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SECRET
D.
*** C-23
DOCUMENT C
(Continued)
THE PRIME MINISTER said that naval operations
in the Bay of Bengal would not necessarily be
coordinated with and linked to the land campaign.
Our naval superiority in this area should ensure the
security of our communications and a threat to those
of the : enemy
THE GENERALISSIMO considered that the enemy would
reinforce Burma and that this could only be stopped
by vigorous naval operations.
THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be disastrous
if we could do nothing to prevent the Japanese bring-
ing large reinforcements by sea through the Malacca
and Sunda Straits. We. could not guarantee to cut
off reinforcements by sea entirely, but we should do
everything to prevent their arrival.
THE GENERALISSIMO said he was not clear as to
the timing of the concentration of the naval forces
in the Indian Ocean. He was convinced that simultaneous
naval and land operations gave the best chance of
success for the operations. Burma was the key to
the whole campaign in Asia. After he had been cleared
out of Burma, the enemy's next stand would be in North
China and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma
would be a very serious matter to the Japanese and
they would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to retain
their hold on the country.
THE PRIME MINISTER said he was unable to agree
that the success of the land operations entirely hinged
on a simultaneous naval concentration. The fleet could
not, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed,
until some time later. The ships had to be tropicalized
and fitted with special equipment. Some would be start-
ing soon, but the build-up to full strength would not
be achieved until the late spring or early summer of
1944. It seemed, however, on the whole improbable
that in the meanwhile the enemy would send naval
forces in any strength to the Bay of Bengal.
DECLASSIFIED
O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) end 9-15-75 story as
of State letter Are a
$979
BV Dept. NLT- H NAK3 palta 2-20-26
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nD.\n*** C-23\nDOCUMENT C\n(Continued)\nTHE PRIME MINISTER said that naval operations\nin the Bay of Bengal would not necessarily be\ncoordinated with and linked to the land campaign.\nOur naval superiority in this area should ensure the\nsecurity of our communications and a threat to those\nof the : enemy\nTHE GENERALISSIMO considered that the enemy would\nreinforce Burma and that this could only be stopped\nby vigorous naval operations.\nTHE PRIME MINISTER said it would be disastrous\nif we could do nothing to prevent the Japanese bring-\ning large reinforcements by sea through the Malacca\nand Sunda Straits. We. could not guarantee to cut\noff reinforcements by sea entirely, but we should do\neverything to prevent their arrival.\nTHE GENERALISSIMO said he was not clear as to\nthe timing of the concentration of the naval forces\nin the Indian Ocean. He was convinced that simultaneous\nnaval and land operations gave the best chance of\nsuccess for the operations. Burma was the key to\nthe whole campaign in Asia. After he had been cleared\nout of Burma, the enemy's next stand would be in North\nChina and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma\nwould be a very serious matter to the Japanese and\nthey would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to retain\ntheir hold on the country.\nTHE PRIME MINISTER said he was unable to agree\nthat the success of the land operations entirely hinged\non a simultaneous naval concentration. The fleet could\nnot, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed,\nuntil some time later. The ships had to be tropicalized\nand fitted with special equipment. Some would be start-\ning soon, but the build-up to full strength would not\nbe achieved until the late spring or early summer of\n1944. It seemed, however, on the whole improbable\nthat in the meanwhile the enemy would send naval\nforces in any strength to the Bay of Bengal.\nDECLASSIFIED\nO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) end 9-15-75 story as\nof State letter Are a\n$979\nBV Dept. NLT- H NAK3 palta 2-20-26\nSECRET"
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