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CONPIDENTIAL s. "NATIONAL -50- RECORDS a SERVICE* term. To try to hold Formosa with troops would give so much ideological ammunition to the Chinese Communists that it would unite China more readily against U.S. The more pressure we bring, the more we can expect hostility in return. The Chinese Communists are prone to regard us as imperialists who are threatening them; they are suspicious of us, they are always talking about spies and saboteurs coming from us, and they have got to have us as enemies to hold their system together. The more we play the role of enemy the more we play into their hands in that respect. Now if Formosa were an absolute life and death matter to us, that would perhaps take precedence, but I think we have got to consider all of Asia as a life and death proposition. We have got to go into places like India. To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response in China, just as our military support of Chiang Kai Shek defeated our ends because we couldn't foresee his inefficiency and that Chiang would have a lack of support, and so on. That's a specific example on Formosa. In the case of economic development, it seems to me we must give these Asiatic peoples the feoling that they will have a chance to use our resources and aid without getting too much involved in trade with us nor tied up with our economic nexus. They have in mind, from the Comminist stuff that has been fed them, that we are dangerous economically because we go into depressions, and that's a theory we have got to combat. We have com- batted it because we haven't got into depressions, but still Marxism feeds them that line. The intellectuals in Peking are being told now that the United States is in a depression; it must be, because it is a capitalist country. And so a certain kind of economic connection may seem dangerous to them. MR. STASSEN: We might focus on that economic thing for a bit. Suppose, as I envisage it, that in various areas of South Asia American economic aid is coming in and getting some results in improved crops, in slightly better living conditions, in improved water and irrigation, and all that goes with it, whereas up in the Communist area of China they are going into a really economic tail- spin. Isn't that the kind of thing that over a period of a few years would begin to make some sense and give some answer to the great promises and claims of the Communists in Asia? I don't see where you have really differed in your specifics to that kind of an approach, and I do emphasize

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    "ocrText": "CONPIDENTIAL\ns.\n\"NATIONAL\n-50-\nRECORDS\na\nSERVICE*\nterm. To try to hold Formosa with troops would give so\nmuch ideological ammunition to the Chinese Communists\nthat it would unite China more readily against U.S. The\nmore pressure we bring, the more we can expect hostility\nin return. The Chinese Communists are prone to regard\nus as imperialists who are threatening them; they are\nsuspicious of us, they are always talking about spies and\nsaboteurs coming from us, and they have got to have us as\nenemies to hold their system together. The more we play\nthe role of enemy the more we play into their hands in\nthat respect. Now if Formosa were an absolute life and\ndeath matter to us, that would perhaps take precedence,\nbut I think we have got to consider all of Asia as a life\nand death proposition. We have got to go into places\nlike India. To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a\nmiscalculation of the response in China, just as our\nmilitary support of Chiang Kai Shek defeated our ends\nbecause we couldn't foresee his inefficiency and that\nChiang would have a lack of support, and so on. That's\na specific example on Formosa.\nIn the case of economic development, it seems to me\nwe must give these Asiatic peoples the feoling that they\nwill have a chance to use our resources and aid without\ngetting too much involved in trade with us nor tied up\nwith our economic nexus. They have in mind, from the\nComminist stuff that has been fed them, that we are\ndangerous economically because we go into depressions,\nand that's a theory we have got to combat. We have com-\nbatted it because we haven't got into depressions, but\nstill Marxism feeds them that line. The intellectuals\nin Peking are being told now that the United States is in\na\ndepression; it must be, because it is a capitalist\ncountry. And so a certain kind of economic connection\nmay seem dangerous to them.\nMR. STASSEN: We might focus on that economic thing\nfor a bit. Suppose, as I envisage it, that in various\nareas of South Asia American economic aid is coming in\nand getting some results in improved crops, in slightly\nbetter living conditions, in improved water and irrigation,\nand all that goes with it, whereas up in the Communist\narea of China they are going into a really economic tail-\nspin. Isn't that the kind of thing that over a period of\na few years would begin to make some sense and give some\nanswer to the great promises and claims of the Communists\nin Asia? I don't see where you have really differed in\nyour specifics to that kind of an approach, and I do\nemphasize"
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