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6 petroleum could be obtained from the Soviet MILITARY CONSEQUENCES Bloc and much oil-burning equipment could be converted to coal. The denial of spare The Existing Situation parts and other capital equipment, industrial 23. Forces. The nations of South Asia possess chemicals, and miscellaneous metal products forces in being of approximately 650,000, some previously obtained from the West would im- 1,500,000 trained reservists, and a vast reser- pose further curbs on industrial output. voir of manpower. The armies of India and 21. Despite these difficulties, the Communists Pakistan, comprising more than 90 percent of would probably have considerable success in the above active strength, are trained and dis- gradually mobilizing and exploiting the sub- ciplined forces of good fighting quality. Both stantial resources of South Asia. Although countries have small air forces designed pri- the area is predominantly agricultural and marily for support of ground operations and characterized by widespread poverty, it has a few light naval surface vessels. the largest industrial plant in Asia outside of 24. Facilities. South Asia's other military Japan, a huge labor supply including a con- assets include: siderable number of skilled and semi-skilled workers, and basic raw material resources suf- a. A large number of excellent airfields and ficient to support an extensive industrial air base sites (notably in West Pakistan) with- expansion. During World War II, India dem- in medium and heavy bomber range of major onstrated considerable potentiality for capital industrial and governmental centers in Soviet formation, and the Communists in other areas Central Asia and the interior of Communist have shown their ability for effective mobiliza- China. The rail and highway net and port tion of resources in predominantly agrarian facilities are adequate for maintenance of areas characterized by low per capita produc- large-scale operations from these bases. tivity. Thus, production in certain key indus- b. Major ports, air bases, and other facilities tries, particularly steel, would probably rise which could be used: (1) for maintenance of after the initial period of readjustment, and communications between Western Europe and there would probably be a gradual improve- the Far East and for logistical support of pos- ment in agricultural output. However, the sible military operations in the Middle or Far development of an industrial complex of the East; or (2) for the support of air and naval order of that existing in Japan and Manchuria action against these communications. at the start of World War II could be accom- C. Limited facilities for production of arms plished only over a long period of time. and equipment. Although these facilities can 22. In terms of support for a military effort, supply significant amounts of small arms and therefore, South Asia could probably, with ammunition, South Asia is dependent on out- only minimum Soviet Bloc assistance: (a) side sources for most other major items of supply small arms and ammunition and some material. artillery for a large ground army; and (b) provide logistical support for whatever addi- 25. Western Interests. At present the mili- tional Soviet forces and equipment were neces- tary potential of South Asia is not available sary to defend South Asia against Western to the West, with certain exceptions such as attack and to attack Western communications British base rights in Ceylon. There is, how- in the Indian Ocean area (see para. 29). A ever, an obvious Western interest in denial of Communist South Asia could not, however, this potential to Communism and in the possi- ble future availability of some of these forces without substantial outside assistance and a and facilities in certain contingencies. In long-term capital investment program, pro- particular, it is considered that, if relations duce more than insignificant amounts of between India and Pakistan can be improved, heavy artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, com- the military strength of Pakistan might be- munications equipment, naval vessels, and air- come effective as a stabilizing factor in the craft. Middle East and that Pakistani air bases

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    "ocrText": "6\npetroleum could be obtained from the Soviet\nMILITARY CONSEQUENCES\nBloc and much oil-burning equipment could\nbe converted to coal. The denial of spare\nThe Existing Situation\nparts and other capital equipment, industrial\n23. Forces. The nations of South Asia possess\nchemicals, and miscellaneous metal products\nforces in being of approximately 650,000, some\npreviously obtained from the West would im-\n1,500,000 trained reservists, and a vast reser-\npose further curbs on industrial output.\nvoir of manpower. The armies of India and\n21. Despite these difficulties, the Communists\nPakistan, comprising more than 90 percent of\nwould probably have considerable success in\nthe above active strength, are trained and dis-\ngradually mobilizing and exploiting the sub-\nciplined forces of good fighting quality. Both\nstantial resources of South Asia. Although\ncountries have small air forces designed pri-\nthe area is predominantly agricultural and\nmarily for support of ground operations and\ncharacterized by widespread poverty, it has\na few light naval surface vessels.\nthe largest industrial plant in Asia outside of\n24. Facilities. South Asia's other military\nJapan, a huge labor supply including a con-\nassets include:\nsiderable number of skilled and semi-skilled\nworkers, and basic raw material resources suf-\na. A large number of excellent airfields and\nficient to support an extensive industrial\nair base sites (notably in West Pakistan) with-\nexpansion. During World War II, India dem-\nin medium and heavy bomber range of major\nonstrated considerable potentiality for capital\nindustrial and governmental centers in Soviet\nformation, and the Communists in other areas\nCentral Asia and the interior of Communist\nhave shown their ability for effective mobiliza-\nChina. The rail and highway net and port\ntion of resources in predominantly agrarian\nfacilities are adequate for maintenance of\nareas characterized by low per capita produc-\nlarge-scale operations from these bases.\ntivity. Thus, production in certain key indus-\nb. Major ports, air bases, and other facilities\ntries, particularly steel, would probably rise\nwhich could be used: (1) for maintenance of\nafter the initial period of readjustment, and\ncommunications between Western Europe and\nthere would probably be a gradual improve-\nthe Far East and for logistical support of pos-\nment in agricultural output. However, the\nsible military operations in the Middle or Far\ndevelopment of an industrial complex of the\nEast; or (2) for the support of air and naval\norder of that existing in Japan and Manchuria\naction against these communications.\nat the start of World War II could be accom-\nC. Limited facilities for production of arms\nplished only over a long period of time.\nand equipment. Although these facilities can\n22. In terms of support for a military effort,\nsupply significant amounts of small arms and\ntherefore, South Asia could probably, with\nammunition, South Asia is dependent on out-\nonly minimum Soviet Bloc assistance: (a)\nside sources for most other major items of\nsupply small arms and ammunition and some\nmaterial.\nartillery for a large ground army; and (b)\nprovide logistical support for whatever addi-\n25. Western Interests. At present the mili-\ntional Soviet forces and equipment were neces-\ntary potential of South Asia is not available\nsary to defend South Asia against Western\nto the West, with certain exceptions such as\nattack and to attack Western communications\nBritish base rights in Ceylon. There is, how-\nin the Indian Ocean area (see para. 29). A\never, an obvious Western interest in denial of\nCommunist South Asia could not, however,\nthis potential to Communism and in the possi-\nble future availability of some of these forces\nwithout substantial outside assistance and a\nand facilities in certain contingencies. In\nlong-term capital investment program, pro-\nparticular, it is considered that, if relations\nduce more than insignificant amounts of\nbetween India and Pakistan can be improved,\nheavy artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, com-\nthe military strength of Pakistan might be-\nmunications equipment, naval vessels, and air-\ncome effective as a stabilizing factor in the\ncraft.\nMiddle East and that Pakistani air bases"
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