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C-14
to Mr. Churchill, "would depend much more upon the
supplies she received over the hump". During the
discussion the Prime Minister said that "he did not
feel committed to an amphibious operation on any
specific date in Southeast Asia", and added that he
"had not realized that the amphibious operation was
directly related to and bound up with TARZAN". The
conferees finally decided to inquire of Admiral
Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could
carry out on a "smaller scale than BUCCANEER" " if the
bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping were
withdrawn in the immediately following weeks
(Doc. M', p. C-50)
In accordance with the suggestion made by the
Prime Minister at the Fourth Plenary Meeting,
President Roosevelt sent a message to the Generalissimo
on December 5, 1943 stating that because of landing-
craft requirements for operations in Europe, which
gave "fair prospect of terminating war with Germany
by end of summer of 1944." it was not practicable to
devote a sufficient number of these craft !to the
amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal simultaneous ly
with launching of Tarzan to insure success of opera-
tions". In view of this circumstance the President
asked the Generalissimo whether: (1) he was prepared
to go ahead with TARZAN "including commitment to main-
tain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with
naval carrier and oommando amphibious raiding opera-
tions simultaneous with launching of Tarzan"; or wheth-
er (2) he preferred to delay TARZAN until November,
when 'heavy amphibious operation" could be included.
The President closed his message with the statement:
"I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous
advantage to be received by China and the Pacific
through the early termination of the war with Germany"
(Doc. N, p. C-56).
The Generalissimo! replies, dated December 8 and
17, 1943, reflected his disappointment at the change
in plans. In the message of December 8 Generalissin
Chiang stated: "I am inclined to accept your rec-
commendation" Then, after pointing out the critical
situation in which China found itself as a result of
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nC-14\nto Mr. Churchill, \"would depend much more upon the\nsupplies she received over the hump\". During the\ndiscussion the Prime Minister said that \"he did not\nfeel committed to an amphibious operation on any\nspecific date in Southeast Asia\", and added that he\n\"had not realized that the amphibious operation was\ndirectly related to and bound up with TARZAN\". The\nconferees finally decided to inquire of Admiral\nMountbatten what amphibious operations he could\ncarry out on a \"smaller scale than BUCCANEER\" \" if the\nbulk of his landing craft and assault shipping were\nwithdrawn in the immediately following weeks\n(Doc. M', p. C-50)\nIn accordance with the suggestion made by the\nPrime Minister at the Fourth Plenary Meeting,\nPresident Roosevelt sent a message to the Generalissimo\non December 5, 1943 stating that because of landing-\ncraft requirements for operations in Europe, which\ngave \"fair prospect of terminating war with Germany\nby end of summer of 1944.\" it was not practicable to\ndevote a sufficient number of these craft !to the\namphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal simultaneous ly\nwith launching of Tarzan to insure success of opera-\ntions\". In view of this circumstance the President\nasked the Generalissimo whether: (1) he was prepared\nto go ahead with TARZAN \"including commitment to main-\ntain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with\nnaval carrier and oommando amphibious raiding opera-\ntions simultaneous with launching of Tarzan\"; or wheth-\ner (2) he preferred to delay TARZAN until November,\nwhen 'heavy amphibious operation\" could be included.\nThe President closed his message with the statement:\n\"I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous\nadvantage to be received by China and the Pacific\nthrough the early termination of the war with Germany\"\n(Doc. N, p. C-56).\nThe Generalissimo! replies, dated December 8 and\n17, 1943, reflected his disappointment at the change\nin plans. In the message of December 8 Generalissin\nChiang stated: \"I am inclined to accept your rec-\ncommendation\" Then, after pointing out the critical\nsituation in which China found itself as a result of\nTOP SECRET"
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