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    "localId": "486501692",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Special Evaluation 41, Present Soviet Objectives in the Security Council",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Special Evaluation 41, Present Soviet Objectives in the Security Council",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501692",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 14,
            "logicalDate": "1950-08-14",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
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{
    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875521/875521-02-003.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nPRESENT SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL\n14 August 1950\nThrough its return to the UN Security Council the Soviet\nUnion has opened a political offensive designed to undermine\nAsian and Western support of the US, revitalize the Soviet\n\"peace\" campaign, and counteract the threats to Soviet long -\nrange objectives which have arisen from the unexpectedly\nstrong reaction of the non-Soviet world to the Korean war. In\nresuming its obstructive role in the Security Council, the USSR\nhas also regained maximum diplomatic and propaganda maneu-\nverability, both for blocking further coalescence of the UN in\nsupport of a firm US policy on Korea and for impeding similar\nprompt and decisive UN action if the USSR should launch further\naggressive moves. The Soviet Union may also hope to pre-\npare the way for consolidating its present victories in Korea\nthrough some form of \"settlement\" under UN auspices before\nthe full weight of Western counteraction can be brought to bear.\nFinally, the USSR may utilize the UN to set the stage for fur-\nther political or military moves in connection with Taiwan,\npossibly including a formal case against US intervention.\nIn pursuit of these objectives, current Soviet tactics\nfor attacking soft spots in the Western diplomatic and propa -\nganda position are developing along the following lines: (1)\npresentation of unacceptable Korean \"peace\" proposals and\nsubsequent exploitation of US rejections, in an effort to em-\nphasize the contrast between Soviet initiative for peace and\nUS determination to pursue its aggressive intervention in the\nKorean \"civil war\"; (2) continual re-raising of the Chinese\nrepresentation issue in an attempt to divide the West and in\norder to press charges that the US opposes Asian self-deter-\nmination and supports reactionary groups for further aggression\n- 1 -\n'NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nTRAIN\nlife\nSERVICE\nSECRET"
}