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{
    "localId": "486501643",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643"
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{
    "id": "486501643",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
    "naId": 486501643,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 18,
            "logicalDate": "1952-06-18",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1952
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
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{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-007.tif",
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    "ocrText": "No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7\nSECRET\n3\noperations would be affected by this\nSoutheast Asia. The Western European\nthreat to the security of their coastal\ncountries would react adversely to such\nborder.\na US program. This unfavorable reac-\n10. The reaction of the Near East to an\ntion would probably not seriously inter-\nidentifiable US program of preparing the\nfere, however, with the cooperation of the\nNationalist forces for offensive operations\nWestern European governments with the\nwould in general be apathetic. In the\nUS in European affairs.\nIndian subcontinent and the non-Com-\n11. If an identifiable US program of pre-\nmunist countries of the Far East, reaction\nparing the Nationalist forces for offensive\nwould for the most part be adverse. Re-\noperations were undertaken subsequent\nactions would be less adverse, particularly\nto increased Communist operations in\nin the Philippines, Thailand, and the As-\nKorea, the Western European countries\nsociated States of Indochina, to the pros-\nwould probably support the US program,\npect of any employment of Nationalist\nand reactions in other non-Communist\ntroops in Korea or mainland China that\ncountries would generally be less unfavor-\nmight successfully take pressure off\nable than as indicated above,\nDISCUSSION\nFACTORS BEARING ON CHINESE NATION-\nB-24 and B-25 light bombers; 3 F-38 recon-\nALIST OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES\nnaissance C: and 161 C-46 and C-47 trans-\nports) In the event of hostile attack, virtu-\nThe Chinese Nationalist Military Situation\nally all of these aircraft would be required to\n12. Ground Forces. The present combat\nparticipate, at least initially, in the defense of\nstrength of the Chinese Nationalist Army\nTaiwan. CNAF morale and leadership are\nnumbers 375,000. However, no divisions are\ngood. but its combat effectiveness is low be-\nready for offensive operations at the present\ncause of inadequate spare parts, equipment,\ntime. Morale is considered satisfactory or\nand supplies, including POL, and limited\nbetter. However, ordnance, signal, and engi-\noperational training and experience, particu-\nneer equipment is obsolescent and in short\nlarly in bombardment-type aircraft. Most\nsupply; present units are considerably under-\nimportant, however, is the fact that the Na-\nmanned; serious shortcomings still exist in\ntionalists have no jet aircraft.\nunit and combined training; and leadership\n14. Naval Forces. The Nationalist Navy is\nabove the division level is incompetent or in-\ncomposed of 160 small vessels, the largest of\nexperienced in large-scale combined planning\nwhich are 7 destroyer-escort-type ships. In-\nand operations. No Nationalist Army units\ncluded in this number are 30 amphibious\nhave had amphibious training.\nships, of which 10 are LST's. Morale in the\n13. Air Forces. The Chinese Nationalist Air\nNationalist Navy appears good. Although\nForce (CNAF) has in tactical units a total of\nthe combat effectiveness of the individual\n311 aircraft (111 F-47 and F-51 fighters; 36\nships has improved, the over-all combat effec-\ntiveness of the present fleet is low because\n3 The combat personnel of the Chinese Nationalist\nof: (a) an inadequate logistic capability; (b)\nArmy are presently organized into 12 armies of\n38 divisions, one armored brigade, one parachute\ngroup, and six independent artillery regiments.\nThe present personnel strength of the CNAF is\nIt is anticipated that, by the end of December\n68,046, including 3,487 flying personnel of which\n1952, this force will have been reorgunized into\n1,777 are trained active pilots. This is the\n12 armies of 28 divisions, one armored brigade,\nplanned maximum mobilization potential of the\nand one parachute group.\nCNAF.\nSECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7"
}