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{
    "localId": "486501517",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the United States Before July 1952, Special Estimate 14",
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{
    "id": "486501517",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501517",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the United States Before July 1952, Special Estimate 14",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501517",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501517",
    "naId": 486501517,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1952-10-23",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1952
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
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}

{
    "seq": 12,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n9\ncapped by wide geographical separation of its\nGermans and Japanese did during World War\nmaritime frontiers, limited operational ex-\nII. The probable uses of Soviet submarines\nperience, and lack of shipborne aircraft.\nare:\nSurface Fleet\n(a) Attacks on merchant shipping and\nnaval vessels.\n38. During the period under consideration,\nthe capability of the Soviet surface fleet and\n(b) Offensive minelaying along shipping\nroutes in the approaches to principal harbors.\nmerchant marine for participating in an at-\ntack on the continental United States is con-\n(c) Landing of saboteurs and agents.\nsidered to be negligible. Soviet surface units\n(d) Undetected reconnaissance and\nwill not present a serious threat or challenge\nradar picket duty.\nto Western naval power or to the security of\n(e) Guiding long-range bombers.\nthe continental US.\n(f) Launching of guided missiles and\nrockets with conventional or atomic warheads,\nAmphibious Forces\nagainst coastal targets.\n39. The Soviet force of minor combatant ves-\nsels, including amphibious types, is entirely\nClandestine Attack With Weapons\nunsuited for a transoceanic attack. Any sub-\nOf Mass Destruction 1\nstitute for amphibious lift would require call-\ning upon the Soviet Merchant Marine. The\n41. Clandestine attack 2 with atomic, biologi-\nSoviet Merchant Marine is a heterogeneous\ncal and chemical weapons 3 offers a high po-\ncollection of vessels, many obsolescent, and is\ntential of effectiveness against a limited num-\ncritically lacking in tankers for overseas oper-\nber of targets, particularly when employed\nations. This largely precludes the possibility\nconcurrently with, or just prior to, the initia-\nof its employment in any large-scale trans-\ntion of full-scale hostilities.\nTRUMAN\noceanic attack on Canada, the Panama Canal,\nNARA\nCLANDESTINE ATOMIC ATTACK\nor the continental United States. It is esti-\nmated that the Soviets could launch against\n42. The USSR is capable of clandestine de-\nWestern Alaska approximately 6,000 troops in\nlivery of atomic weapons by disguised aircraft,\nan amphibious assault coupled with an air-\nmerchant ships, smuggling, and guided mis-\nborne attack of initially 4,000. Such assault\nsiles.\nwould probably be directed at: (a) the Seward\nPeninsula; (b) the Anchorage-Fairbanks area;\nDisguised Aircraft\n(c) the Aleutian Chain; or (d) Kodiak Island.\n43. Because of its resemblance to the US\nB-29, the Soviet TU-4 could be disguised with\nSubmarines\nUS markings and employed for clandestine\n40. The major naval threat to the US during\natomic attacks. A small number of disguised\nthis period is that of the Soviet submarine\nTU-4's, by taking advantage of the gaps in\nfleet. The USSR will have during the period\nour radar screen, might escape detection.\na total of 370 submarines, of which 104 will\nThis would greatly increase the probability of\nbe capable of launching a direct attack against\na successful attack on high priority targets,\nthe United States. Assuming that present\nsuch as the Washington area, for the purpose\ndispositions remain unchanged, nineteen\nocean patrol submarines will be available to\nThis section is a summary of NIE-31 (published\nthe Soviet Pacific fleet for attacks along the\n4 September 1951), which may be consulted for a\nmore detailed discussion of this subject.\nwest coast of the United States, and four high\nFor the purpose of this estimate, the term \"clan-\nsubmerged speed and 81 ocean patrol subma-\ndestine attack\" does not include the employment\nrines will be available from the Baltic, North-\nof conventional sabotage.\nern and Black Sea fleets for attacks along the\nOnly atomic, biological and chemical weapons\nhave been discussed, since the state of development\neast coast. The Soviets should at all times\nof other conceivable weapons of mass destruction is\nbe able to employ more submarines in offen-\nsuch that their employment during the period of\nsive mining and in torpedo attacks than the\nthis estimate is considered most unlikely.\nP SECRET"
}