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SECRET
PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC
OF PANAMA THROUGH MID-1952
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable political developments in the Republic of Panama through
mid-1952 with special reference to Communist and other anti-US developments
which might adversely affect US interests in Panama.
CONCLUSIONS
1. As an organized political entity operat-
5. The principal candidates in the presi-
ing in its own name, the Communist
dential election to be held on 11 May 1952
Party in the Republic of Panama is weak.
are José Remón, who is favorably dis-
The Communists cannot themselves seize
posed toward the United States, and Ro-
power in Panama, or otherwise politically
berto Chiari, who is not unfavorably dis-
endanger US strategic interests there,
posed but is dependent on the support of
during the period of this estimate.
the Patriotic Front. Remón could prob-
2. Economic, social, and political condi-
ably win a free election with his present
tions in Panama are fundamentally un-
support and would almost certainly win
sound, however, and are susceptible of
with the additional support of Arnulfo
Communist exploitation.
Arias. The Patriotic Front and the Com-
munists, however, are likely to resort to
3. Panama is suffering an economic de-
mob violence in their determination to
pression attributable immediately to the
defeat him. Remón, who has the goodwill
postwar reduction of US expenditures
of the National Police, is reluctant to re-
in the area, but basically to the neglect of
sort to force to gain the Presidency, but
Panama's economic potential. Pana-
might do SO if he concluded that other-
manian officials and businessmen look to
wise his election would be prevented. It
the United States for economic assistance
is not certain that the Police would sup-
and are likely to exaggerate the Com-
port Remón in a coup d'état, but it is
munist danger in order to obtain it.
likely that they would do SO. Whatever
4. The principal danger to US interests in
course they took would probably prove
decisive.
Panama is the rapid rise of the ultra-na-
tionalistic (anti-US) Patriotic Front
6. Civil disturbances are probable in con-
Party. This Party is not now Communist
nection with the forthcoming election
controlled, but is an important avenue of
and a coup d'état by either side is possible.
Communist penetration and influence.
The intensity of such disturbances will
SECRET
1
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nPROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC\nOF PANAMA THROUGH MID-1952\nTHE PROBLEM\nTo estimate probable political developments in the Republic of Panama through\nmid-1952 with special reference to Communist and other anti-US developments\nwhich might adversely affect US interests in Panama.\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. As an organized political entity operat-\n5. The principal candidates in the presi-\ning in its own name, the Communist\ndential election to be held on 11 May 1952\nParty in the Republic of Panama is weak.\nare José Remón, who is favorably dis-\nThe Communists cannot themselves seize\nposed toward the United States, and Ro-\npower in Panama, or otherwise politically\nberto Chiari, who is not unfavorably dis-\nendanger US strategic interests there,\nposed but is dependent on the support of\nduring the period of this estimate.\nthe Patriotic Front. Remón could prob-\n2. Economic, social, and political condi-\nably win a free election with his present\ntions in Panama are fundamentally un-\nsupport and would almost certainly win\nsound, however, and are susceptible of\nwith the additional support of Arnulfo\nCommunist exploitation.\nArias. The Patriotic Front and the Com-\nmunists, however, are likely to resort to\n3. Panama is suffering an economic de-\nmob violence in their determination to\npression attributable immediately to the\ndefeat him. Remón, who has the goodwill\npostwar reduction of US expenditures\nof the National Police, is reluctant to re-\nin the area, but basically to the neglect of\nsort to force to gain the Presidency, but\nPanama's economic potential. Pana-\nmight do SO if he concluded that other-\nmanian officials and businessmen look to\nwise his election would be prevented. It\nthe United States for economic assistance\nis not certain that the Police would sup-\nand are likely to exaggerate the Com-\nport Remón in a coup d'état, but it is\nmunist danger in order to obtain it.\nlikely that they would do SO. Whatever\n4. The principal danger to US interests in\ncourse they took would probably prove\ndecisive.\nPanama is the rapid rise of the ultra-na-\ntionalistic (anti-US) Patriotic Front\n6. Civil disturbances are probable in con-\nParty. This Party is not now Communist\nnection with the forthcoming election\ncontrolled, but is an important avenue of\nand a coup d'état by either side is possible.\nCommunist penetration and influence.\nThe intensity of such disturbances will\nSECRET\n1"
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