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14. Effect on popular attitudes toward the US. US air attacks would
probably cause an initial growth of hostility toward the attacker,
particularly among bombed groups, but we doubt whether over the
longer run they would produce widespread popular hatred of the US.
To some extent at least Soviet civilians would tend realistically and
even fatalistically to accept US bombing as one of the hazards of
war. Moreover, the fairly general lack of strong anti-US sentiment
among the people and the difficulty of building up hatred for the US
is recognized by the Soviet leaders, as indicated by their extensive
postwar propaganda campaign to build up antagonism. The anti-US
reaction to air attacks would be much stronger among groups most
closely identified with the regime, which might contribute to greater
Soviet will to fight. The development of a strong anti-US reaction
among the general population, however, woula largely depend upon
Soviet success in convincing the people that the US was the aggressor,
and was launching atrocity and "terror" attacks.
15. Effect on popular attitudes toward the Kremlin. On the other
hand, we consider it likely that much of the initial hostility toward
the US might be supplanted, to the extent that Soviet defense and
countermeasures were unsuccessful, by an increased antagonism
toward the regime. German and Japanese experience in the last war
indicates that to the extent the government failed to provide adequate
protection to the people and attempted to minimize the extent of the
damage, it aroused popular resentment. If Soviet propaganda attempted
to underplay US air attacks it might well boomerang. The heightened
popular emotions created by air attacks, which would have little out-
let against the attackers, would probably be expended finally on
domestic leaders and fellow citizens, particularly if Soviet defenses
were inadequate.
16. We consider it unlikely that US bombing would in itself cause
the Soviet people to rally closer to the regime, at least in the long
run. The considerable apathy toward the Kremlin which exists among
the population and the wide gap already separating the people from
their leaders militate against any such development. Only if the popu-
lation were convinced that the USSR was fighting a patriotic war of
- 6 -
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n14. Effect on popular attitudes toward the US. US air attacks would\nprobably cause an initial growth of hostility toward the attacker,\nparticularly among bombed groups, but we doubt whether over the\nlonger run they would produce widespread popular hatred of the US.\nTo some extent at least Soviet civilians would tend realistically and\neven fatalistically to accept US bombing as one of the hazards of\nwar. Moreover, the fairly general lack of strong anti-US sentiment\namong the people and the difficulty of building up hatred for the US\nis recognized by the Soviet leaders, as indicated by their extensive\npostwar propaganda campaign to build up antagonism. The anti-US\nreaction to air attacks would be much stronger among groups most\nclosely identified with the regime, which might contribute to greater\nSoviet will to fight. The development of a strong anti-US reaction\namong the general population, however, woula largely depend upon\nSoviet success in convincing the people that the US was the aggressor,\nand was launching atrocity and \"terror\" attacks.\n15. Effect on popular attitudes toward the Kremlin. On the other\nhand, we consider it likely that much of the initial hostility toward\nthe US might be supplanted, to the extent that Soviet defense and\ncountermeasures were unsuccessful, by an increased antagonism\ntoward the regime. German and Japanese experience in the last war\nindicates that to the extent the government failed to provide adequate\nprotection to the people and attempted to minimize the extent of the\ndamage, it aroused popular resentment. If Soviet propaganda attempted\nto underplay US air attacks it might well boomerang. The heightened\npopular emotions created by air attacks, which would have little out-\nlet against the attackers, would probably be expended finally on\ndomestic leaders and fellow citizens, particularly if Soviet defenses\nwere inadequate.\n16. We consider it unlikely that US bombing would in itself cause\nthe Soviet people to rally closer to the regime, at least in the long\nrun. The considerable apathy toward the Kremlin which exists among\nthe population and the wide gap already separating the people from\ntheir leaders militate against any such development. Only if the popu-\nlation were convinced that the USSR was fighting a patriotic war of\n- 6 -\nSECRET"
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