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C-10
Staff for the purpose of discussing operations for
the recapture of Burma (Doc. C, p. C-22)
At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
the next day, November 24; 1943, General Marshall
reported on the discussion he had had with the
Generalissimo regarding operations in the Southeast
Asia Command, in which the Generalissimo had
stipulated that there must be an amphibious operation
simultaneous with the land attack in Burma, and
had suggested action against the Andaman Islands.
After the Chinese representatives jointed the meeting
General Shang Chen, Director of the Foreign Affairs
Bureau of the National Military Council, reiterated
the Generalissimo's views on synchronizing naval
action in the Bay of Bengal with land operations.
General Shang also stated that the Generalissimo
was insistent that the air lift to China must not
drop below 10,000 tons a month, the amount required
to meet the needs of the Yünnan force and the Chinese
AiriForce. During the course of the ensuing dis-
cussion General Stilwell said that he had been
instructed by the Generalissimo to put forward
four points which the Generalissimo considered
essential: (1) naval and amphibious operations to
be synchronized with the land campaign; (2) the
Indaw and Imphal advances should continue. as far
as Mandalay; (3) the Yunnan force should advance
to Lashio; and (4) the meeds of the Chinese Air
Force should be met. It was finälly decided that
Admiral Mountbatten should wait on the Generalissimg
to explain the details of the plan of operations,
the reasons underlying it, the effort involved, as
well as the implications with respect to the air
lift to China (Doc. E, p. C-26).
At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
on November 25, 1943 Admiral Mountbatten made a
report on his conference with. the Generalissimo at
which the latter had again stressed the importance
of carrying out an amphibious operation simultaneousl
with land operations in Burma. Sir Alan Brooke,
Chief of the British Imperial General staff, commen-
ted, with regard to an ämphibious operation, that
the ¹Generalissimo must be told that he must wait
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nC-10\nStaff for the purpose of discussing operations for\nthe recapture of Burma (Doc. C, p. C-22)\nAt the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff\nthe next day, November 24; 1943, General Marshall\nreported on the discussion he had had with the\nGeneralissimo regarding operations in the Southeast\nAsia Command, in which the Generalissimo had\nstipulated that there must be an amphibious operation\nsimultaneous with the land attack in Burma, and\nhad suggested action against the Andaman Islands.\nAfter the Chinese representatives jointed the meeting\nGeneral Shang Chen, Director of the Foreign Affairs\nBureau of the National Military Council, reiterated\nthe Generalissimo's views on synchronizing naval\naction in the Bay of Bengal with land operations.\nGeneral Shang also stated that the Generalissimo\nwas insistent that the air lift to China must not\ndrop below 10,000 tons a month, the amount required\nto meet the needs of the Yünnan force and the Chinese\nAiriForce. During the course of the ensuing dis-\ncussion General Stilwell said that he had been\ninstructed by the Generalissimo to put forward\nfour points which the Generalissimo considered\nessential: (1) naval and amphibious operations to\nbe synchronized with the land campaign; (2) the\nIndaw and Imphal advances should continue. as far\nas Mandalay; (3) the Yunnan force should advance\nto Lashio; and (4) the meeds of the Chinese Air\nForce should be met. It was finälly decided that\nAdmiral Mountbatten should wait on the Generalissimg\nto explain the details of the plan of operations,\nthe reasons underlying it, the effort involved, as\nwell as the implications with respect to the air\nlift to China (Doc. E, p. C-26).\nAt the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff\non November 25, 1943 Admiral Mountbatten made a\nreport on his conference with. the Generalissimo at\nwhich the latter had again stressed the importance\nof carrying out an amphibious operation simultaneousl\nwith land operations in Burma. Sir Alan Brooke,\nChief of the British Imperial General staff, commen-\nted, with regard to an ämphibious operation, that\nthe ¹Generalissimo must be told that he must wait\nTOP SECBET"
}