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aid to the Arab states without binding them
into a more broadly effective organization
by "unequal treaties" or interfering in their
would remain an extremely difficult task.
internal affairs. This does not mean that
13. Although the evacuation of British forces
Egypt would accept the substitution of US for
from Egypt would eliminate a major irritant
British forces on its territory or that any of
in Arab-Western relations, Arab fears and sus-
the Arab states would be willing to accord
picions and intraregional rivalries would con-
to the US the type of administrative influence
tinue to plague negotiations for development
which the UK now exerts in Jordan and Iraq.
of an effective organization. Public opinion,
It does, however, mean that the Arab states
as well as many leaders, would continue to
would prefer to obtain military and economic
underestimate, ignore, or be fatalistic about
assistance from the US rather than from the
the threat of Soviet aggression, which they
UK or France and would prefer to deal with
would regard as far less tangible than the
US advisors. Arab cooperation in any Middle
question of Western "interference" or the
East defense organization, therefore, would be
Arab-Israeli dispute. Arab leaders would re-
likely to increase to the extent that the organ-
main suspicious of Western motives, and
ization provided a means of increasing US aid
would be concerned lest the defense organiza-
to the region and reducing British and French
tion be used as a means of applying collective
influence therein.
pressure on them or re-establishing spheres of
11. It is doubtful that Israel could initially be
influence. Moreover, nationalist resentment
included in a Middle East defense organiza-
against foreign interference in the Arab states
tion although Israel could probably be associa-
might be turned against the regional defense
ted with the purposes of the organization
organization, and lead to a demand for the
through ties with the US and UK. In any
withdrawal of foreign technicians from the
case Israel would probably be unwilling to
Suez Canal base and other Middle East bases.
enter into any arrangement which involved
In general, most states would remain moti-
furnishing military information to its Arab
vated primarily by a desire to exploit Western
neighbors and would certainly oppose any in-
fear of Soviet aggression in order to improve
crease in Arab military strength relative to
their military strength vis-a-vis their neigh-
its own. Moreover, Israel is reluctant to take
bors.
any overt step calculated to alienate the USSR
14. For the foreseeable future, effective de-
and thus eliminate all possibility of further
fense of the Middle East against Soviet aggres-
Jewish emigration from the Soviet bloc.
sion is dependent upon the commitment of
Western forces for that purpose, regardless of
Problems Confronting A Middle East
whether a Middle East defense organization
Defense Organization
is established or not. Over the longer term,
12. While settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian
an effective Middle East defense organization
dispute would thus probably make possible
would require an improvement in Arab-Israeli
the establishment of a regional defense organ-
relations, a lessening of the hostility of Arab
ization capable of channelling Western mili-
nationalists to cooperation with the West, and
tary aid and advice to the Middle East states
the inducing of Arab states to give primary
and of carrying out some preliminary defense
emphasis to the defense of the area against
planning and coordination, its development
Soviet aggression.
SECRET
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Document data
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DTO data
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n3\naid to the Arab states without binding them\ninto a more broadly effective organization\nby \"unequal treaties\" or interfering in their\nwould remain an extremely difficult task.\ninternal affairs. This does not mean that\n13. Although the evacuation of British forces\nEgypt would accept the substitution of US for\nfrom Egypt would eliminate a major irritant\nBritish forces on its territory or that any of\nin Arab-Western relations, Arab fears and sus-\nthe Arab states would be willing to accord\npicions and intraregional rivalries would con-\nto the US the type of administrative influence\ntinue to plague negotiations for development\nwhich the UK now exerts in Jordan and Iraq.\nof an effective organization. Public opinion,\nIt does, however, mean that the Arab states\nas well as many leaders, would continue to\nwould prefer to obtain military and economic\nunderestimate, ignore, or be fatalistic about\nassistance from the US rather than from the\nthe threat of Soviet aggression, which they\nUK or France and would prefer to deal with\nwould regard as far less tangible than the\nUS advisors. Arab cooperation in any Middle\nquestion of Western \"interference\" or the\nEast defense organization, therefore, would be\nArab-Israeli dispute. Arab leaders would re-\nlikely to increase to the extent that the organ-\nmain suspicious of Western motives, and\nization provided a means of increasing US aid\nwould be concerned lest the defense organiza-\nto the region and reducing British and French\ntion be used as a means of applying collective\ninfluence therein.\npressure on them or re-establishing spheres of\n11. It is doubtful that Israel could initially be\ninfluence. Moreover, nationalist resentment\nincluded in a Middle East defense organiza-\nagainst foreign interference in the Arab states\ntion although Israel could probably be associa-\nmight be turned against the regional defense\nted with the purposes of the organization\norganization, and lead to a demand for the\nthrough ties with the US and UK. In any\nwithdrawal of foreign technicians from the\ncase Israel would probably be unwilling to\nSuez Canal base and other Middle East bases.\nenter into any arrangement which involved\nIn general, most states would remain moti-\nfurnishing military information to its Arab\nvated primarily by a desire to exploit Western\nneighbors and would certainly oppose any in-\nfear of Soviet aggression in order to improve\ncrease in Arab military strength relative to\ntheir military strength vis-a-vis their neigh-\nits own. Moreover, Israel is reluctant to take\nbors.\nany overt step calculated to alienate the USSR\n14. For the foreseeable future, effective de-\nand thus eliminate all possibility of further\nfense of the Middle East against Soviet aggres-\nJewish emigration from the Soviet bloc.\nsion is dependent upon the commitment of\nWestern forces for that purpose, regardless of\nProblems Confronting A Middle East\nwhether a Middle East defense organization\nDefense Organization\nis established or not. Over the longer term,\n12. While settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian\nan effective Middle East defense organization\ndispute would thus probably make possible\nwould require an improvement in Arab-Israeli\nthe establishment of a regional defense organ-\nrelations, a lessening of the hostility of Arab\nization capable of channelling Western mili-\nnationalists to cooperation with the West, and\ntary aid and advice to the Middle East states\nthe inducing of Arab states to give primary\nand of carrying out some preliminary defense\nemphasis to the defense of the area against\nplanning and coordination, its development\nSoviet aggression.\nSECRET"
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