Ask the Scholar
Page 3 of 10
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST CONTROL
OVER SOUTH ASIA 1
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strategic consequences, to the West and to the Soviet Bloc, of
the establishment of Communist control over South Asia without either the Middle
East or Southeast Asia having previously come under Communist control.
Whether
or not South Asia is likely to come under Communist control, or whether there is any
likelihood that South Asia would fall under Communist control prior to
extensive
Communist victories in Southeast Asia, is excluded from consideration.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The most serious effects of the loss of
countries and would increase the cost of
South Asia to Communist control would
European commercial communications
be psychological and political. It would
with the Far East.
add to the Soviet Bloc five countries, two
3. Communist control of South Asia
of them potentially powerful, and would
would probably make the principal strate-
extend Communist control to include
gic materials of the area increasingly dif-
nearly half the world's population. In
ficult to obtain under cold war conditions
the absence of decisive Western counter-
and certainly unavailable to the West in
action, Communist control over South
wartime. Of these mica, graphite, man-
Asia would be speedily followed by the
ganese, jute, and shellac are of particular
loss of much of Southeast Asia. Loss of
strategic importance to the West.
South Asia would greatly reduce the effec-
tiveness of the UN to the West, and would
4. Although denial of South Asian re-
greatly reduce confidence in the capacity
sources would not necessitate any signifi-
of the free world to halt the expansion of
cant reduction in defense and essential
Communism.
civilian consumption in the US, the over-
2. In present circumstances, denial of
all effect, in terms of the magnitude of
Western access to South Asia would
the readjustments required, would almost
necessitate serious readjustments in the
certainly be serious at any time up
foreign trade and exchange pattern of
through 1954. US stockpiles would have
the UK and the other Commonwealth
to be drawn on pending the development
of generally inferior and more expensive
1 For the purposes of this estimate, South Asia will
alternate sources and substitute mate-
be taken to include India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Nepal, and Ceylon.
rials. Moreover, the West would have to
1
Page data
- Page
- 3
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 654b5aae4d528a3c
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486501666
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486501666",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501666",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences of Communist Control of South Asia, Special Estimate 32",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501666",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-001.tif",
"imageCount": 10,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486501666",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences of Communist Control of South Asia, Special Estimate 32",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501666"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486501666",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501666",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences of Communist Control of South Asia, Special Estimate 32",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501666",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-001.tif",
"imageCount": 10,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501666",
"naId": 486501666,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 3,
"logicalDate": "1952-10-03",
"month": 10,
"year": 1952
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 3,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-09-003.tif",
"mediaId": "654b5aae4d528a3c",
"ocrText": "SECRET\nCONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST CONTROL\nOVER SOUTH ASIA 1\nTHE PROBLEM\nTo estimate the strategic consequences, to the West and to the Soviet Bloc, of\nthe establishment of Communist control over South Asia without either the Middle\nEast or Southeast Asia having previously come under Communist control.\nWhether\nor not South Asia is likely to come under Communist control, or whether there is any\nlikelihood that South Asia would fall under Communist control prior to\nextensive\nCommunist victories in Southeast Asia, is excluded from consideration.\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. The most serious effects of the loss of\ncountries and would increase the cost of\nSouth Asia to Communist control would\nEuropean commercial communications\nbe psychological and political. It would\nwith the Far East.\nadd to the Soviet Bloc five countries, two\n3. Communist control of South Asia\nof them potentially powerful, and would\nwould probably make the principal strate-\nextend Communist control to include\ngic materials of the area increasingly dif-\nnearly half the world's population. In\nficult to obtain under cold war conditions\nthe absence of decisive Western counter-\nand certainly unavailable to the West in\naction, Communist control over South\nwartime. Of these mica, graphite, man-\nAsia would be speedily followed by the\nganese, jute, and shellac are of particular\nloss of much of Southeast Asia. Loss of\nstrategic importance to the West.\nSouth Asia would greatly reduce the effec-\ntiveness of the UN to the West, and would\n4. Although denial of South Asian re-\ngreatly reduce confidence in the capacity\nsources would not necessitate any signifi-\nof the free world to halt the expansion of\ncant reduction in defense and essential\nCommunism.\ncivilian consumption in the US, the over-\n2. In present circumstances, denial of\nall effect, in terms of the magnitude of\nWestern access to South Asia would\nthe readjustments required, would almost\nnecessitate serious readjustments in the\ncertainly be serious at any time up\nforeign trade and exchange pattern of\nthrough 1954. US stockpiles would have\nthe UK and the other Commonwealth\nto be drawn on pending the development\nof generally inferior and more expensive\n1 For the purposes of this estimate, South Asia will\nalternate sources and substitute mate-\nbe taken to include India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,\nNepal, and Ceylon.\nrials. Moreover, the West would have to\n1"
}