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COMPIDENTIAL 158 em by and large. pro-Russian in its anti-Americanism, then there is E much more favorable basis for returning it to some kind of friendly attitude toward the United States than if, let' aay, its anti-Americanism were identical with a pro-Soviet approach. I might add as a footnote that I think in a country of 450 million people such as China, in which only a small percentage of the population, even the politically conscious, have a clear-cut, fixed ideology, that this question of how people feel on grounda of personal reac- tion to the policy of a foreign power, in this case the United States, is very important. 1, personally, as I have suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the earliest feasible moment. I thinic, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recognition, there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent that we disentangle ourgelves from the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for recognition. As a matter of fact, if we were to recog- nize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in a highly contradictor7 situation of recognizing at the time that we were delivering, through ECA, supplies to Formosa, and 80 on. We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement with the Nationalists. I'd like to suggest, although I am riot informed on the technical problems of carrying out some of these actions, that we end our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the rem- nants or the Chinese Nationalists. I'd like to suggest that one important question would be the position we take at the United Nations in connection with the reso- lutions or the proposals of the Chinese Nationalists. I think to the extent that we associate ourselves at the United Nations with their position, we make it very difficult to move toward recognition. I would be in Iavor of keeping ourselves 8.3 clear as possible from association with the Chinese Nationalist position at the United Nations. I think the question of the blockade is extremely important. I was particularly interested in the phrose from the letter of Mr. Hopkins, just read by Mr. Robertson, to the effect that we should actively break the blockade. Regardless of the phrase that is = SERVICE! used, I think it 1s rather obvious that the blockade could not continue if the United States and Britain took an active position against it. The blockade, let's say, arose independently of our will, but its continuance is dependent on the assumption of a certain position of acquiescence on our part. In

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    "ocrText": "COMPIDENTIAL\n158 em\nby and large. pro-Russian in its anti-Americanism, then\nthere is E much more favorable basis for returning it to\nsome kind of friendly attitude toward the United States\nthan if, let' aay, its anti-Americanism were identical\nwith a pro-Soviet approach.\nI might add as a footnote that I think in a country\nof 450 million people such as China, in which only a\nsmall percentage of the population, even the politically\nconscious, have a clear-cut, fixed ideology, that this\nquestion of how people feel on grounda of personal reac-\ntion to the policy of a foreign power, in this case the\nUnited States, is very important. 1, personally, as I\nhave suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the\nearliest feasible moment. I thinic, though, that in terms\nof preparing American public opinion for recognition,\nthere is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese\nNationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead,\nand I think to the extent that we disentangle ourgelves\nfrom the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for\nrecognition. As a matter of fact, if we were to recog-\nnize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in\na highly contradictor7 situation of recognizing at the\ntime that we were delivering, through ECA, supplies to\nFormosa, and 80 on. We have not yet cleared ourselves\nfrom the entanglement with the Nationalists. I'd like\nto suggest, although I am riot informed on the technical\nproblems of carrying out some of these actions, that we\nend our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the rem-\nnants or the Chinese Nationalists. I'd like to suggest\nthat one important question would be the position we\ntake at the United Nations in connection with the reso-\nlutions or the proposals of the Chinese Nationalists.\nI think to the extent that we associate ourselves at\nthe United Nations with their position, we make it very\ndifficult to move toward recognition. I would be in\nIavor of keeping ourselves 8.3 clear as possible from\nassociation with the Chinese Nationalist position at the\nUnited Nations. I think the question of the blockade is\nextremely important. I was particularly interested in\nthe phrose from the letter of Mr. Hopkins, just read by\nMr. Robertson, to the effect that we should actively\nbreak the blockade. Regardless of the phrase that is\n= SERVICE!\nused, I think it 1s rather obvious that the blockade\ncould not continue if the United States and Britain\ntook an active position against it. The blockade, let's\nsay, arose independently of our will, but its continuance\nis dependent on the assumption of a certain position of\nacquiescence on our part.\nIn"
}