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C-46
DOCUMENT L
(Continued)
THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that
operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in
their relation to the predominating importance of
OVERLORD, He was astounded at. the demands for
BUCCANEER which thad reached him from the Supreme
Commander. Although there were only 5,000 Japanese
in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required
to capture it: As he understood it, the Americans
had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds
of two and a half to one. In the fáce of Marshal
Stalin's prómise that Russia would come dinto the
war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had
lost a good deal of their value; whileror the other
hand their cost has been put up to a prohibitive extent.
THE PRIME MINISTERooneluded by observing that
there were still very large differences of, opinion
between the British and American Delegations, and
that it was of the first importance that these
differences should be cleared away
SIR ALAN BROOKE said
The following matters
were still outstanding: First; an examination of
the landing eraft position, without which it was im-
possible to say what operations could or could not
be undertaken; second, the long term plan for the
defeat of Japan, which in its turnowas affected by
the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma
next March. The plan was also sériously. affected by
Marshal Stalin's promise to makeiwarion Japan as
soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential
that these problems should be resolved before the
Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean
was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to
let up in that area We should go on hitting. the
Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every
place that we could. Finally, the question of
ANVIL was still under examination and it was essential
to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.
GENERAL MARSHALL expressed agreement with General
Brooke's observations. There was no question that
there were a number of important points to be settled.
It was impossible to say how long this settlement
would take; and thereafter there would be the business
of surveying ways and means.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nC-46\nDOCUMENT L\n(Continued)\nTHE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that\noperations in Southeast Asia must be judged in\ntheir relation to the predominating importance of\nOVERLORD, He was astounded at. the demands for\nBUCCANEER which thad reached him from the Supreme\nCommander. Although there were only 5,000 Japanese\nin the island, 58,000 men were apparently required\nto capture it: As he understood it, the Americans\nhad been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds\nof two and a half to one. In the fáce of Marshal\nStalin's prómise that Russia would come dinto the\nwar, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had\nlost a good deal of their value; whileror the other\nhand their cost has been put up to a prohibitive extent.\nTHE PRIME MINISTERooneluded by observing that\nthere were still very large differences of, opinion\nbetween the British and American Delegations, and\nthat it was of the first importance that these\ndifferences should be cleared away\nSIR ALAN BROOKE said\nThe following matters\nwere still outstanding: First; an examination of\nthe landing eraft position, without which it was im-\npossible to say what operations could or could not\nbe undertaken; second, the long term plan for the\ndefeat of Japan, which in its turnowas affected by\nthe decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma\nnext March. The plan was also sériously. affected by\nMarshal Stalin's promise to makeiwarion Japan as\nsoon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential\nthat these problems should be resolved before the\nCombined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean\nwas of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to\nlet up in that area We should go on hitting. the\nGermans as hard as we possibly could, and in every\nplace that we could. Finally, the question of\nANVIL was still under examination and it was essential\nto decide how the necessary resources could be provided.\nGENERAL MARSHALL expressed agreement with General\nBrooke's observations. There was no question that\nthere were a number of important points to be settled.\nIt was impossible to say how long this settlement\nwould take; and thereafter there would be the business\nof surveying ways and means.\nSECRET"
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