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any encouragement derived from the warning would probably
be offset by fear of involvement in a conflict between the
great powers and by general suspicion of Western "imperialist"
motives.
7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia the effect
would be mixed. There would be a tendency, notably in
Japan and the Philippines, to applaud this new manifesta-
tion of Western determination to check Communist aggres-
sion. On the other hand, the feeling would be widespread,
especially in India and Indonesia, that the warning represented
another instance of Western meddling in Asian affairs in pur-
suit of colonial objectives.
8.
The effect of a warning on other countries probably
would not be of major importance. A warning might well
revive the fears in the smaller NATO powers regarding the
dangers of general war or of an overextension of Western
strength in the Far East, but it is unlikely that the basic
attitudes of these countries would be changed.
9.
The inclusion in the warning of a threat to use
atomic weapons would produce a widespread and serious
adverse reaction throughout the on=Communist world.
II.
INITIATION OF ACTION IN THE UN AND PROBABLE
UN REACTIONS THERETO
10. If identifiable Chinese Communist military inter -
vention in Southeast Asia actually took place, the UN could
- 5 -
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nany encouragement derived from the warning would probably\nbe offset by fear of involvement in a conflict between the\ngreat powers and by general suspicion of Western \"imperialist\"\nmotives.\n7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia the effect\nwould be mixed. There would be a tendency, notably in\nJapan and the Philippines, to applaud this new manifesta-\ntion of Western determination to check Communist aggres-\nsion. On the other hand, the feeling would be widespread,\nespecially in India and Indonesia, that the warning represented\nanother instance of Western meddling in Asian affairs in pur-\nsuit of colonial objectives.\n8.\nThe effect of a warning on other countries probably\nwould not be of major importance. A warning might well\nrevive the fears in the smaller NATO powers regarding the\ndangers of general war or of an overextension of Western\nstrength in the Far East, but it is unlikely that the basic\nattitudes of these countries would be changed.\n9.\nThe inclusion in the warning of a threat to use\natomic weapons would produce a widespread and serious\nadverse reaction throughout the on=Communist world.\nII.\nINITIATION OF ACTION IN THE UN AND PROBABLE\nUN REACTIONS THERETO\n10. If identifiable Chinese Communist military inter -\nvention in Southeast Asia actually took place, the UN could\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET"
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