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4-6
These were well handled and with the manifest advantages of interior lines,
despite overwhelming superiority of the Japanese air force in numbers some re-
sistance in the air had been maintained. Russia has stopped sending planes,
and since September this year Japanese planes are much superior in quality as
well as in absolute numbers, so that today no existing Chinese planes could
take the air. The effect of constant bombing on the Chinese troops, and .
pecially on the civilians in the principal cities, without the possibility of
any defence, is telling on the general morale.
4. In the present military situstion by coucentrating on a fow strategie
centers in China the Japanese could withdran a large pertion of their aray and
transports, because the hardy and seasoned Chinese aray could not counter-attack
well fortified areas without air-suppert. With air-support on a moderate scale
they could easily recapture Canton and Hankos, and oblige the Japanese to retain
their forces in China. As experience has shown, operating on interior lines an
air force of say 500 planes will certainly contain an enomy air force of four
times their number. In addition, the presence of this striking force, which
could be based on Chinese air fields near the coast vould, by its threat to Japan
proper, Formosa, and their newly acquired base in Hainan, act as a most effective
deterrent to Japanese designs on Singapore and Dutch East Indies.
5. This Special Air Unit need not exceed 200 modern bombers and 300 pur-
suits but must be adequately manned and staffed, and above all serviced by requi-
site mechanics and ground organisation. While Chinese pilots and mechanics are
available in part, it is clear that for the greatest efficieney personnel from
the British and American Training Centers should be drawn upon, these foreign
pilots forming a special Air Unit. Special consideration must be given to the
status of this force, according to the political development of the situation
in the Far East.
ARCHIVES NATIONAL RECORDS SERVICE* AND
is
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"ocrText": "(2)\n37\n4-6\nThese were well handled and with the manifest advantages of interior lines,\ndespite overwhelming superiority of the Japanese air force in numbers some re-\nsistance in the air had been maintained. Russia has stopped sending planes,\nand since September this year Japanese planes are much superior in quality as\nwell as in absolute numbers, so that today no existing Chinese planes could\ntake the air. The effect of constant bombing on the Chinese troops, and .\npecially on the civilians in the principal cities, without the possibility of\nany defence, is telling on the general morale.\n4. In the present military situstion by coucentrating on a fow strategie\ncenters in China the Japanese could withdran a large pertion of their aray and\ntransports, because the hardy and seasoned Chinese aray could not counter-attack\nwell fortified areas without air-suppert. With air-support on a moderate scale\nthey could easily recapture Canton and Hankos, and oblige the Japanese to retain\ntheir forces in China. As experience has shown, operating on interior lines an\nair force of say 500 planes will certainly contain an enomy air force of four\ntimes their number. In addition, the presence of this striking force, which\ncould be based on Chinese air fields near the coast vould, by its threat to Japan\nproper, Formosa, and their newly acquired base in Hainan, act as a most effective\ndeterrent to Japanese designs on Singapore and Dutch East Indies.\n5. This Special Air Unit need not exceed 200 modern bombers and 300 pur-\nsuits but must be adequately manned and staffed, and above all serviced by requi-\nsite mechanics and ground organisation. While Chinese pilots and mechanics are\navailable in part, it is clear that for the greatest efficieney personnel from\nthe British and American Training Centers should be drawn upon, these foreign\npilots forming a special Air Unit. Special consideration must be given to the\nstatus of this force, according to the political development of the situation\nin the Far East.\nARCHIVES NATIONAL RECORDS SERVICE* AND\nis"
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