Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486501535",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Possible Psychological Reactions to a United States Air Offensive Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Special Estimate 15",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501535"
}

{
    "id": "486501535",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501535",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Possible Psychological Reactions to a United States Air Offensive Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Special Estimate 15",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501535",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875519/875519-04-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875519/875519-04-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875519/875519-04-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 15,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501535",
    "naId": 486501535,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 4,
            "logicalDate": "1951-10-04",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1951
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875519/875519-04-004.tif",
    "mediaId": "ff782cdd82caf221",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\nPOSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO A US AIR\nOFFENSIVE AGAINST THE USSR\nTHE PROBLEM\nTo assess the psychological reactions of the Soviet people (as\ndistinguished from the Communist officialdom) to a US strategic air\noffensive, using both atomic and conventional weapons.\nESTIMATE\nPSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING\nIN WORLD WAR II\n1. There is but little evidence on the Soviet reaction to German bomb-\ning during World War II, and consequently not much basis for judging\nthe probable psychological effects of heavy US strategic air attacks,\nincluding attacks with atomic weapons. Since the Soviet people are\nSlavs, it may be that their reaction would be different from that of the\nBritish, Germans or Japanese, who were subjected to the heaviest\nstrategic air attacks during the recent conflict. However, certain\nlessons might be drawn from German and Japanese experience, in\nparticular since the totalitarian social and political structure of these\ntwo countries was broadly comparable to that of the Soviet Union.\nWhile strategic bombing was secondary to front line defeats in de-\npressing Axis civilian morale, it had a serious adverse effect. It was\nthe principal means of affecting directly the morale of the non-military\npopulation. Bombing had a less adverse effect on Nazi party mem-\nbers, the bureaucracy and others closely identified with the regime\nthan it did on the remainder of the population.\nSECRET"
}