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SECRET
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR A MILITARY ATTACK
ON THE UNITED STATES BEFORE JULY 1952
1
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to launch a military attack on the United
States 2 before July 1952.
ASSUMPTIONS
For the purpose of this estimate it is assumed that:
a. A Soviet attack on the US would be designed to cause the maximum possible
reduction in the capability of the US to wage offensive war.
b. The USSR would not avoid employing any weapon and tactic because of US
capabilities for retaliation in kind.
NARA
ESTIMATE
Direct Military Attack
tion of conventional bombing with high ex-
plosives against Alaska, will not constitute a
AIR ATTACK
serious threat. Although chemical and bio-
1. Atomic bombardment with long-range air-
logical weapons might be delivered by long-
craft is the most threatening of the various
range aircraft, these weapons are better suited
types of potential military operations against
to clandestine or sabotage attack. It is con-
the US within Soviet capabilities during the
sidered unlikely that the USSR will possess a
period considered in this estimate.
hydrogen bomb during the period of this esti-
2. The Soviet Air Force is capable of attempt-
mate.
ing a strategic air offensive against the United
States while simultaneously providing ade-
Soviet Atomic Weapons
quate tactical support for all campaigns which
4. The limiting factor in the scale of atomic
the USSR might launch against continental
attack would be the stockpile of bombs avail-
Europe and the Near and Middle East (except
able to the USSR for use against the US. The
India and Pakistan).
USSR possesses sufficient aircraft, trained
3. During the period of this estimate other
crews, and base facilities to enable it to at-
types of air attack,3 with the possible excep-
tempt delivery against the US of the full stock-
pile of atomic bombs that will be available in
1 The effects of US countermeasures upon Soviet
capabilities have not been considered in this esti-
the period covered by this estimate.
mate.
2 Including Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone.
5. The Soviet atomic stockpile for 1951 and
3 Such as conventional bombing with high ex-
1952 has been estimated as follows:
plosives, guided missiles launched from Soviet-con-
trolled territory and the employment of free bal-
Mid-1951
45
loons.
Mid-1952
100
OF
SECRET
1
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nSOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR A MILITARY ATTACK\nON THE UNITED STATES BEFORE JULY 1952\n1\nTHE PROBLEM\nTo estimate the capabilities of the USSR to launch a military attack on the United\nStates 2 before July 1952.\nASSUMPTIONS\nFor the purpose of this estimate it is assumed that:\na. A Soviet attack on the US would be designed to cause the maximum possible\nreduction in the capability of the US to wage offensive war.\nb. The USSR would not avoid employing any weapon and tactic because of US\ncapabilities for retaliation in kind.\nNARA\nESTIMATE\nDirect Military Attack\ntion of conventional bombing with high ex-\nplosives against Alaska, will not constitute a\nAIR ATTACK\nserious threat. Although chemical and bio-\n1. Atomic bombardment with long-range air-\nlogical weapons might be delivered by long-\ncraft is the most threatening of the various\nrange aircraft, these weapons are better suited\ntypes of potential military operations against\nto clandestine or sabotage attack. It is con-\nthe US within Soviet capabilities during the\nsidered unlikely that the USSR will possess a\nperiod considered in this estimate.\nhydrogen bomb during the period of this esti-\n2. The Soviet Air Force is capable of attempt-\nmate.\ning a strategic air offensive against the United\nStates while simultaneously providing ade-\nSoviet Atomic Weapons\nquate tactical support for all campaigns which\n4. The limiting factor in the scale of atomic\nthe USSR might launch against continental\nattack would be the stockpile of bombs avail-\nEurope and the Near and Middle East (except\nable to the USSR for use against the US. The\nIndia and Pakistan).\nUSSR possesses sufficient aircraft, trained\n3. During the period of this estimate other\ncrews, and base facilities to enable it to at-\ntypes of air attack,3 with the possible excep-\ntempt delivery against the US of the full stock-\npile of atomic bombs that will be available in\n1 The effects of US countermeasures upon Soviet\ncapabilities have not been considered in this esti-\nthe period covered by this estimate.\nmate.\n2 Including Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone.\n5. The Soviet atomic stockpile for 1951 and\n3 Such as conventional bombing with high ex-\n1952 has been estimated as follows:\nplosives, guided missiles launched from Soviet-con-\ntrolled territory and the employment of free bal-\nMid-1951\n45\nloons.\nMid-1952\n100\nOF\nSECRET\n1"
}