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of paralyzing the top military and civil com-
whether a ship is actually under Soviet con-
mand a few hours prior to the initiation of
trol.
hostilities elsewhere. Soviet capabilities for
(a) The Soviets enforce secrecy for their
clandestine air attack correspond to those for
ship chartering by maintaining their own
overt air attack discussed in paragraphs 7-32
charter and insurance agencies which enable
above.
them to by-pass the usual commercial chan-
44. The USSR also could undertake clandes-
nels.
tine attack with civilian aircraft of a type used
(b) In many instances, intelligence in-
by US or foreign transoceanic airlines. Such
formation indicating Soviet charter or pur-
aircraft would have a greater chance of es-
chase has not been received until more than
caping detection and identification inasmuch
sixty days after the transaction occurred.
as civilian aircraft are not equipped with IFF.
Therefore, it is within Soviet capabilities to
However, employment of civilian aircraft is
obtain and employ a foreign ship for clandes-
less probable than the use of military craft
tine delivery before the US could learn that
since, at present, neither the USSR nor any
the ship was under Soviet control.
of the Satellites are known to possess suitable
48. Because of the above factors, the USSR
aircraft, and acquisition from either a US or
must be considered capable of utilizing a mer-
foreign concern would increase the risk of
chant ship for delivering an atomic weapon
compromising the operation.
into a key US harbor with a relatively good
chance of escaping detection.
Merchant Ships
45. An atomic weapon could be detonated in
Smuggling
the hold of a ship or laid as an underwater
49. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable
mine. Detonation of an atomic weapon in
material, could be broken down into relatively
the hold of a ship would not involve any
small components* which could be smuggled
special engineering problems, nor need the
separately into the US. Unusual handling
crew be aware of the presence of the weapon.
precautions would not be required and radi-
Laying an atomic weapon as a mine would re-
ation detection would be most improbable.
quire encasing the weapon in a watertight
Assembly of the bomb would present certain
container and might also require special lay-
difficulties but none of an insuperable char-
ing equipment. The USSR is capable of meet-
acter.
ing these requirements as well as providing
50. Under the cover of diplomatic immunity,
an accurate time-delay mechanism to permit
components for an atomic bomb or, less prob-
laying the weapon several days, weeks, or
ably, even an assembled bomb could be con-
months in advance of D-Day.
signed to Soviet diplomatic representatives in
46. During the first quarter of 1951, the Soviet
the US as household effects or supplies with-
orbit (including China, but excluding Fin-
out fear of official inspection by US authori-
land) had under charter more than 140 West-
ties. In addition, no government agency is
ern ships.* In addition, the chartering of
specifically charged with the responsibility for
Western ships by non-Soviet countries often
observing the offloading, processing, and dis-
leads to their sale to the USSR or the Satel-
position of such shipments. This method
lites. Soviet possession of a number of ocean-
would require the closely coordinated effort of
going fishing trawlers similar in type to US
several individuals in the US to acquire the
vessels and capable of transporting atomic
weapon and deliver it to the target area.
weapons constitutes a particular threat.
51. It is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb
47. Examination of a ship's papers is not al-
through Customs as a commercial shipment,
ways a reliable method of determining
Although it would be theoretically possible to
These figures do not include the additional West-
manufacture clandestinely within the US all the
ern ships engaged in trade with the Soviet orbit
components of an atomic weapon with the excep-
but not under direct charter to the Soviet orbit.
tion of the fissionable material, it would be difficult
to procure and process the necessary material.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "10\nSECRET\nof paralyzing the top military and civil com-\nwhether a ship is actually under Soviet con-\nmand a few hours prior to the initiation of\ntrol.\nhostilities elsewhere. Soviet capabilities for\n(a) The Soviets enforce secrecy for their\nclandestine air attack correspond to those for\nship chartering by maintaining their own\novert air attack discussed in paragraphs 7-32\ncharter and insurance agencies which enable\nabove.\nthem to by-pass the usual commercial chan-\n44. The USSR also could undertake clandes-\nnels.\ntine attack with civilian aircraft of a type used\n(b) In many instances, intelligence in-\nby US or foreign transoceanic airlines. Such\nformation indicating Soviet charter or pur-\naircraft would have a greater chance of es-\nchase has not been received until more than\ncaping detection and identification inasmuch\nsixty days after the transaction occurred.\nas civilian aircraft are not equipped with IFF.\nTherefore, it is within Soviet capabilities to\nHowever, employment of civilian aircraft is\nobtain and employ a foreign ship for clandes-\nless probable than the use of military craft\ntine delivery before the US could learn that\nsince, at present, neither the USSR nor any\nthe ship was under Soviet control.\nof the Satellites are known to possess suitable\n48. Because of the above factors, the USSR\naircraft, and acquisition from either a US or\nmust be considered capable of utilizing a mer-\nforeign concern would increase the risk of\nchant ship for delivering an atomic weapon\ncompromising the operation.\ninto a key US harbor with a relatively good\nchance of escaping detection.\nMerchant Ships\n45. An atomic weapon could be detonated in\nSmuggling\nthe hold of a ship or laid as an underwater\n49. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable\nmine. Detonation of an atomic weapon in\nmaterial, could be broken down into relatively\nthe hold of a ship would not involve any\nsmall components* which could be smuggled\nspecial engineering problems, nor need the\nseparately into the US. Unusual handling\ncrew be aware of the presence of the weapon.\nprecautions would not be required and radi-\nLaying an atomic weapon as a mine would re-\nation detection would be most improbable.\nquire encasing the weapon in a watertight\nAssembly of the bomb would present certain\ncontainer and might also require special lay-\ndifficulties but none of an insuperable char-\ning equipment. The USSR is capable of meet-\nacter.\ning these requirements as well as providing\n50. Under the cover of diplomatic immunity,\nan accurate time-delay mechanism to permit\ncomponents for an atomic bomb or, less prob-\nlaying the weapon several days, weeks, or\nably, even an assembled bomb could be con-\nmonths in advance of D-Day.\nsigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives in\n46. During the first quarter of 1951, the Soviet\nthe US as household effects or supplies with-\norbit (including China, but excluding Fin-\nout fear of official inspection by US authori-\nland) had under charter more than 140 West-\nties. In addition, no government agency is\nern ships.* In addition, the chartering of\nspecifically charged with the responsibility for\nWestern ships by non-Soviet countries often\nobserving the offloading, processing, and dis-\nleads to their sale to the USSR or the Satel-\nposition of such shipments. This method\nlites. Soviet possession of a number of ocean-\nwould require the closely coordinated effort of\ngoing fishing trawlers similar in type to US\nseveral individuals in the US to acquire the\nvessels and capable of transporting atomic\nweapon and deliver it to the target area.\nweapons constitutes a particular threat.\n51. It is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb\n47. Examination of a ship's papers is not al-\nthrough Customs as a commercial shipment,\nways a reliable method of determining\nAlthough it would be theoretically possible to\nThese figures do not include the additional West-\nmanufacture clandestinely within the US all the\nern ships engaged in trade with the Soviet orbit\ncomponents of an atomic weapon with the excep-\nbut not under direct charter to the Soviet orbit.\ntion of the fissionable material, it would be difficult\nto procure and process the necessary material.\nSECRET"
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