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143 -
They undoubtedly felt that they could win politically
and, therefore, 1i they could avoid the military effort,
they were very nuch better off. They had discipline and E
solid party; whereas they felt the Kuomintang was just an
icing on the top and all its former foundations of public
support had become non-existent or hostile.
MR. QUIGLEY: General, was there any suggestion on
their part of Russian participation at this stage of media-
tion?
GENERAL MARSHALL: No, no, not at all. I don't recall
they ever made such a proposal.
MRe COLEGROVE: Your view is that American aid to Japan
should continue as long as 1t seems necessary to keep the
population from starving and to get on their feet industrially?
GENERAL MARSHALL: I would say 80, but the qualification
there 18, "as long as 1t seems necessary. I would have
to
look at that through a magnifying glass because you just can
not continue this thing indefinitely It just can not be
done. It can not be done politically, for one thing, and it
can not be done economically, I think, for another.
MR. DECKER: It seems to me that one of the very serious
political obstacles that we are going to meet in attempting
a settlement with China==political from the standpoint of
sentiment in the United States-sis that long period when we
had the support of Chiang Kai-shek and he was the one hopa
of continuing China in the war. That was in our dark hour
and we were very dependent on him, and what he represented,
to keep China in line. Nows there is a moral situetion in-
volved there as well. I would like you to, 1f you can and
SERVICE* RECORDS AND
if you will, comment on what the abandonment of Chiang Kal-
shek 18 going to mean-wwat - its significance may mean po-
litically.
GENERAL MARSHALL Well, I would say we did our best in
spite of action that ruined that best in its application to
the situation. Throughout all of this procedure there was
continuous preseure to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek, but no one
ever suggested anyone could Gake his place.
You have the great moment of his career, about 1927,
when he was a graat inspiration, when the Nationalists came
up from the South, and then you go through a transition when
these young military subordinates of his, that did such a
fine job, had become corroded by long tenure of office with-
out any opposition whatsoèver, and the procedure lent itself
to
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"ocrText": "143 -\nThey undoubtedly felt that they could win politically\nand, therefore, 1i they could avoid the military effort,\nthey were very nuch better off. They had discipline and E\nsolid party; whereas they felt the Kuomintang was just an\nicing on the top and all its former foundations of public\nsupport had become non-existent or hostile.\nMR. QUIGLEY: General, was there any suggestion on\ntheir part of Russian participation at this stage of media-\ntion?\nGENERAL MARSHALL: No, no, not at all. I don't recall\nthey ever made such a proposal.\nMRe COLEGROVE: Your view is that American aid to Japan\nshould continue as long as 1t seems necessary to keep the\npopulation from starving and to get on their feet industrially?\nGENERAL MARSHALL: I would say 80, but the qualification\nthere 18, \"as long as 1t seems necessary. I would have\nto\nlook at that through a magnifying glass because you just can\nnot continue this thing indefinitely It just can not be\ndone. It can not be done politically, for one thing, and it\ncan not be done economically, I think, for another.\nMR. DECKER: It seems to me that one of the very serious\npolitical obstacles that we are going to meet in attempting\na settlement with China==political from the standpoint of\nsentiment in the United States-sis that long period when we\nhad the support of Chiang Kai-shek and he was the one hopa\nof continuing China in the war. That was in our dark hour\nand we were very dependent on him, and what he represented,\nto keep China in line. Nows there is a moral situetion in-\nvolved there as well. I would like you to, 1f you can and\nSERVICE* RECORDS AND\nif you will, comment on what the abandonment of Chiang Kal-\nshek 18 going to mean-wwat - its significance may mean po-\nlitically.\nGENERAL MARSHALL Well, I would say we did our best in\nspite of action that ruined that best in its application to\nthe situation. Throughout all of this procedure there was\ncontinuous preseure to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek, but no one\never suggested anyone could Gake his place.\nYou have the great moment of his career, about 1927,\nwhen he was a graat inspiration, when the Nationalists came\nup from the South, and then you go through a transition when\nthese young military subordinates of his, that did such a\nfine job, had become corroded by long tenure of office with-\nout any opposition whatsoèver, and the procedure lent itself\nto"
}