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486501477
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Memorandum Regarding Korea
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486501477
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document
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Memorandum Regarding Korea
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President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)
Intelligence Files
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486501477
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1950-01-01
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1950
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SECURITY
SEGRET
DRAFT MESSAGE TO CINCFE
Reur C 53167
Based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those
presented in your recent messages, we are forced to the conclusion that it
is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by
Communist China, to hold for a protracted period a position in Korea.
However, it would be to our national interest, and also to the interest
of the UN, to gain some further time for essential diplomatic and military
consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort before you issue
firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from Korea.
It is important also to US prestige worldwide, to future of UN and
NATO organizations, and to efforts to organize anti-communist resistance
in Asia that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military con-
siderations, and that maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on
is
Communist aggressors.
$
It is not possible in Washington to evaluate present state of combat
efficiency and morale of UN forces. However, we are concerned about
effect on troops, particularly ROK forces, if it should become known to them
that a decision to initiate troop evacuation were made at this stage in opera-
tions. Instructions to evacuate are almost certain to become known soon after
issue. Judging from your C 52964, this might well result in partial collapse
of ROK troops, thus seriously jeopardizing the ability of 8th Army to reach
a relatively secure beachhead about Pusan and hold it during period required
for actual evacuation.
You had indicated in your C 52391 and C 52712 that it would not be
necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had
arrived at the old Pusan beachhead (line 9 on FECOM G-3 Map).
Your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which,
including consideration of factors outlined above, you will have to issue
instructions to evacuate Korea.
Meanwhile directives contained in Par. C JCS 80680, remain in effect.
DEFENSE GUIDELIME 6-13-79
DECLASSIFIED
By NETHC NARS, Date 10-11-79
SEOUL