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G-10
forthcoming on any point (Doc. MM, p. G- 109).
The United States Delegation submitted a memorandum
on the same day accepting the proposal for four protocols,
but specifying that the general protocol should Ti state
the fact regarding the 11th September decision, and also
the position with reference thereto of the Soviet Union
taken on 22nd September", and that "the special protocols
to be signed by four, three, and two, respectively"
would contain a head-note stating the fact that the non-
signatory members were present pursuant to invitation,
but did not vote, up to 22nd September, following which
date there were no further treaty discussions" . The
memorandum proposed that until agreement could be reached
on this question and that of the calling of a peace con-
ference, the Deputies should consider general matters
only, and not the drawing up of treaty terms. If agree-
ment could not be reached, then other procedure for making
the peace should be sought (Doc. KK, p. G-103).
The American position was supported by the British
(Doc. AA, p. G- 78), Chinese (Doc. EE, p. 89) , and
French (Doc. HH, p. G- 100) Delegations. When it became
evident that Mr. Molotov was determined not to yield on
any point, there appeared to be nothing to be gained in
continuing the conference, and it was adjourned (Doc. LL,
p. G-104) :
In his radio report on the First Session of the
Council Secretary Byrnes, reviewing the procedural
difficulties which had broken up the session, stated
that the Soviet interpretation of the Berlin Agreement
was incorrect in the opinion of the United States and
British Governments. Referring to China and France, he
said that the United States was willing to dictate the
terms of peace to an enemy but not to its Allies. He also
reported his proposal, made with considerable reluctance" 11
to ask the Chinese and French Foreign Ministers to accept
the Soviet position on procedure if agreement could be
reachéd to convoke "a truly representative peace conference"
before the end of the year. He concluded by stating his
hope that the Soviet Government would agree to the con-
vocation of such a conference (Doc. MM, p. G-109).
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nG-10\nforthcoming on any point (Doc. MM, p. G- 109).\nThe United States Delegation submitted a memorandum\non the same day accepting the proposal for four protocols,\nbut specifying that the general protocol should Ti state\nthe fact regarding the 11th September decision, and also\nthe position with reference thereto of the Soviet Union\ntaken on 22nd September\", and that \"the special protocols\nto be signed by four, three, and two, respectively\"\nwould contain a head-note stating the fact that the non-\nsignatory members were present pursuant to invitation,\nbut did not vote, up to 22nd September, following which\ndate there were no further treaty discussions\" . The\nmemorandum proposed that until agreement could be reached\non this question and that of the calling of a peace con-\nference, the Deputies should consider general matters\nonly, and not the drawing up of treaty terms. If agree-\nment could not be reached, then other procedure for making\nthe peace should be sought (Doc. KK, p. G-103).\nThe American position was supported by the British\n(Doc. AA, p. G- 78), Chinese (Doc. EE, p. 89) , and\nFrench (Doc. HH, p. G- 100) Delegations. When it became\nevident that Mr. Molotov was determined not to yield on\nany point, there appeared to be nothing to be gained in\ncontinuing the conference, and it was adjourned (Doc. LL,\np. G-104) :\nIn his radio report on the First Session of the\nCouncil Secretary Byrnes, reviewing the procedural\ndifficulties which had broken up the session, stated\nthat the Soviet interpretation of the Berlin Agreement\nwas incorrect in the opinion of the United States and\nBritish Governments. Referring to China and France, he\nsaid that the United States was willing to dictate the\nterms of peace to an enemy but not to its Allies. He also\nreported his proposal, made with considerable reluctance\" 11\nto ask the Chinese and French Foreign Ministers to accept\nthe Soviet position on procedure if agreement could be\nreachéd to convoke \"a truly representative peace conference\"\nbefore the end of the year. He concluded by stating his\nhope that the Soviet Government would agree to the con-\nvocation of such a conference (Doc. MM, p. G-109).\nSECRET"
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