-06",
"month": 8,
"year": 1951
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 14,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-08-014.tif",
"mediaId": "0d1b5a12854369d0",
"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nwould divert increasing numbers of UN aircraft from missions\nof close support and interdiction to the mission of maintaining\nair superiority.\n(c) Initiation of offensive air operations against UN air, ground, and\nnaval forces on the Korean peninsula and adjacent waters. Ex-\nploitation of this capability might:\n(i)\nDisrupt UN air operations and logistic support of UN\nground forces by airborne attacks on UN air bases, lines\nof communications, and supply bases.\n(ii) Divert UN air effort from direct support of ground action\nand interdiction of lines of communications.\n(iii) Hamper the rreedom of movement of UN ground forces.\n(iv) Hinder UN airlift operations.\n(v) Harass UN naval operations and the present freedom of\nUN sea communications.\n17. Soviet Assistance. Soviet assistance to Communist forces in Korea\nto date has consisted of advisory, technical, and logistical support and\nlimited participation of antiaircraft personnel and possibly other\nspecialized Soviet combat troops. Virtually all heavy combat equip-\nment for the North Korean Army has been furnished by the USSR. In\naddition, most of the electronic and antiaircraft equipment for both\nNorth Koreans and Chinese Communists, POL supplies, and some\nvehicles and ammunition, have been supplied by the USSR. The USSR\nhas the capability to increase considerably the level of its present type\nof assistance to the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces. UN\nattacks on lines of communications will continue to hamper the delivery\nof supplies to the front, however, and Chinese Communist forces thus\nfar engaged in Korea appear to have lacked the skilled personnel re-\nquired to operate modern heavy arms and equipment. The Soviets have\nsupplied all the jet aircraft and most of the piston-engined aircraft in\nthe Chinese Communist and North Korean air forces. They have also\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET"
}