Ask the Scholar
Page 676 of 709
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
FOR SECRET
H-116
DOCUMENT P
E. O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and S(D) 1928 or 194
DEC! ASSIFIED
By Dept. NLT- HIS NARS Dall, 7-20-76
of State letter, Aug. 9.
EXTRACT
Memorandum of Conversation among
the Three Foreign Ministers,
December 23, 1945, 12 noon
3. North China
MR. MOLOTOV asked the Secretary if he had any- -
thing further to say on north China in the light of
the Soviet memorandum of December 21.
1
THE SECRETARY said that he had discussed this
question three times with Mr. Molotov and he had
submitted a paper on the subject and also sent
Mr. Molotov a copy of the President's statement. He
felt he had nothing to add. He did note, however,
that the Soviet memorandum to which Mr. Molotov
referred revealed that his statements both in writing
and orally had not cleared up Soviet nisunderstand-
ings. For example, it was stated in the Soviet
memorandum that American troops would remain in China
in order to restore stability in that country. This
was not true since the American troops would be
removed as soon as the problem of the disarming of
the Japanese had been settled. -He had explained in
great detail why this was a complicated question and
might take some time, but the United States felt that
it was its duty to carry out this task and to help
Chiang effect a surrender of these Japanese forces.
He pointed out that the Japanese surrender had
placed the responsibility upon the Soviet Union for
the surrender of the Japanese troops in Manchuria
and on the Chinese Government for those in north
China. Chiang Kai-shek had asked for patience and
more time in order to carry out his responsibility
and the United States Government was prepared to be
patient with a friendly and Allied government. He
said that in the last analysis if the Chinese Gov-
ernment was unable to do this it would then devolve
upon the United States to do it with their own forces.
He had also explained to Mr. Molotov the difficulty
in regard to shipping and the efforts we were making
to expedite the evacuation of the Japanese. He said
1Doc. I, Encl. 1, p. H- 102.
TOP SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 676
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 4a514d46a71021f1
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 750274
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "750274",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750274",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Far Eastern Conference Discussions: November, 1949",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750274",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 709,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "750274",
"label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Far Eastern Conference Discussions: November, 1949",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750274"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "750274",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750274",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Far Eastern Conference Discussions: November, 1949",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750274",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 709,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750274",
"naId": 750274,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 676,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750274/750274-01-676.jpg",
"mediaId": "4a514d46a71021f1",
"ocrText": "FOR SECRET\nH-116\nDOCUMENT P\nE. O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and S(D) 1928 or 194\nDEC! ASSIFIED\nBy Dept. NLT- HIS NARS Dall, 7-20-76\nof State letter, Aug. 9.\nEXTRACT\nMemorandum of Conversation among\nthe Three Foreign Ministers,\nDecember 23, 1945, 12 noon\n3. North China\nMR. MOLOTOV asked the Secretary if he had any- -\nthing further to say on north China in the light of\nthe Soviet memorandum of December 21.\n1\nTHE SECRETARY said that he had discussed this\nquestion three times with Mr. Molotov and he had\nsubmitted a paper on the subject and also sent\nMr. Molotov a copy of the President's statement. He\nfelt he had nothing to add. He did note, however,\nthat the Soviet memorandum to which Mr. Molotov\nreferred revealed that his statements both in writing\nand orally had not cleared up Soviet nisunderstand-\nings. For example, it was stated in the Soviet\nmemorandum that American troops would remain in China\nin order to restore stability in that country. This\nwas not true since the American troops would be\nremoved as soon as the problem of the disarming of\nthe Japanese had been settled. -He had explained in\ngreat detail why this was a complicated question and\nmight take some time, but the United States felt that\nit was its duty to carry out this task and to help\nChiang effect a surrender of these Japanese forces.\nHe pointed out that the Japanese surrender had\nplaced the responsibility upon the Soviet Union for\nthe surrender of the Japanese troops in Manchuria\nand on the Chinese Government for those in north\nChina. Chiang Kai-shek had asked for patience and\nmore time in order to carry out his responsibility\nand the United States Government was prepared to be\npatient with a friendly and Allied government. He\nsaid that in the last analysis if the Chinese Gov-\nernment was unable to do this it would then devolve\nupon the United States to do it with their own forces.\nHe had also explained to Mr. Molotov the difficulty\nin regard to shipping and the efforts we were making\nto expedite the evacuation of the Japanese. He said\n1Doc. I, Encl. 1, p. H- 102.\nTOP SECRET"
}