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OR
SECRET
III.
PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTION OF
JOINT MILITARY COUNTERME ASURES
Reaction of the Chinese Communist and Soviet Governments*
13. If the Chinese Communists undertook an identifiable
military intervention in Southeast Asia despite a joint warning
against such a move, Chinese Communist planning unquestionably
would have considered the likelihood of Western counteraction
and would have been coordinated with the USSR. It is possible
that such an intervention might be undertaken in the belief
that the warning was a bluff, or at least that the countermeasures
would be confined to the area of the aggression. In this case
the execution of forceful military countermeasures might induce
the Communists to seek a settlement. It appears far more
likely, however, that such an intervention would be undertaken
in full recognition of the risks involved. Under these circum-
stances, the immediate reaction to such military counteraction
would probably be an attempt to accelerate Chinese Communist
military operations. The Chinese Communists would probably
attempt to extend their operations to other parts of Southeast
Asia and, having already accepted the danger of expanded
hostilities, they might well intensify operations in Korea
and seize Hong Kong and Macao. Highest priority would be
given, however, to the defense of Communist China.
14. Chinese Communist defiance of a joint warning
would almost certainly involve the prior consent of the
USSR. The degree of Soviet aid to Communist China would
depend upon (a) the nature, scope, and degree of success of
the Western counteraction, and (b) the degree to which the
existence of the Peiping regime seemed to be jeopardized.
*
C-20: "The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible
US Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and
Korea" treats most of the material discussed in this section
in more detail.
- 7 -
for SECRET
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"ocrText": "OR\nSECRET\nIII.\nPROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTION OF\nJOINT MILITARY COUNTERME ASURES\nReaction of the Chinese Communist and Soviet Governments*\n13. If the Chinese Communists undertook an identifiable\nmilitary intervention in Southeast Asia despite a joint warning\nagainst such a move, Chinese Communist planning unquestionably\nwould have considered the likelihood of Western counteraction\nand would have been coordinated with the USSR. It is possible\nthat such an intervention might be undertaken in the belief\nthat the warning was a bluff, or at least that the countermeasures\nwould be confined to the area of the aggression. In this case\nthe execution of forceful military countermeasures might induce\nthe Communists to seek a settlement. It appears far more\nlikely, however, that such an intervention would be undertaken\nin full recognition of the risks involved. Under these circum-\nstances, the immediate reaction to such military counteraction\nwould probably be an attempt to accelerate Chinese Communist\nmilitary operations. The Chinese Communists would probably\nattempt to extend their operations to other parts of Southeast\nAsia and, having already accepted the danger of expanded\nhostilities, they might well intensify operations in Korea\nand seize Hong Kong and Macao. Highest priority would be\ngiven, however, to the defense of Communist China.\n14. Chinese Communist defiance of a joint warning\nwould almost certainly involve the prior consent of the\nUSSR. The degree of Soviet aid to Communist China would\ndepend upon (a) the nature, scope, and degree of success of\nthe Western counteraction, and (b) the degree to which the\nexistence of the Peiping regime seemed to be jeopardized.\n*\nC-20: \"The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible\nUS Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and\nKorea\" treats most of the material discussed in this section\nin more detail.\n- 7 -\nfor SECRET"
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