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No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 : NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7
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4
a failure to understand and apply the princi-
of Taiwan, additional manpower would have
ples of command responsibility in coordinated
to be found for reserves and replacements.
operations; and (c) a system of officer assign-
ment which seriously limits the possibility of
17. The chief source of available manpower
improvement. There are 11,000 Nationalist
for the Nationalists is the indigenous popula-
Marines, but they cannot be expected to oper-
tion of Taiwan. Only a few Taiwanese have
ate in larger than battalion size, and at
been inducted into the Nationalist military
present only one battalion is equipped for
forces. If assured of fair treatment, and espe-
limited amphibious operations.
cially if all-Taiwanese units were formed, the
Taiwanese probably would not resist conscrip-
15. Guerrilla Forces. There are approxi-
tion. The great majority of Taiwanese are
mately 9,000 organized guerrillas on the Na-
anti-Communist, and such troops could serve
tionalist-held offshore islands who have had
as an effective national guard for the defense
commando training and experience. These
of Taiwan provided adequate training and
forces are organized in approximately bat-
equipment were provided them. It is esti-
talion-sized units and are equipped at least as
mated that there are now on Taiwan about
well as Chinese Nationalist regular forces.
650,000 physically fit Taiwanese plus about
Although there are an estimated 175,000 guer-
150,000 physically fit Chinese mainlanders
rillas in scattered units on the mainland, none
(excluding the military) in the 15 to 29 male
of these units is believed to be effectively con-
age group. In view of existing underemploy-
trolled or directed by the Chinese Nationalists.
ment, it is probable that up to 300,000 men
could be conscripted immediately and possi-
Chinese Nationalist Manpower Resources
bly 300,000 more over the course of a year
16. Most of the present Nationalist units were
without seriously affecting production. Be-
organized prior to the end of World War II.
cause of the probable Taiwanese aversion to
Since coming to Taiwan in 1949, these units
participation in operations against the main-
land and Nationalist aversion to the creation
have had few discharges or new recruits, and
of indigenous combat units, only a fraction
consequently normal attrition is becoming an
of the total Taiwanese troops could be inte-
increasingly important problem. Before the
grated into those Nationalist units committed
Nationalists would be able to commit substan-
to offensive operations against the Chinese
tial numbers of troops to operations outside
Communists.
18. In sum, the manpower situation on Taiwan is estimated as follows:
Physically Fit and
Available for Mili-
Physically Fit and
tary Service With-
Available for Offen-
Total Manpower
Physically Fit
out Adversely At-
sive Operations
fecting the Econo-
Against the Chinese
Nationalist Military
my of Taiwan
Communists
Establishment
585,000
585,000
585,000
585,000
Civilians in Age
Taiwanese
1,025,000
650,000
Group 15-29
Chinese
300,000
150,000
1,325,000
800,000
Civilians in Age
S Taiwanese
400,000
200,000
600,000
150,000
Group 30-40
l Chinese
200,000
100.000
600,000
300,000
Guerrillas on Offshore
Islands
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
TOTAL
2,519,000
1,694,000
1,194,000
744,000
The proportion of physically fit out of the total population is estimated at 2/3 in the age group 15-29 and 1/2 in the age
group 30-40.
This group is largely entrenched in the Nationalist Government and economy on Taiwan and few If any of this group would
be made available to the military forces.
In addition, a relatively small number of Taiwanese could be utilized for offensive operations against the Chinese Commu-
nists (sec Paragraph 17).
TOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 : NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7\nTOP SECRET\n4\na failure to understand and apply the princi-\nof Taiwan, additional manpower would have\nples of command responsibility in coordinated\nto be found for reserves and replacements.\noperations; and (c) a system of officer assign-\nment which seriously limits the possibility of\n17. The chief source of available manpower\nimprovement. There are 11,000 Nationalist\nfor the Nationalists is the indigenous popula-\nMarines, but they cannot be expected to oper-\ntion of Taiwan. Only a few Taiwanese have\nate in larger than battalion size, and at\nbeen inducted into the Nationalist military\npresent only one battalion is equipped for\nforces. If assured of fair treatment, and espe-\nlimited amphibious operations.\ncially if all-Taiwanese units were formed, the\nTaiwanese probably would not resist conscrip-\n15. Guerrilla Forces. There are approxi-\ntion. The great majority of Taiwanese are\nmately 9,000 organized guerrillas on the Na-\nanti-Communist, and such troops could serve\ntionalist-held offshore islands who have had\nas an effective national guard for the defense\ncommando training and experience. These\nof Taiwan provided adequate training and\nforces are organized in approximately bat-\nequipment were provided them. It is esti-\ntalion-sized units and are equipped at least as\nmated that there are now on Taiwan about\nwell as Chinese Nationalist regular forces.\n650,000 physically fit Taiwanese plus about\nAlthough there are an estimated 175,000 guer-\n150,000 physically fit Chinese mainlanders\nrillas in scattered units on the mainland, none\n(excluding the military) in the 15 to 29 male\nof these units is believed to be effectively con-\nage group. In view of existing underemploy-\ntrolled or directed by the Chinese Nationalists.\nment, it is probable that up to 300,000 men\ncould be conscripted immediately and possi-\nChinese Nationalist Manpower Resources\nbly 300,000 more over the course of a year\n16. Most of the present Nationalist units were\nwithout seriously affecting production. Be-\norganized prior to the end of World War II.\ncause of the probable Taiwanese aversion to\nSince coming to Taiwan in 1949, these units\nparticipation in operations against the main-\nland and Nationalist aversion to the creation\nhave had few discharges or new recruits, and\nof indigenous combat units, only a fraction\nconsequently normal attrition is becoming an\nof the total Taiwanese troops could be inte-\nincreasingly important problem. Before the\ngrated into those Nationalist units committed\nNationalists would be able to commit substan-\nto offensive operations against the Chinese\ntial numbers of troops to operations outside\nCommunists.\n18. In sum, the manpower situation on Taiwan is estimated as follows:\nPhysically Fit and\nAvailable for Mili-\nPhysically Fit and\ntary Service With-\nAvailable for Offen-\nTotal Manpower\nPhysically Fit\nout Adversely At-\nsive Operations\nfecting the Econo-\nAgainst the Chinese\nNationalist Military\nmy of Taiwan\nCommunists\nEstablishment\n585,000\n585,000\n585,000\n585,000\nCivilians in Age\nTaiwanese\n1,025,000\n650,000\nGroup 15-29\nChinese\n300,000\n150,000\n1,325,000\n800,000\nCivilians in Age\nS Taiwanese\n400,000\n200,000\n600,000\n150,000\nGroup 30-40\nl Chinese\n200,000\n100.000\n600,000\n300,000\nGuerrillas on Offshore\nIslands\n9,000\n9,000\n9,000\n9,000\nTOTAL\n2,519,000\n1,694,000\n1,194,000\n744,000\nThe proportion of physically fit out of the total population is estimated at 2/3 in the age group 15-29 and 1/2 in the age\ngroup 30-40.\nThis group is largely entrenched in the Nationalist Government and economy on Taiwan and few If any of this group would\nbe made available to the military forces.\nIn addition, a relatively small number of Taiwanese could be utilized for offensive operations against the Chinese Commu-\nnists (sec Paragraph 17).\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7"
}