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CONSIDENTIAL TOP SECRET ASSIFIED BW Attack Against Crops 33. It is estimated that the USSR might possibly employ some form of cereal rust in a clandestine BW attack against US crops. However, such attack is unlikely because of the un- certainty that this disease would spread over a wide area. It is considered that attacks with other BW agents such as blights, insects, and chemical growth regulators would be impracticable. 1/ SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS, SABOTAGE, AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES Groups and Individuals Available for Soviet Subversive Purposes 34. To aid in its attempts to disrupt and frustrate our defensive and counter-offensive efforts in the circumstances of a surprise 16 attack, the USSR has a very formidable ally within our own camp: the Communist Party, USA. The members of that organization, now estimated at 37,000, by virtue of their total devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the Soviet "fatherland," are committed to defend the USSR "unswervingly," with all means at their disposal and at any price. 35. Other potential sources upon which the USSR may draw (or from which it may obtain spontaneous aid) are Communist sympathizers, Communist front organizations, some Trotskyites, anti-US national- istic groups, and persons otherwise disaffected. Additional potential sources of manpower for aid in subversive purposes are members of Soviet and Satellite diplomatic, consular, commercial, industrial, press, academic and "cultural" establishments and missions, and UN personnel. 1/ The following estimate has been made by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference composed of the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; G-2, Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; and Office of Special Investigation, Air Force. - 13 - TOP SECRET CO

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    "ocrText": "CONSIDENTIAL\nTOP SECRET\nASSIFIED\nBW Attack Against Crops\n33. It is estimated that the USSR might possibly employ some\nform of cereal rust in a clandestine BW attack against US\ncrops. However, such attack is unlikely because of the un-\ncertainty that this disease would spread over a wide area.\nIt is considered that attacks with other BW agents such as\nblights, insects, and chemical growth regulators would be\nimpracticable.\n1/\nSUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS, SABOTAGE, AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES\nGroups and Individuals Available for Soviet Subversive Purposes\n34. To aid in its attempts to disrupt and frustrate our defensive\nand counter-offensive efforts in the circumstances of a surprise\n16\nattack, the USSR has a very formidable ally within our own camp:\nthe Communist Party, USA. The members of that organization,\nnow estimated at 37,000, by virtue of their total devotion to the\nprinciples of Marxism-Leninism and to the Soviet \"fatherland,\" are\ncommitted to defend the USSR \"unswervingly,\" with all means at\ntheir disposal and at any price.\n35. Other potential sources upon which the USSR may draw (or from\nwhich it may obtain spontaneous aid) are Communist sympathizers,\nCommunist front organizations, some Trotskyites, anti-US national-\nistic groups, and persons otherwise disaffected. Additional potential\nsources of manpower for aid in subversive purposes are members of\nSoviet and Satellite diplomatic, consular, commercial, industrial,\npress, academic and \"cultural\" establishments and missions, and UN\npersonnel.\n1/ The following estimate has been made by the Interdepartmental\nIntelligence Conference composed of the Directors of the Federal\nBureau of Investigation; G-2, Army; Office of Naval Intelligence;\nand Office of Special Investigation, Air Force.\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nCO"
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