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{
    "localId": "750252",
    "label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: China: \"Documents on Diplomatic Aspects of Efforts by the United States to Supply China with Materials of War under the Lend-Lease Act, 1940-47\": Part IV:  1944 - 1947",
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    "title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: China: \"Documents on Diplomatic Aspects of Efforts by the United States to Supply China with Materials of War under the Lend-Lease Act, 1940-47\": Part IV:  1944 - 1947",
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    "seq": 48,
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    "ocrText": "556\n[Mar. 29, '44]\n80. -/\nto Brit. Emb.\nIII\npay\nLA:ALM\nAIDE MEMOIRE\nMAR 2/01944\nThe cosition in regard to civilly China has\nbeen the cause of concern to the U.K. author some time past,\nand they have been considering what steps might usefully be taken to\nimprove the present somewhat unsatisfactory situation.\nAs far as the U.K. authorities themselves are concerned\nthey are naturally anxious to do whatever they can, subject to con-\nsiderations of suroly and transport, to meet the organs which the\nChinese Government wish to place in the U.K, present cir-\ncumstances, however, they find great diffiniat in dealing with in-\ndividual Chinese orders owing to their lack of information on a\nnumber of very relevant boints. For example it is important for the\nU.K. authorities, in present conditions of shortages of materials\nand production canacities, to know before deciding whether or not to\naccent a Chinese order the degree of importance or essentiality which\nshould be placed on the varticular order. Otherwise there is a risk\nof valuable production facilities in the U.K. or much needed shipping\nsnace being used for articles which subsecuently turn out to be of\nlittle real value to the Chinese war economy. The essentiality of\nthese Chinese orders can only be esteblished on the snot in China,\nbut -at present the machinery for doing so is lacking.\nAgain, it is important for the U.K. authorities before\ndeciding whether to make supolies available in response to a request\nfrom the Chinese, to be sure that a similar order has not been\nplaced elsewhere or duolicated by some other department of the\nChinese Government. But at present the absence of information re-\ngarding the commercial orders placed or being placed by the Chinese\nauthorities in the U.S. or of the supplies being made available to\nthem under Lend-Lease makes it difficult for the U.K. authorities\nwhen considering Chinese recuests addressed to them to be sure that\nno such duolication is teking place.\nFurthermore as long as the Chinese are dependent upon air\ntransnort for obtaining their supplies from the U.K. and U.S., it\n8 93.24\nis inevitable that only a very small ^roportion of the goods which\nthey want and which the two countries can subply can in fact reach\nChina. It is obviously desirable that the best use should be made\nof the limited space available for the import of civilian supplies\ninto China and that those supplies which are flown into China\nshould be those which the Chinese most urgently need. It is\nequally desirable that as long as transnortation facilities are so\nstrictly limited, scarce materials or valuable productive capacity\nshould not be devoted to producing goods which have no chance of\nreaching China within the period during which they are recuired.\nNowever, unless and until some closer coordination between Chinese\nrequirements and U.S. and U.K. supply policy and supoly action can\nbe established it will be impossible to achieve these objectives.\nSERVICE\nFinally it is important that in arranging for supplies to\nChina, regard should be had to the transport facilities, storage capa-\ncity, etc., available in India. Otherwise there will be a risk of\nvaluable stores being mislaid or deteriorating, or of an undue strain\nbeing placed on transport and other facilities at a time when mili-\ntary operations are laying a heavy burden on them. In the absence,\nhowever, of some coordination of information regarding civilian\nsupplies despatched from the U.K. and the U.S. to India for onward\ntransport to China it is difficult to guard against this danger.\nIt is of course true that the contribution in respect\nof civilian supplies which the U.K. can a t present make to Chine is\nsmall compared with that of the U.S., but this fact does not make the\nsupply problems of the U.K. any simpler -- as will indeed be seen\nw\nfrom the specific cases of difficulty quoted in the first annex to\nthis note -- nor make the need for a full understanding between the\nU.K. and U.S. on supply policy and sunoly procedure with regard to\nChina any less.\n20\nso\nIn the/"
}