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more stringent curbs on consumption in the
ite, iron and manganese ores, beryl, and jute
other Western countries, where stockpiles are
products. Transporting these products to the
virtually nonexistent. Present US stocks of
Soviet Bloc would present serious problems,
these critical classes of mica represent about
however, and in any event the amount of
a year's supply. Development of new sources
goods that the Soviet Bloc could absorb would
would be very costly and the efforts being
be relatively small, in terms both of South
made to develop substitutes cannot be ex-
Asia's present exports and of total Soviet Bloc
pected to show usable results for several years.
consumption. Moreover, the strategic value
C. Graphite Since Ceylon is the only
of these materials to the Bloc would be
source of high-grade amorphous lump graph-
meager, except with respect to monazite and
ite, the US would have to draw on its stock-
rubber.
pile, notably for such uses as carbon brushes
19. Conversely, the Soviet Bloc probably
in high-altitude aircraft, and would have to
could and would provide only limited assist-
modify specifications for other end-items
ance to a Communist South Asia struggling
where inferior grades of graphite might pos-
with the major internal readjustments arising
sibly be used. At the end of 1951, the US
from the transfer of economic and political
stockpile was close to its goal, which was
power to a Communist regime and from the
about three times the amount consumed an-
probable cutting-off of major Western im-
nually by the US during the latter part of
ports. Just as South Asia's principal exports
World War II.
are commodities for which the Soviet Bloc has
d. Jute and jute products - The loss would
no great immediate need, SO its principal
be serious, involving far-reaching conservation
present imports - notably petroleum prod-
measures and costly adjustments, especially
ucts, machinery and other metal manufac-
for countries like those of Western Europe
tures, industrial chemicals, and foodstuffs-
where substitutes are less readily available.
are items which the Communist world cannot
e. Other products Development of syn-
easily spare. The USSR's willingness and
thetic substitutes for Indian kyanite is well
ability to make up for the loss of Western
under way, and the loss of the Indian product
products would be sharply limited by com-
should cause no serious difficulties. Loss of
peting demands within the Bloc and by the
Indian shellac would involve higher costs and
Bloc's grave shortage of shipping facilities.
widespread inconvenience since different sub-
20. Initially, the shortages of food and petro-
stitutes would have to be developed for most
leum would be major problems to a Commu-
of the various uses of shellac. Loss of Indian
nist regime. South Asia now imports about
opium would inconvenience the UK, which has
four million tons of grain annually. This
obtained most of its supply from the subcon-
deficiency would probably be met by a variety
tinent. The loss of India would cut off a
of measures including some imports from the
potential supply of coking coal and iron ore
USSR, ruthless rationing and crop collection
for Japan.
methods, and, if the Communists were suffi-
ciently well entrenched to clash with religious
Effect on the Economic Position of the
sentiment, use for human consumption of
Soviet Bloc
approximately a million tons of grain now con-
sumed by monkeys and cattle. Much of
18. In the short run, Communist control of
South Asia would provide few economic bene-
South Asia's food deficit could be provided by
fits to the rest of the Soviet Bloc. The USSR
mainland Southeast Asia if that area were
would probably exploit India's thorium-
Communist. Loss of the six million tons of
bearing monazite for atomic energy develop-
petroleum now imported from the Middle East
ment purposes, and the Bloc as a whole could
would almost certainly cause an initial decline
probably use the limited amounts of rubber,
in industrial output and for some time create
cotton, and cotton textiles available for export,
bottlenecks in production. However, the ef-
as well as moderate amounts of mica, graph-
fects would probably not be crippling. Some
SECRET
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"ocrText": "5\nmore stringent curbs on consumption in the\nite, iron and manganese ores, beryl, and jute\nother Western countries, where stockpiles are\nproducts. Transporting these products to the\nvirtually nonexistent. Present US stocks of\nSoviet Bloc would present serious problems,\nthese critical classes of mica represent about\nhowever, and in any event the amount of\na year's supply. Development of new sources\ngoods that the Soviet Bloc could absorb would\nwould be very costly and the efforts being\nbe relatively small, in terms both of South\nmade to develop substitutes cannot be ex-\nAsia's present exports and of total Soviet Bloc\npected to show usable results for several years.\nconsumption. Moreover, the strategic value\nC. Graphite Since Ceylon is the only\nof these materials to the Bloc would be\nsource of high-grade amorphous lump graph-\nmeager, except with respect to monazite and\nite, the US would have to draw on its stock-\nrubber.\npile, notably for such uses as carbon brushes\n19. Conversely, the Soviet Bloc probably\nin high-altitude aircraft, and would have to\ncould and would provide only limited assist-\nmodify specifications for other end-items\nance to a Communist South Asia struggling\nwhere inferior grades of graphite might pos-\nwith the major internal readjustments arising\nsibly be used. At the end of 1951, the US\nfrom the transfer of economic and political\nstockpile was close to its goal, which was\npower to a Communist regime and from the\nabout three times the amount consumed an-\nprobable cutting-off of major Western im-\nnually by the US during the latter part of\nports. Just as South Asia's principal exports\nWorld War II.\nare commodities for which the Soviet Bloc has\nd. Jute and jute products - The loss would\nno great immediate need, SO its principal\nbe serious, involving far-reaching conservation\npresent imports - notably petroleum prod-\nmeasures and costly adjustments, especially\nucts, machinery and other metal manufac-\nfor countries like those of Western Europe\ntures, industrial chemicals, and foodstuffs-\nwhere substitutes are less readily available.\nare items which the Communist world cannot\ne. Other products Development of syn-\neasily spare. The USSR's willingness and\nthetic substitutes for Indian kyanite is well\nability to make up for the loss of Western\nunder way, and the loss of the Indian product\nproducts would be sharply limited by com-\nshould cause no serious difficulties. Loss of\npeting demands within the Bloc and by the\nIndian shellac would involve higher costs and\nBloc's grave shortage of shipping facilities.\nwidespread inconvenience since different sub-\n20. Initially, the shortages of food and petro-\nstitutes would have to be developed for most\nleum would be major problems to a Commu-\nof the various uses of shellac. Loss of Indian\nnist regime. South Asia now imports about\nopium would inconvenience the UK, which has\nfour million tons of grain annually. This\nobtained most of its supply from the subcon-\ndeficiency would probably be met by a variety\ntinent. The loss of India would cut off a\nof measures including some imports from the\npotential supply of coking coal and iron ore\nUSSR, ruthless rationing and crop collection\nfor Japan.\nmethods, and, if the Communists were suffi-\nciently well entrenched to clash with religious\nEffect on the Economic Position of the\nsentiment, use for human consumption of\nSoviet Bloc\napproximately a million tons of grain now con-\nsumed by monkeys and cattle. Much of\n18. In the short run, Communist control of\nSouth Asia would provide few economic bene-\nSouth Asia's food deficit could be provided by\nfits to the rest of the Soviet Bloc. The USSR\nmainland Southeast Asia if that area were\nwould probably exploit India's thorium-\nCommunist. Loss of the six million tons of\nbearing monazite for atomic energy develop-\npetroleum now imported from the Middle East\nment purposes, and the Bloc as a whole could\nwould almost certainly cause an initial decline\nprobably use the limited amounts of rubber,\nin industrial output and for some time create\ncotton, and cotton textiles available for export,\nbottlenecks in production. However, the ef-\nas well as moderate amounts of mica, graph-\nfects would probably not be crippling. Some\nSECRET"
}